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The metric of entropy provides a measure about the randomness of data and a
measure of information gained by comparing different attributes. Intrusion detection
systems can collect very large amounts of data, which are not necessarily manageable by
manual means. Collected intrusion detection data often contains redundant, duplicate, and
irrelevant entries, which makes analysis computationally intensive likely leading to
unreliable results. Reducing the data to what is relevant and pertinent to the analysis
requires the use of data mining techniques and statistics. Identifying patterns in the data is
part of analysis for intrusion detections in which the patterns are categorized as normal or
anomalous. Anomalous data needs to be further characterized to determine if
representative attacks to the network are in progress. Often time subtleties in the data
may be too muted to identify certain types of attacks. Many statistics including entropy
are used in a number of analysis techniques for identifying attacks, but these analyzes can
be improved upon. This research expands the use of Approximate entropy and Sample
entropy for feature selection and attack analysis to identify specific types of subtle attacks
to network systems. Through enhanced analysis techniques using entropy, the granularity
of feature selection and attack identification is improved.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background

Intrusion detection systems help identify malicious and dangerous attacks sent to
networks and computers while allowing normal traffic to arrive at its intended destination.
In order for intrusion detection systems to identify harmful traffic to computers and
networks, packets of data are classified to determine if the contents contain malicious
actions or not. Fields of data representing the traffic flow must be collected and analyzed
to determine which traffic may pass and which traffic is blocked. The two primary
methods used for intrusion detection are signature-based systems and anomaly based
systems. A signature based system attempts to match specific patterns in the packets
traversing the network for byte strings which are known to be malicious. Anomaly based
systems analyze the statistics of the traffic to determine if the packet is malicious.
Data for intrusion detection systems may be collected from multiple sources such
as system access logs and activity logs. As these disparate sources merge into a single
corpus of data with many records that may provide insight into the collected activity.
Each record contains fields that provide information about the activity that the record
represents. Some of the fields may contain similar, irrelevant, or missing data, which
could potentially cloud the analysis and the overall quality of data. The amount of data
collected may also be quite large and impractical to analyze.
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For anomaly intrusion detection, fields within the data files are referred to as
features. These features describe a particular aspect of information in the record. Since
there may be duplicate and irrelevant features contained within the data, using only those
features directed at the analysis reduces the computing resources and may improve the
accuracy of the resulting analysis. The process of selecting the data, to include only
needed features, is termed feature selection. The goal of feature selection is to use only
the fields that represent the packet activity while maintaining the integrity of the record
and the integrity of entire data set.
There are different methods available to select these pertinent features based on
statistics by using one or more algorithms such as used in artificial intelligence, clustering,
classification, statistics, and specialized applications targeting specific problems. There
are no generic solutions to detect each different type of intrusion or anomalous activity.
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Problem Statement

This research addresses the problem of reducing the number of features and
correctly identifying relevant features from a set of collected data for an anomaly-based
intrusion detection system while maintaining integrity of the data. Data acquired for an
intrusion detection system frequently originates from multiple sources such as system
activity logs, content of data packets and headers, system calls, memory and disk access
activities, and other information. Intrusion detection systems may also share these logs
among other network devices for collaboration in a distributed manner. Reducing the
amount of data to that which is relevant requires categorizing the information from the
logs into parameters, also referred to as dimensions. In a data set of network traffic,
attacks are identified by the selection of features that represent particular activities. This
implies that not all attacks are found by the same selection of features in all cases.
Research conducted by Lima, de Assis, and de Souza (2012) using the KDD CUP 99
(KDD Cup 99 Data, 1999) data resulted in a different set of attributes for each of the four
major attack types. Without reducing the number of features, detecting attack patterns
within the data is more difficult for rule generation, forecasting, or classification (Gheyas
& Smith, 2010). One of the problems is that not all of the features are important
(Velayutham & Thangavel, 2012). Identifying and eliminating redundant and irrelevant
features within the data, while maintaining the integrity of the corpus, results in features
which succinctly describe the activity recorded. Reducing the number of features
pertinent to intrusion detection analysis provides better data manageability, lowers
computing resource requirements, and usually better results.

3

Dissertation Goal

The goal of this research is to present a new method that correctly identifies
relevant features from an intrusion detection dataset that reduces the amount of data
required for anomalous activity detection while maintaining the integrity of the data set.
By reducing the redundant features, irrelevant features, and noise, better results may be
gained in the analysis of the data for identifying anomalous activities.
The expected results of this research included the following goals:
1. Methods to identify relevant features and minimize the number of features
selected from a source of network traffic data without altering the characteristics
of the data representation.
2. Compare results of correctly classified and incorrectly classified as percentages,
and the features selected with those published by Sharma and Mukjherjee (2012),
and Lima, et al., (2012) for the KDD CUP 99 data (KDD Cup 99 Data, 1999).
3. Using real-world data from the SRI Cyber-Threat Analysis Project, apply the
methods used in goals 1 and 2 to compare and contrast the results with a second
set of data for correctly classification of attacks and the features selected from the
analysis.
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Relevance and Significance
This research focuses on methods that select features from a set of intrusion
detection system data in an efficient manner while maintaining the integrity of the data to
represent the traffic and events collected. Many approaches have addressed the problem
of feature selection. Even with the successes, a significant amount of work is still needed
to find improved methods of feature selection from intrusion detection system data.
Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, and Ghorbani (2009) state that current approaches to intrusion
detection are not a mature technology. This problem is still relvant as identified by the
research of Zuech, Khoshgoftaar, and Wald (2015). Improving detection and feature
selection are important to provide better analysis results for anomaly detection in
identifying attacks on network systems.
Data sources from intrusion detection systems provide a large quantity of data for
analysis. Since most of the raw intrusion detection data sets contain duplicate and
irrelevant features, the selection of significant and relevant features is important. The
feature selection process attempts to discard superfluous data and noise, which in turn
reduces the overall volume of the data set while maintaining its integrity. This reduced
data set, in turn, yields to a faster and more accurate analysis. In order to carry out this
data reduction effort, classification applications analyze the data and identify appropriate
categories. In addition to the classification, elimination of redundant features from the
data is necessary. Without doing so makes patterns more difficult to detect (Gheyas &
Smith, 2010).
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Barriers and Issues
The problem presented is an on-going issue for selecting features within a data set
that accurately represents the activity of the collected data. Often these files are large
since they are generated from disparate sources. The quantity of data must be reduced
and categorized into a set of events called attributes (Lima et al., 2012). Within the large
files, the data must be normalized and attributes that best represent the activity must be
present, while duplicate and non-essential information is eliminated. This may result in
improved performance and outcome. Having clean and usable data provides the analytic
applications with a higher probability of obtaining usable results.
This goal of efficient feature selection is not always met. Even though there may
be a large volume of anomalous data, not all attacks may appear within the data. In
addition, there may not be a sufficient number of events present to identify the anomaly
as an attack or identify it correctly. Properly identifying the features to use is a problem
since different attacks may need different attributes for the correct identification.
The research conducted by Lima, et al. (2012) used the C4.5 decision tree model
based on entropy and compared these results with three other attribute selection methods.
They conducted their evaluation was using the KDD CUP 99 (KDD Cup 99 Data, 1999)
data set.
Tavallaee et al. (2009) described the different attack categories in the
KDD CUP 99 (KDD Cup 99 Data, 1999) data in the following list.


Denial of Service Attack (DOS): denies legitimate users access to a system by
consuming computing and memory resources.
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User to Root (U2R): An attacker gains legitimate access to a system and exploits
a vulnerability to escalate their privileges to root access.



Remote to Local (R2L): A user who does not have an account for legitimate
access to a system, gains remote access to it through exploiting a vulnerability by
sending packets over a network.



Probing Attack: Gathering information about a network and its computers to
circumvent its security.

The analysis by Lima et al. (2012) used three different entropy approaches, and
each approach produced a different set of attributes for identifying the type of attack
group. Even though some of the features selected were the same, there was overlap in the
parameter selection, the results were different. Their work showed that varying
approaches affects results.
In conducting this research with a feature selection algorithm using entropy as a
factor in the classification and selection process, evaluating which entropy calculation
best fits a specific attack, attack type, or a generalized application for all attacks were
among some of the challenges for consideration. The Shannon entropy is the most
established measure of uncertainty and mutual information (Alvim, Andrés &
Palamidessi, 2010). Other entropy methods, such as the Rényi entropy and the Tsallis
entropy, shared some of the properties with Shannon's approach (Harremoës, 2006).
Lima et al. (2012) used the Rényi entropy and the Tsallis entropy as additional entropy
measures in their research.
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Alazab, Hobbs, Abawajy, and Alazab (2012) identified attack patterns within the
attack types. Their focus on the U2R attack type in which they identified four new attack
patterns: httptunnel, ps, sqlattack, and xterm. The following table detailed their
categorization of the attacks and attack patterns.

Attack Type

Attack Pattern

Probe

Ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan, mscan, saint

DoS

back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, teardrop, apache2, mailbomb,
processtable, udpstorm

U2R

Buffer_overflow, loadmodule, perl, rootkit, httptunnel, ps, sqlattack,
xterm

R2L

ftp_write, guess_password, imap, multihop, phf, spy, warezclient,
warezmaster, xlook, xsnoop, snmpguess, worm

Other research data sources, such as those referenced in research performed by
Nguyen, Franke, and Petrović (2012), used the ECLM/PKDD 2007 data and the CSIC
2010 data. Both of these data sets were tested using data from web application firewalls.
The ECLM/PKDD 2007 data was from the 18th European Conference on Machine
Learning and the 11th European Conference on Principles and Practice of Knowledge
Discovery in Databases (Gallagher, & Eliassi-Rad, 2008). Another set of data used in
research was by the Spanish National Research Council that developed the CSIC data set.
This data provided a set of http transactions from an e-commerce site. The purpose was to
test the protection of web applications (HTTP DATASET CSIC, 2010).
Even though the KDD CUP 99 data set was not an ideal source, according to
Tavallaee et al. (2009), variants include the NSL-KDD (NSL-KDD Data Set, 2009) data

8

set. This alleviated and reduced some of the problems with the original KDD CUP 99
dataset identified by Tavallaee et al. (2009).
To improve the data available for off-line intrusion detection system research,
Vasudevan, Harshini, and Selvakumar (2011) evaluated the KDD CUP 99 data set and
identified a number of shortcomings. They developed their own set of intrusion detection
system data to represent current network activities. Some of the weaknesses of the KDD
CUP 99 data set identified included:


Many of the attacks used in the data set were fixed and do not exist anymore.



Attack sophistication increased while knowledge needed to launch an attack has
decreased.



The attacks were in a naive form and do not represent network behavior.



All attacks were preplanned and mixed between host and network.

Guillén, Rodriguez, Páez, and Rodriguez (2012) also supported the concept of the
KDD CUP 99 data set being outdated. However, they qualified this statement by
indicating that the results were reliable for analysis purposes, and the data was usable to
analyze new intrusion detection approaches for machine learning or computational
intelligence. Their research included using a DARPA data set and a software package
named Spleen along with the KDD CUP 99 data. Even though the KDD CUP 99 data
contained shortfalls as noted, it was still considered satisfactory for use with the analysis
proposed for this research.
The availability of publically available labeled data sets for intrusion detection
research was limited. The KDD CUP 99 data set was the most recognizable data store
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publically available for intrusion detection research. Another set of data that was of
potential use was named PREDICT was supported by the US Department of Homeland
Security, Science & Technology Directorate. Users of PREDICT must be vetted and
agreements signed as to the nature of its usage and disclosure. PREDICT data was not
labeled, and therefore not satisfactory for this research.
Other possible data sources for use in the research included the CAIDA (n.d.) and
SRI (n.d.) data repositories. These sources contained various types of data from internet
traces. The possibility also existed that data from SRI International located in Menlo Park,
California had merit since it contained timing data and attack information to provide a
labeled data set (SRI, n.d.). In reviewing the data sources for a second analysis using
different data, it was decided that the data from SRI would be the best choice.
Another area of difficulty was the integration of new calculation algorithms into
the existing applications chosen for classification and feature selection analysis.
Depending on the openness and complexity of the applications, incorporating custom
entropy algorithms into the structure of the programs may be difficult. This challenge was
overcome by the use of tutorials and papers that described modification of analysis
applications for customized calculations.
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations

Since intrusion detection systems data often contained a collection of logs from
multiple sources, analyzing and interpreting the data was a challenge. This research made
two primary assumptions about the data. First was the quality of the data, in that each
record provides an accurate representation of the information contained within the
complete packet. The second assumption addressed the problem of consistency in the
meaning and relationship of the data across the different fields within the record. Since
one of the data sets was the KDD CUP 99, this collection of data was used in many
analyzed research projects. Although deficiencies were noted in the Barriers and Issues
section of this thesis, the KDD CUP 99 is widely accepted as a standard data store for this
type of analysis. The second set of data for this research originated from the SRI System
Design Laboratory (SRI, n.d.). Other sources considered were the PREDICT, and the
CAIDA data repository (CAIDA - The Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis, n.d.). None of these sources were as thoroughly tested and researched as the
KDD CUP 99 data.
Because the fields within each record may be an aggregation of data from more
than one source, the meanings of similar fields from each source may not be the same.
This causes inaccuracies in the calculations of results along with a potential bias of the
data, which impacts the results. There was no control of the representation of the data as
it was presented in the initial stages of the research. As the research effort progressed,
adjustments were made as needed to normalize the individual data fields for more
accurate representation of their intended meanings.
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An additional data source which has labels and time markings was collected at
SRI by their Cyber-Threat Analysis Project. An arrangement was made between the
researcher and provider for use of this data for the analysis (Personal communications
with Phillip Porras of SRI, May 25, 2014).
The researcher, to establish boundaries for this research, imposed delimiting
factors. Since Approximate entropy and Sample entropy are time based, some data,
which does not have timings associated with the records, as in the KDD CUP 99 data set,
were simulated. No research was located that assigned timings to the entries in the KDD
CUP 99 data store. Fares, Sharawy, and Zayed (2011) identified timing in their research,
where they described the taxonomy of intrusion detection but never applied it in the
analysis.
The manner of simulating periodicity within the KDD CUP 99 was established for
this research. Simulation consisted of applying different windowing sizes and statistics to
the data. One example used the order of the data as provided and assigned windowing
intervals based upon recommendations of Yentes et al. (2013). Another method was to
vary the windowing intervals. In addition, the ordering was assigned to the data analyzed
at the time. The ordering and windowing in the KDD CUP 99 data was needed and used
to calculate the Approximate entropy and Sample entropy. This research addressed the
issue of windowing with a selection of data from the KDD CUP 99 data set. Ordering of
the records by attack type represent the timing in which they occurred. The results may or
may not show that ordering was highly critical in the election of attributes for the
analysis. Experiments during the research indicated how the windowing and parametric
variation impacted the analysis.
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The second data set was from SRI. It was a series of data files including a number
of them in pcap format. Pcap stands for packet capture and contains network traffic
information. A number of Unix/Linux based utilities were available that deconstructed
the contents of pcap files. The files from SRI contained timing points and labels
incorporated within the collection.

Summary
This research provided additional viewpoints for the use of entropy in feature
selection. The number of features available in a set of data collected from intrusion
detection systems may be quite large and unmanageable for manual human manipulation
and for analysis by computer applications. By reducing the number of features in the data
set, the goal was to make it more manageable for analysis and enhance the accuracy of
the results.
This section also identified some of the challenges that made this research
difficult. One of the more challenging and difficult problems was the availability of valid
labeled data which was satisfactory for use in this context. The KDD CUP 99 data set
was the most widely used and accepted for intrusion detection research purposes. Other
sources were primarily accessed from non-public sources, which may place restrictions
on its use. SRI granted permission for this researcher to use data from its Cyber-Threat
Analysis Project for this research (Personal email Communications with SRI Researcher,
August 26, 2014).
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
This literature review is a study of research work discussing the development of
intrusion detection methods and current advances in the field and focuses on the methods
of feature selection using intrusion detection data. Within the feature selection process,
the metric of entropy is used in different aspects of data analysis. Subsections in this
chapter are:


Background of Intrusion Detection Systems



Data Mining and Feature Selection Methods



Entropy Calculations used in feature Selection



Shannon entropy



Rényi and Tsallis entropy



Approximate entropy and Sample entropy



Methods and applications used in this research

Background of Intrusion Detection Systems
Anderson (1980) introduced the concept of auditing and surveillance as a way to
improve the security of a customer’s computer systems. The research focused on the use
of security audit trails as an important role in detecting unauthorized access to a data set
or system. He also defined the concepts of threat, risk, vulnerability, attack, and
penetration. The types of intrusions identified were an internal penetration from within
the system or an attacker from outside the system via communications lines. Also
14

included was the application of statistics to collected data in order to identify abnormal
use of the systems. For systems with a large number of users, it was necessary to reduce
the volume of the data. One of the methods proposed by Anderson was through sampling
data on a periodic basis. These techniques proposed some of the first methods to monitor
the security of computer systems.
Denning (1986) expanded the concept of intrusion detection and developed a
model for a real-time intrusion detection system. Denning proposed using a real-time
collection of audit records from attempted break-ins, system penetrations, and abuses
through the use of system monitoring. Abnormal use information was categorized into
bundles, called tuples, and models were applied to the data. Denning's analysis detected a
wide range of intrusions. Some of the detected intrusions identified were without
knowledge of system vulnerabilities.
As the complexity of systems grew, the quantity of collected data increased to the
point where manual processing was impractical and automation was needed.
Development of automated systems that merged data from multiple sources provided a
vast array of different aspects of system activity. Collections, such as these, result in
many dimensions, including possible duplicates, irrelevant features, and general noise.
Identifying anomalous behavior from bloated data sets produced bad results and taxed
computational resources (Lima et al., 2012).
As data was collected from the system and the network device logs, it was
analyzed, and the results used to protect the systems by developing information, which
analyzed the traffic and determined if an attack might be taking place. Determining if an
attack took place was the result of analyzed system and network device logs. Through

15

this effort, different techniques to identify intrusions were developed. The two main
approaches to categorize intrusion detection systems were misuse detection, and anomaly
detection (Sharma, & Mukherjee, 2012). A misuse-based system examined the packets
looking for patterns and signatures of known attacks on the network. Anomaly based
systems used statistical analysis to compare features of the traffic with a profile of what
normal traffic flow should look like. A majority of the commercial intrusion detection
systems used today implemented misuse-based detection because of its high accuracy
(Tavallaee et al., 2009). An example of a misuse-based detection program is Snort (n.d.).
However, the academic community considered anomaly based detection a more powerful
method due to its potential to detect novel attacks (Tavallaee et al., 2009).
Research conducted by Gupta, Nath, and Kotagiri (2010) developed a layered
approach to intrusion detection in which their work used layers in series to identify
anomalous activity. Each layer detected one of the four groups of intrusions included in
the KDD CUP 99 data set. A feature selection process was run for each of the four
intrusion types with the results having a different set of attributes identified. Improved
accuracy and performance was evident with this model.
When an intrusion detection system identifies an attack through misuse detection
or anomaly detection, the action taken may be passive or reactive. A passive intrusion
detection system logs information when it detects a potential security breach. The
reactive intrusion detection system takes action when it detects suspicious behavior such
as discontinuing service to the user or alerting a firewall to block traffic from a particular
source (Sharma, & Mukherjee, 2012).
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In both the misuse and anomaly-based intrusion detection systems, the data
sources provided a large quantity of data for analysis. Since raw intrusion detection data
sets often contained duplicate and irrelevant features, elimination of this superfluous data
and noise reduced the volume, which, in turn, yielded a better analysis (Hammer &
Villmann, 2002).
Sharma and Mukherjee (2012) focused on the detection of minority attacks since
current standalone intrusion detection systems were not effective in finding these types of
attacks. Within the KDD CUP 99 data set, there are four major attack types: DoS, Probe,
R2L, and U2R. The work of Sharma and Mukherjee examined the attributes that detected
the R2l and U2R attacks. Sharma and Mukherjee based their work on a layered approach
by Gupta et al. (2010).
Anomaly detection included the problem of identifying patterns and behaviors
that do not conform to the normal traffic data (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2011).
Successfully identifying these anomalies had a higher probability when the intruder did
not know what a legitimate user's activity should look like and what was considered
anomalous. They refer to work by Kumar and Spafford (1994) regarding the four
possibilities in detecting an intruder who has no knowledge of the system activity profile
as denoted in the following list.


Intrusive but not anomalous: a false negative since the activity was intrusive but
not detected or identified as anomalous.



Not intrusive but anomalous: a false positive since the legitimate user was
conducting a non-malicious activity; however, identified as anomalous.
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Not intrusive and not anomalous: a true negative since the activity was not
intrusive or anomalous.



Intrusive and anomalous: a true positive since the activity was intrusive and
identified as anomalous.

In the above list of an intruder's activities as defined by Kumar and Spafford
(1994), the detection of anomalous behavior differed based on the metrics and
approaches. The conclusion by Bhuyan et al. (2011) was that some anomaly detection
methods were better than other methods and more work was needed to focus on lowering
false alarm rates.
Data Mining and Feature Selection Methods

Methods for identifying pertinent features that represent the data include
classification algorithms, genetic algorithms, statistics, and decision trees. These methods,
developed over the years, usually focused on specific types of problems, such as those
tuned for attacks, which are rare or minor (Sharma, & Mukherjee, 2012). Even though
significant academic research and applied implementations focused on intrusion detection,
these systems still had trouble detecting intrusive activities since new and novel attacks
were constantly evolving (Sharma, & Mukherjee, 2012).
Feature selection algorithms used supervised learning when labeled data sets were
available for training. Unsupervised learning used non-labeled data sets. With labeled
data sets, the features could distinguish different classifications. Selection of the proper
method for analyzing data was important, as each data set had its own statistical
18

properties. Using these methods along with classifiers and entropy combinations resulted
in improved granularity for feature selection.
Lima et al. (2012) referred to the reduced number of features as attributes. These
features contained information describing a particular aspect of the activity recorded.
They accomplish this feature reduction through compressing the collected data with
methods and applications used in biological research. The feature reduction processes
conducted by Lima, et al. (2012) used applications that performed clustering,
classification, and feature selection functions.
Research conducted by Yentes, Hunt, Schmid, Kaipust, McGrath, and Stergiou
(2013) investigated the use of Approximate entropy and Sample entropy for the
measurement of data in a time series. Their data source originated from physiological
characteristics between young and older adults, such as their gait. These entropy
calculations included use in a number of other biological research environments
including heart rate and other biomedical data (Pan, Wang, Liang & Lee, 2011).
Yentes et al. (2013) used Approximate entropy and Sample entropy calculations
in their feature selection research with biological data. Each of these different forms of
entropy calculations provided additional views of the information extracted from the
available data.
One of the data sources for this research included the KDD CUP 99 data (KDD
CUP Data, 1999) set which contained approximately 5 million records of normal and
attack traffic. Another possible data source was from the Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA, n.d.) data made available in association with PREDICT
Repository (PREDICT - Protected Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure Against
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Cyber Threats, n.d.) supported by the Department of Homeland Security, Science and
Technology Directorate. In addition, data from SRI International's System Design
Laboratory investigated intrusion-detection research since 1983 (SRI, n.d.).
Tavallaee et al. (2009) evaluated the KDD CUP 99 (KDD Cup 99 Data, 1999)
data set and identified details of its attributes and shortcomings. They resolved a number
of the issues that resulted in a new data set designated as NSL-KDD (NSL-KDD data set,
2009). Their new data set, NSL-KDD, has the following advantages:
1. No redundancy in the training data thereby reducing the bias towards those
records.
2. No duplication in the test data thereby reducing the bias towards more frequent
detection of those duplicates.
3. Better mix of the levels of difficulty resulting in classification learning rates with
a more accurate evaluation of different learning techniques.
4. Record count in the training sets and test data set allowed learning and evaluation
applications to use the complete range of data without random selection.

The three main characteristics of intrusion detection systems were accuracy,
extensibility, and adaptability (Om & Kundu, 2012). They proposed a hybrid intrusion
detection system that utilized incremental learning to detect future attacks. The goal for
their method was to have a high detection rate and a low false positive rate. To profile the
network, Om and Kundu (2012) used K-means clustering and K-Nearest Neighbor
algorithms. Om and Kundu (2012) also used entropy as a feature based statistical method
to select attributes and eliminate redundant attributes. Their process first removed
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irrelevant features then calculated mutual information between features and the
classification.
The next step was to cluster the data into similar types of objects without using
classification labels, or unsupervised learning. This unsupervised learning approach
created groups with different attributes, and the greater the differences occurring among
the groups actually improved the clustering. When classifying data using an unsupervised
learning approach, three different methods were used including Naïve Bayes, decision
tree, and support vector machine.
A Naïve Bayes classifier algorithm computed the probability of the classes given
the data, which assumed independence among the features for each class (Dougherty,
Kohavi, & Sahami, 1995) implemented in the WEKA analysis package. WEKA is an
acronym for Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA 3, n.d.). In decision
tree methods, continuous values were binned during the learning process and a
dependency map was structured.
A support vector machine classifier automatically searched vectors with
classification ability to maximize the margin between the classes. It had excellent
generalization and high classification accuracy. The standard support vector machine
algorithm calculated the vectors by solving a quadratic programming problem, whose
time complexity was exponential. Thus, for large-scale training sets, the computation of
the standard support vector machine was not practical (Songfeng, Xiaofeng, Nanning, &
Weipu, 2003).
Nguyen et al. (2012) researched the use of pattern recognition for intrusion
detection systems through the application of steadiness and consistency metrics to judge
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the classifier's performance. Generic Feature Selection is one of the feature selection
methods discussed by Nguyen et al. A steadiness metric, in the feature selection process,
quantified and measured the parametric of a specific classifier's performance. The other
metric implemented by Nguyen et al. was the consistency of the analysis that evaluated
the feature selection process for a specific classifier. When a variable used in the
calculation, α was equal to 1, the search strategy was said to be consistent.
Om and Kundu (2012) used the KDD CUP 99 data to train and test their model.
They applied 10-fold cross validation to calculate classification accuracy using detection
rate, false positive rate, classification rate, along with the true positive, true negative, and
false negative. Their methodology was a three step process. The first step applied a
feature selection algorithm, which used entropy as one of the statistics. The next step
clustered the data with unlabeled data using K-means clustering and classification
methods. The final step was a hybrid classification that assigned classification labels to
objects. This was accomplished by using one of the following algorithms: K-Nearest
Neighbor, Naïve Bayes, decision tree, or support vector machines. Om and Kundu (2012)
concluded that with their hybrid approach and algorithms, they could detect differences
between normal and anomalous data.
Lee, Gray, and Kim (2013) discussed the problem of high-dimensional data as
being commonplace due to advanced sensing systems and storage technologies. These
massively high-dimensional data sets introduced sparsity, redundancy, and computational
complexity into the analysis. High-dimensional data usually had a limited number of
degrees of freedom, which was the intrinsic dimensionality of the data (Lee et al., 2013).
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Reducing the dimensionality of the data set reduced some of the problems relating to
redundancy and computational complexity.
Research conducted by Zhai, Li, and Zhai (2011) reduced the computing resource
requirements through the use of sample fuzzy entropy along with a condensed K-Nearest
Neighbor rule method. This calculation used decision table, fuzzy entropy, and an
algorithm to determine the fuzzy membership degree of instances in the training data set
(Zhai et al., 2011). Their research developed two algorithms, which determined the fuzzy
membership degree in the training data set. A third algorithm implemented the
Condensed Fuzzy K-Nearest Neighbor (CFKNN) rule based on sample fuzzy entropy.
Results showed their method reduced the complexity for K-Nearest Neighbor
computations using fuzzy entropy. The authors recommend the use of the third algorithm,
CFKNN, which they claim resulted in a feasible and effective solution.
Decision trees represented acquired knowledge. The strategy for decision trees
implemented non-incremental learning from examples (Quinlan, 1986). Quinlan’s
research also provided a description of induction trees. This work led to the ID3
application, which evolved into C4.5, used by Lima et al. (2012). Quinlan (1986)
discussed the concept of Top Down Induction of Decision Trees in which the
classification was conducted from the top down by considering the frequency of
occurrences within the data. Through the induction task, the set of objects were a
collection of attributes where each object belonged to one of a set of mutually exclusive
classes. The objects in the set of training data had a known class. The mission was to
develop a classification rule that could determine the class from the attributes of any
object. A subset of the training data was selected and used to train the classifier in an
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iterative manner. The remaining entries in the training data were classified against the
tree. If there were classification errors, these errors were added to the subset of training
data and the tree were developed again. This process repeated until all the classification
of the training data was correct. Used in tree generation, the algorithms calculated the
information gained in an object of data through the use of entropy.
Alazab et al. (2012) defined classification as a learning function for categorizing
unseen data into predefined classes. This implied that the data had the records labeled
according to their classification. When working with cluster algorithms, the data was
unlabeled. While in clustering, the classes were not predefined. Alazab et al. stated that
further research into feature selection based intrusion detection was needed.
Even though a classifier completed its goals, the question arose as to whether the
outcome of a classifier could be trusted (Nguyen et al., 2012). The feature selection
process consisted of the method and search strategies for relevant features. Each dataset
had its own statistical properties, where the feature selection process best represented the
patterns of the data (Nguyen et al., 2012).
Bhuyan et al. (2011) further described an intrusion detection architecture. In this
design, data collection, pre-processing, feature extraction, data typing, normalization, and
an anomaly detection engine were functions of the system, which identified irrelevant
parameters for anomaly detection. The detected anomalies were classified into three
categories based on the following list:


Point anomalies: An individual data point was anomalous with respect to the rest
of the data.
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Contextual anomalies: These anomalies consisted of two types: contextual and
behavioral. The contextual content was with respect to its relation to a certain set
of attributes. The behavioral is with respect to non-contextual attributes.



Collective anomalies: A single point was not anomalous but a collection of single
points constituted anomalous activity. In order to detect this type of anomaly, the
appropriate behavioral attributes in the data needed identification.

Feature selection involved maximizing classification accuracy of data. Multiple
approaches were available for feature selection with the two main feature selection
models being the wrapper model and filter model. The wrapper model used a learning
algorithm on subsets of the features and the resulting feature set quality was determined
by the prediction accuracy (Gheyas & Smith, 2010). In the filter model, statistical
criteria generated scores and ranks for the features. This model determined the relevance
of features through statistical techniques that were independent of any classifier.
Alelyani, Tang, and Liu (2013) differentiated feature selection and feature
extraction as approaches to reducing the dimensionality of a data set. In feature
extraction, features were projected into a new space with lower dimensionality, while
feature selection took a subset of features that minimized redundancy while maximizing
their relevance. Alelyani et al. (2013) expanded the feature selection models to include an
embedded model and a hybrid model. In their proposed hybrid model, statistical
measures were used like the filter model, and a subset of the data was chosen with the
highest classification accuracy. This embedded model implemented feature selection and
model fitting simultaneously where they selected a set of features based upon a particular
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classifier. Overall, the filter model worked well with large data sets while the wrapper
model improved classification accuracy.

Liu and Yu (2005) described a typical feature selection process that consisted of
four steps.
1. Generate a subset of features from a set of data. This selection of features
may be additive in that the null set was the basis and features were added,
or it may be a subtractive process by starting with all features and
removing them in a predetermined manner. A complete exhaustive search
found optimal results. Other options were a sequential search and a
random search.
2. Evaluated the subset based on a set of criterion. Different criteria
evaluations techniques included distance measures, dependency measures,
and consistency measures.
3. Determine if the resulting goals were met. This may be a specific
boundary of features, a better solution was not produced from a previous
result, or the results were satisfactory based on the classification error rate.
4. If the goals were met, results were validated and the process terminated. If
prior knowledge was available, the results could be compared. Often prior
knowledge was not available and other techniques were employed. These
may be classification error rates, or conducting “before-and-after”
experiments.
Liu & Yu (2005) further discuss the filter and wrapper methods and a hybrid
combination of the two. Their discussion included real world applications with feature
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selection and network security. They proposed using data mining algorithms for large
audit data files to obtain frequency patterns. The patterns were used in automated
learning and classifiers were applied to determine an intrusion or normal traffic.
Research conducted by Barot, Chauhan, and Patel (2014) used the KDD CUP 99
data set and applied different feature selection methods including a Naïve Bayes classifier,
decision table, correlation based feature selection, and Chi-squared attribute selection.
Their results showed that using five attributes produced very good performance. Using a
correlation based feature algorithm along with the decision table majority produced the
best results.

Entropy calculations used in Feature Selection

Entropy was defined as a statistical metric that related the amount of information
into a random variable (Lima et al., 2012). Using this definition for entropy, parameters
used for the identification of an intrusion from activity logs contained randomness within
the data, which provided information about that data, to the analytic algorithms used.
Nychis, Sekar, Andersen, Kim, and Zhang (2008) stated that little research has been
conducted to understand the detection power of entropy-based analysis related to multiple
traffic distributions.
Lima et al. (2012) used the Shannon entropy that was included in the WEKA,
toolkit (Witten & Frank, 2005). Lima et al. then replaced the Shannon entropy with the
Rényi and the Tsallis entropy formulas and compared the impact of the different entropy
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calculations on feature selection functionality. The Rényi and Tsallis entropy calculations
included an α term which adjusted the sensitivity to the probability distribution.
In a paper on Boltzmann's entropy, Lebowitz (1993) discusses how Boltzmann
used entropy to describe associating different states of matter between microscopic and
macroscopic in a statistical manner. The results were in terms of classical Newtonian
mechanics based on Newton’s laws of motion. The Boltzmann entropy was equal to the
Boltzmann constant times the log of the absolute phase state (Γ) for a state of M. The
point showed that entropy extended beyond not only information theory as proposed by
Shannon (1948) but also had roots in mechanical and quantum systems.
Lee and He (2009) used entropy with the Chi-square goodness metrics and mean
and variance to develop traffic profiles and behavior patterns. The concept of relative
uncertainty created a data profile that used time series to find hidden features in the
traffic. They used the KDD CUP 99 data set and developed a correlation matrix using
different features against the true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative
measures. Their research reduced the false positives by 3 to 4 percent.
Barbará, Couto, and Li (2002) proposed a method that clustered the data to reduce
the entropy rather than using a distance metric. Their approach yielded an NP-Complete
problem that used heuristics to solve it. They applied this methodology to different types
of data, including the KDD CUP 99 data set. The algorithm was effective and compared
well to other algorithmic methods that used Shannon entropy.
Research conducted by Nychis et al. (2008) utilized entropy to analyze
bidirectional traffic with the goal of improving granularity of detection from simple
volume based metrics. The basis for the data was flow-headers and behavioral features.
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The parametric data collected from the flow-header consisted of source and destination IP
addresses and ports, and the flow size. The behavioral attributes were counts of specific
addresses where an end-host communicated when entering and exiting the system. The
data used in the analysis originated from collections made in 2005 at Carnegie Mellon
University. The data consisted of 92TB of traffic with 2.5 billion flows. The data
segments contained five-minute non-overlapping time slots, and anonymized IP
addresses. The entropy for the parameters was normalized and computed. The
researchers found strong correlation between address and port distributions. The results
showed that with entropy based anomaly detection, traffic selection required more than
simple port and address based distributions. Traffic features should originate from traffic
distributions that complement each other. Also, unidirectional traffic could introduce bias
into the computing traffic distributions.
Nychis et al. (2008) concluded that port and address distributions were strongly
correlated when using entropy during time series analysis. They confirmed this with the
behavioral metrics and from the analysis of synthetic data. Calculating correlations of
entropy values during normal periods suggested a new way to provide anomaly detection
services and they suggested this for future work.
Velayutham and Thangavel (2012) used entropy for feature selection with Rough
Set Theory. In their work, both supervised and unsupervised sets of data showed how
their process produced better results with the unsupervised data. One of their claims
stated supervised data classification was often unknown or incomplete. In their
demonstration example, the unsupervised data was grouped by like attributes and the
entropy was calculated among their values. The minimal entropy was selected and
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grouped with the remaining attribute sets. This continued iteratively until an entropy of
zero resulted. The attributes in this set were the reduced group of features that provided
information about the data set.
Yurtkan and Demirel (2013) used entropy based feature selection for facial
recognition. The use of variance and entropy provided measures of uncertainty and
information content. A high entropy indicated a feature’s position was more variable and
carried more information. A low entropy was considered a stable feature. Their research
used Shannon entropy for feature selection in facial expressions. The higher the entropy
value the greater the chance was that the feature was associated with different
expressions.
Özçelik and Brooks (2015) discussed the use of entropy in identifying Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in a network. If the attacker had knowledge of the
network traffic entropy, the attacker could spoof the use of entropy to evade the
identification of a DDoS attacks. With this information, an attack could be constructed to
maintain the entropy of the traffic within the upper and lower bounds of the entropy
range considered. Features used were in the packet headers. Similarly, the attacker could
construct zombies to send dummy traffic/requests that generate false positives, which
rendered the intrusion detection system unreliable. To counter this spoofing capability,
the calculated standard deviation for the traffic was normalized in two limits by
asymptotically increasing the entropy less than 1 to approaching 1, and conversely
normalizing entropy larger than 0 to approaching 0. This method enabled the
identification of spoofing attacks.
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Shannon Entropy
Claude Shannon (1948) worked at Bell Laboratories and developed a useful
definition of information produced. The definition stated that if the number of messages
in a set was finite, then this number was a measure of information when one message was
chosen from the set. This definition provided the basis for Forward Error Correction and
communications security (Gappmair, 1999). Shannon’s research in entropy and channel
capacity became part of the common mechanisms used to monitor and evaluate
communications systems. Shannon’s application of entropy to information theory was the
basis for describing variability in a signal.
Mathematical formulations of entropy in feature selection were as follows.
Applying feature selection techniques to data sets using a random variable, C, with a
discrete probability distribution, then the entropy of the expected information was
determined by the Shannon (1948) entropy defined in the equation below.
Using this basic formula for Shannon entropy, there are multiple attributes (k),
where i = 1, .. k.

Where:
H(C) is the entropy of variable C
pi is the probability of element i in the distribution.
k is the number of elements.
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Mutual information I(C;Ai) measures the interdependence between two features,
i.e. C and Ai, is shown as when using Shannon entropy (Lima et al., 2012).

Where:
I(C;Ai) is the mutual information denoting the dependence between C and Ai.
H(C) is the entropy of variable C
H(C|Ai) is the conditional entropy of C given Ai.

Rényi & Tsallis Entropy
Both the Rényi and Tsallis entropy use a term in their equations identified as α.
This term makes the entropy results more or less sensitive to the considered probability
distribution shapes Lima et al. (2012).
The Rényi entropy is a measure of information of order α. For Rényi entropy,
Shannon entropy is the limiting case Lima et al. (2012). The formula for Rényi entropy is
as follows.

Where:
Rα(C) is Rényi entropy with factor alpha for term C
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α is an exponential distribution where 0 ≤ α ≠1
piα is the probability of element i in the distribution raised to the α term.
With 0 > α < 1, the mutual information is defined as follows (Lima et al., 2012).

Where:
IR(C;Ai) is the mutual information of C given A using Rényi entropy
Rα(C) is Rényi entropy with factor alpha for term C
Rα(C|Ai) is Rényi entropy with factor alpha for term C given Ai

Constantino Tsallis, a Brazilian physicist, developed an entropy relationship
integrated within the Boltzmann-Gibbs domain that defined entropy as follows (Johal &
Tirnakli, 2004).

Where:
Tα(C) is Tsallis entropy with factor alpha for term C
α is an exponential distribution where 0 ≤ α ≠1
piα is the probability of element i in the distribution raised to the α term.
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The mutual information as noted by IT(C;A) is for Tsallis entropy when α > 1, the
dependencies between two variables are defined as follows (Lima et al., 2012).

Where:
IT(C;Ai) is the mutual information of C given Ai using Tsallis entropy
Tα(C) is Tsallis entropy with factor alpha for term C
Tα(C|Ai) is Tsallis entropy with factor alpha for term C given Ai

Approximate Entropy and Sample Entropy
Approximate entropy is the conditional probability of a set of data segments of
the same duration. There is less complexity with a smaller Approximate entropy, which
yields a higher probability. Its introduction quantified regularity in a time series (Liu &
Zhao, 2011).
Pincus (1991) developed a method to determine the changing system complexity
in which Approximate entropy could classify complex systems. The use of Approximate
entropy was applicable to deterministic (predictable), and stochastic (non-deterministic)
systems. This approximation was good for data sets containing at least 1000 points.
Approximate entropy is a widely used statistical index that quantifies the
complexity of a signal used, especially in the fields of heat variability and endocrinology
(Chen, Solomon, & Chon, 2005). This metric may provide quantitative information about
noisy and short data in a small sample size. The data may have both deterministic and
stochastic (non-random and random) attributes. Some of the problems with Approximate
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entropy includes bias due to self-matches, or duplicates, and is very dependent on sample
size.
Yentes et al. (2013) applied Approximate entropy as developed by Pincus (1991)
for quantifying levels of complexity in time series. Sample entropy, developed by
Richmond and Moorman (2000), was less sensitive to the number of data points than
Approximate entropy and provided a better entropy method for data sets with less than
200 points. Approximate entropy does have some problems in its use. It is biased towards
regularity, lacks relative consistency, and parameters must be the same when comparing
two data sets.
The smaller the value of the Approximate entropy indicated less complexity
within the data. This suggested that repeated patterns imply order and therefore resulted
in a reduced entropy value (Lake, 2011). The calculation required a prior determination
of two unknown parameters. The variable named r had a recommended value in the range
of 0.1 to 0.2 times the standard deviation of the data. The other variable named m
determined the length of the sequences, or window sizes. A third parameter used in the
entropy equation is N which is the number of data points (Chon, Scully, & Lu, 2009).
Most entropy definitions were discontinuous to noise (Pincus 1991). Approximate
entropy used three primary attributes in the calculation. The nomenclature was
represented by ApEn(m, r, N) for Approximate entropy. Selection of the attributes
affected results of the calculation. The m referred to the window size of how many points
represented a reading. Pincus (1991) started with m equal to 2 as does Yentes et al.
(2013). The r is a measure of the percentage of the standard deviation.
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Sample entropy is a negative natural logarithm of the conditional probability that
two samples of length m with tolerance r would match the next point in the series of m+1.
If m was too large or r was too small, the template match count would be inadequate for
confidence estimation of the conditional probability. Conversely, if the m was too small
and r was too large, all results matched and there would be no discrimination signals
(Lake, 2011).
Liu, Liu, Shao, Li, Sun, Wang, and Liu (2011) determined the selection of the r
variable was controversial. They referred to studies that indicated that as the performance
of a time series became faster, the selection of r might lead to incorrect conclusions.
Their work was based on heart failure rate among healthy subjects vs. those that had heart
failure. They concluded the value of r had a big impact on the results and proposed the
use of a value that maximized the Approximate entropy. This showed the true complexity
of the different signals more clearly.

Six steps used to calculate Approximate entropy were described by Pincus and
Keefe (1992) and are detailed below.
1. Develop an equally spaced time series:
where u(1), u(2), ….. u(N)

where N is the number of values

2. Define m and r.
m = length of the time sequence (windows) use 1, 2, 3, etc. and
r = filter - usually between 10% to 25% of the standard deviation.
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3. Define a set of vectors: x(1), x(2), x(3) ...... x(N)
where: x(i) = ( u(1). . . . . u(i + m – 1) )

4. Use x(1), x(2), x(3) ...... x(N)
for each i, 1 ≤ I ≤ N – m – 1
C

m
i

(r) = { number of x(j) such that d[ x(i), x(j)] ≤ r } / ( N + m -1 )

Where:
d is the distance between vectors x(i) and x(j). It is defined as:
d[x(i), x(j)] = max | u(i + k -1) - u(j + k -1) |
for k = 1, 2, . . . . m.

5. Next define:

To this point, Approximate entropy yielded that
Φm+1(r) – Φm(r) = the average over i of
ln [ probability that | u(j+m) – u(i+m) | ≤ r

given that
| u (j+k) – u (i+k) | ≤ r
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for k = 0,1,....m-1 ]

6. (ApEn) Approximate entropy equation:
ApEn= Φm(r) – Φm+1(r)

for m and r fixed as in step 2.

Work by Manis (2008) developed a way to increase the speed of approximate
calculations. In this method, data is assigned buckets, the buckets are examined for
similarity of data pairs, and updates made to the overall calculation.
Sinai (2007) explained the entropy of dynamical systems and stated that
entropy (h) of a measurable transformation of the dynamical system was in a set of
entropy values for the entropy across the upper bounds of all finite partitions. Sinai (2007)
further stated that Kolmogorov proved this theorem in a lecture on Bernoulli partitions
where entropy must be positive.
Richman and Moorman (2000) developed Sample entropy, which was a variant of
the Approximate entropy. Sample entropy does not count self-matches and is the negative
natural logarithm of the conditional probability that two sequences for m points remain
similar at the next point. Self-matches were not included in the probability calculation.
Approximate entropy quantifies information about complex data that may be
noisy and corrupted in both deterministic and stochastic environments (Chen et al., 2005).
With both Approximate entropy and its variant Sample entropy, the equations use two
variables that must be predefined. One variable is the embedding dimension, m. The
second variable is the threshold that acted as a noise filter with the designation of r.
Chen et al. (2005) referred to a recommendation by Pincus (1991) for slow dynamic
signals in which r should be 0.1 to 0.26 (10% to 26%) of the standard deviation of the
data. They also recommended that m should be 1 or 2 for 100 to 5,000 data points. Chen
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et al. (2005) detailed the calculation for Approximate entropy and Sample entropy in their
research. Both calculations were six step processes not described in this thesis.

Methods and applications used in this research.
Lima et al. (2012) used different entropy calculations in their research. The most
used calculation for entropy of computer communications work was that of Shannon
(1948). Lima et al. (2012) extended the Shannon entropy calculation in the C4.5
classification algorithm to include Rényi and Tsallis variations of entropy. This compared
the feature selection ability of the Rényi and Tsallis entropy calculations versus the
Shannon method.
Very little research existed that addressed the use of Approximate entropy and
Sample entropy for use with intrusion detection data. The focus of Approximate entropy
and Sample entropy calculations was data that exhibited periodicity. The proper data
must align with the Approximate and Sample entropy models used.
Sharma and Mukherjee (2012) utilized a Naïve Bayes classifier in WEKA that
reduced the dimensionality of intrusion detection system data sets. The Naïve Bayes
classifier worked well with high dimensionality data sets and had a strong independence
relation assumption in which the features were independent of a class and the probability
of one attribute did not influence the probability of the other. They used the entropybased supervised discretization. This process transformed continuous models into discrete
parts for analysis. In particular, the WEKA application calculates a result, iteratively
removes a feature, and the results are compared for effectiveness.
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The main classification algorithms used for feature selection were genetic
algorithms, decision trees, Bayes networks, and neural networks. Lima, et al. (2012) used
classification models implemented for medical data that included CLONal selection
ALGorithm (CLONALG), Clonal Selection Classification Algorithm (CRCA), and
Artificial Immune Recognition Systems (AIRS). The attribute selection method used by
Lima et al. (2012) was C4.5. They modified the entropy calculations to include Rényi
entropy and Tsallis entropy, in addition to the Shannon entropy calculations available in
C4.5.
The data mining capabilities of the WEKA software used by Lima et al. (2012)
provided an extensible environment to modify and insert custom calculations for the
analysis. Hall, Frank, Holmes, Pfahringer, Reutemann, and Witten (2009) discussed this
flexibility in their paper on WEKA. Multiple forms of data entry were available,
including comma separated variables as is contained in the KDD CUP 99 data set. The
WEKA application was Java based and provisions were available to add custom software.
The WEKA open-source project specifically focused on open-source data mining systems.
The research conducted by Lima et al. (2012) incorporated the use of the wrapper
model into the C4.5 application for their model. They surmised that in general, the
wrapper method was more effective in selecting the best features.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview of Research Methodology
This research incorporated the use of entropy in the statistical methods for feature
selection to detect network intrusions. The goal was to reduce the number of features
required to identify anomalies in a set of data from an intrusion detection system. Using
Approximate and Sample entropy as metrics in the feature selection process was part of
achieving that goal. The applicability of this method was adapted to the detection of
different intrusion types that exhibited periodicity or modeled with periodicity. The
focus was on the use of the entropy statistic to provide additional information regarding
the content and variability of data.
The approach used was based on the use of entropy for feature selection as that
conducted by Lima et al. (2012). The Lima et al. research utilized the C4.5 decision tree
modeled with the Shannon, Rényi, and Tsallis entropy calculations as part of the statistics
for attribute selections. Research conducted by Yentes et al. (2013) used Approximate
entropy and Sample entropy to measure the randomness of periodic biomechanical data
such as a person’s walking gait. This research includes the Approximate entropy and
Sample entropy within the C4.5 decision tree.
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Specific Research Methods Employed

The Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA 3, n.d.) software
framework was used for the C4.5 decision tree generation that is designated as J48 in the
WEKA classification analysis package. The 10-fold cross validation option validated the
results. Programming modifications made to WEKA enabled the use of Rényi, Tsallis,
Approximate, and Sample entropy calculations and combinations.
Data for the research originated from two different sources. The KDD CUP 99
data used by Lima et al. (2012) was one source. The second set of data was from SRI
International in which the data was collected from real-world malware attacks. The use of
these two different data sources supported a process for validating the methods used in
identifying anomalies from the KDD CUP 99 data set. The second set of data used the
same process in finding anomalous activity.
Following the finalization of the basic methods and techniques mentioned above,
the applications for classification and feature selection were developed and programs
written. The next set of activities identified the code development required for Rényi,
Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample entropy calculations and statistical algorithms.
Development also included writing programs that acquired, parsed, and formatted the
data for use in the analysis programs and its associated results.
Analyzing the results from the decision trees and extracting the features provided
data to compare metrics from established research by Lima et al. (2012). The metrics
used for the comparisons examined the classification values and the features selected.
This started an iterative process of working with both sets of data available, producing
results, and comparing them with the selected standards. Adjustment made to the
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methods or calculations to improve the performance and robustness of the results
continued until no significant improvement was gained by more changes. As the research
completed, new literature was reviewed for comparison of the techniques and methods to
validate the conclusions. No additional research was identified that utilized similar
methodologies.
Instrument Development and Validation

The primary application used during the analysis was the WEKA program
(WEKA 3, n.d.). This application contained the tools required for the analysis.
Modifications made to the WEKA application implemented the Rényi, Tsallis,
Approximate, and Sample entropy statistic modules developed for this research. The
general description of the Approximate entropy and Sample entropy algorithms were set
forth in the paper by Pincus and Keefe (1992). The paper by Hall et al. (2009) provided a
description of the WEKA program along with its history, accomplishments, and
capabilities.
A web site called “The Code Project” contained the C++ code for both the
Approximate entropy and Sample entropy algorithms that was posted by Chesnokov
(2008). This downloaded code was validated for correctness by comparing the process
described by Pincus and Keefe (1992). Modifications were made to the Chesnokov (2008)
code to translate it into Java code. The Approximate entropy and Sample entropy
algorithms were integrated into the WEKA J48 tree classification package for feature
selection. A paper by Bouckaert, Frank, Hall, Holmes, Pfahringer, Reutemann, and
Witten (2010) described the process of custom code integration into WEKA.
43

The research results presented an objective description of the outcomes with
tables, graphics, and text along with a discussion of the methods used. Also included
were references to research literature supporting or refuting the findings.

Resource Requirements

This research utilized the expertise of researchers, computer systems, applications,
and data. Collaboration occurred via email with committee members, other researchers,
and peers as needed. These researchers were considered knowledgeable and experts in
intrusion detection mechanisms, data analysis, and statistics.
Windows and Linux based computer systems were used for data retrieval, storage,
development, preparation, and processing. The primary computer used was an HP laptop
running the Windows 8 operating system (Win8, n.d.). Linux was supported via a virtual
machine using Oracle VM VirtualBox (VB, n.d.) on the HP laptop. VirtualBox allowed
the instantiation of virtual machines to run on a system. The Windows 8 system ran
VirtualBox to support the Ubuntu operating system (Ubuntu, n.d.). The version of
Ubuntu used in VirtualBox was 14.04.1.
The Eclipse (n.d.) Integrated Development Environment was used for the Java
applications and integration into WEKA. Additional development tools were available in
a Linux environment including vi, javac, etc.
Two main data sources were used. One was the KDDCUP 99 data file, considered
one of the standard data sets used for Intrusion Detection research (KDD Cup 1999
Data, 1999). The second data source originated from the SRI International Cyber-Threat
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Analysis Project (SRI, n.d.) and this is the first time it was used for feature election in this
manner.
Summary

This section described the methodologies used to conduct the research and
include Approximate, and Sample entropy into the feature selection process. The goal
was to determine if the Approximate and Sample entropies generated better results than
the Shannon, Rényi, and Tsallis entropies used by Lima et al. (2012), and the Shannon
entropy used by Sharma and Mukjherjee (2012). The data acquired for this research was
KDDCUP 99 data, and data from the SRI Cyber-Threat Analysis project as the second
source selected. The WEKA application, using the J48 decision tree analysis with the
10-fold cross validation option, was selected to conduct the analysis. The output from J48
provided a decision tree analysis for the selected features and classification statistics. The
output values were extracted and compared with the selected features from Lima et al.
(2012) and the work of Sharma and Mukjherjee (2012).
The modification and development of software was needed for this research. The
open source WEKA application provided the primary package for generation of the
decision tree analysis. The features identified were part of the decision tree output. The
WEKA application was modified to include the Rényi, and Tsallis entropies that Lima et
al. (2012) used, and included the Approximate and Sample entropies. Each of the added
entropy calculations were made available for the analysis along with the Shannon entropy
that was included in WEKA. Work by Chesnokov (2008) was the basis for the source
code used in the Approximate and Sample entropies calculations. The code was then
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modified for use in WEKA. The approach used for modifying WEKA and including new
source code were identified by Bouckaert et al. (2010).
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
Chapter 4 focuses on the processes used for this research, the results achieved,
and the research accomplishments during the data acquisition, data preparation, and
analysis. This work developed new methods for labeling activity in intrusion detection
system data resulting in multiple views of different entropy calculations in the feature
selection process. These views provide different options for the selection of relevant
features from data sets that identify anomalous traffic from intrusion detection system.
The analysis methodology used multiple entropy statistics developed for the C4.5
classification tree algorithm.
The primary analytic tool used for the analysis was the open source WEKA
application written in Java by the Machine Learning Group at the University of Waikato
in New Zealand. Being open source, all source code and binaries were available for
downloaded and modification. Java and Linux shell scripts were the languages used to
develop additional software applications for this research.
Anomalous and malware data acquired for this research originated from two
sources. One was the KDD CUP 99 data used by many intrusion detection researchers for
validating new intrusion detection processes and statistical evaluations. The second data
source consisted of real-world data collected by the Computer Science Laboratory at SRI
in Menlo Park, California in cooperation with its director, Phillip Porras. This SRI data
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originated from malware alerts collected by the BotHunter (BotHunter, n.d.) application
that identified malware in network traffic.

Computing System Environment
The computing environment for this research included both Microsoft Windows
and Linux based operating systems that ran on an HP Envy laptop. The system’s primary
hardware consisted of an Intel I7 processor, 12 GB of memory, a 1 TB hard disk drive,
and a 17-inch screen. Microsoft Windows 8.1 was the operating system on the laptop.
The standard Microsoft Office applications suite was included along with the Oracle VM
VirtualBox virtualization product.
Oracle VM VirtualBox version 4.3.12 is a type 2 hypervisor for virtual machine
support to host the Linux kernel version 3.13.0-35-generic with the Ubuntu operating
system version 14.04.1. This system configuration supported the concurrent use of a
Microsoft Windows and Linux environment while also enabling the sharing of files
between the two operating system applications and their utilities.
Directory structure for the file systems consisted of two types: the standard
Microsoft Windows hierarchical structure, and the Linux hierarchical structure. A share
point established within the MS Windows file system and the Linux file system provided
a common point to mount file systems. Any files written below this share point in the file
directory structure were accessible by both operating systems.
As identified in the introduction of this chapter, the WEKA source code and
binaries were available for download from the WEKA website (WEKA 3, n.d.). In
addition, the files were available for different operating systems. This research
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downloaded and implemented the Linux version of WEKA as the main development and
execution platform. WEKA Version 3.4.19 was acquired as a zip file, which was the
same version used by Lima et al. (2012). The expanded zip package consisted of Java and
binary code that installed into default directories.

Code Modification and Development

Eclipse version 3.8 provided the Integrated Development Environment to modify
the WEKA Java source code and develop new Java classes. The WEKA download
consisted of Java source code files, documentation, and the build.xml support file for use
within Eclipse.
Several WEKA Java methods required modification in order to implement the
new entropy calculations into the source code. Calls to the entropy calculations from the
WEKA application were for the Java methods in the EntropyBasedSplitCrit.java file.
The EntropyBasedSplitCrit class contained methods named logFunc(), oldEnt(), and
newEnt(). The J48 classification algorithms used these methods in the calculation.
In the downloaded WEKA code, only the Shannon entropy calculation was
included in the source code. Modifications made to the EntropyBasedSplitCrit class
added the Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample entropy calculations. Selecting the
entropy calculation to use was a run time configurable option defined in an external file
that set the values for the current WEKA analysis. The J48 classification tree module
read the configuration file at run-time. Parametric values, identified in the external file,
determined the type of entropy algorithm to use and the values for the corresponding
variables in the program.
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In the EntropyBasedSplitCrit class, a method created for this analysis, named
varInitialize(), defined the variables used with the five different entropy calculations.
This method initiated a program call that read the configuration file then set the
corresponding parameters. The Rényi and Tsallis entropy calculations were added to the
existing Java code in the EntropyBasedSplitCrit class by modifying the logFunc(),
oldEnt(), and newEnt() methods. Appendix A lists the modified
EntropyBasedSplitCrit class Java code.
Four additional classes were developed. One was the fileRead class that read and
parsed the configuration file. The second class, entUtils, provided utilities for use by the
entropy application, which included a method to calculate standard deviation, stdev(), for
data passed to it by methods in the classes that calculated Approximate and Sample
entropies. In addition, a method added to the entUtils class handled the reading of the
configuration file and printing its parameters. This method, called the fileRead() method
from the fileRead class, used the results to print attributes and set variables for the
subsequent calculations. Appendix D lists the Java code for the fileRead class and
Appendix E lists the entUtils class Java code.
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Configuration File
The configuration file, named EntropyInfoFile.txt, was read when the J48 tree
classification module instantiated the EntropyBasedSplitCrit class. Within the
configuration file, values used by different entropy calculations were initialized in
WEKA. Depending on the entropy calculation used, only those variables required for the
calculations were relevant, variables not needed were ignored.
Appendix F provides an example of a configuration file. Variables included in the
external configuration file are listed in Table 1.
Name

Description

etype

A numeric designation of the entropy calculation to use.
0 = Shannon
1 = Rényi
2 = Tsallis
3 = Approximate
4 = Sample

alpha

The numerical value for the alpha term in the Rényi and Tsallis entropy
calculations that denotes the sensitivity to the considered probability
distribution shapes. Values proposed by Lima et al. (2012) are 0.5 for Rényi
and 1.2 for Tsallis, however, these values may be set to a value suitable for
the calculation

m

This is the window size for the Approximate and Sample entropy
calculations. Research by Yentes et al. (2013) proposed a value of 2, but
may be reset in this configuration file.

r

This is the amount of the variance to be used in the calculation of
Approximate and Sample entropy. Research by Yentes et al. (2013)
proposed a value of 0.2, but may be reset in this configuration file.

D

This is a Boolean variable used to turn on debugging during the
development and modification of the application. It has no impact on the
computations.

Table 1 Entropy Configuration File Variables
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Algorithms for Rényi and Tsallis Entropy Calculations
The Literature Review chapter presented details of the Rényi and Tsallis entropy
calculations. These equations were programmed in Java for this research and added to
WEKA as logFunc(), oldEnt(), and newEnt() methods in the EntropyBasedSplitCrit
class. The logic included a series of if statements based upon the etype parameter that
sets the type of entropy based on the configuration file.

Algorithms for Approximate and Sample Entropy Calculations
New classes for the Approximate and Sample entropy calculations were
developed and identified as ApproximateEntropy, and SampleEntropy. These new
classes were downloaded in the C++ language from Chesnokov (2008), converted to Java
code, and further modified for use within this research. The methods in these classes were
programmatically called from the logFunc(), oldEnt(), and newEnt() methods of the
EntropyBasedSplitCrit class. Appendix B and Appendix C list the modified
ApproximateEntropy and SampleEntropy Java classes respectively.

Eclipse Usage
The Eclipse (n.d.) package provided an Integrated Development Environment. Its
development began at IBM and then the Eclipse Foundation sponsored its support.
Eclipse, an open source application, enabled the development of programming projects in
different computer languages, including Java. For this research, Eclipse supported Java
code development, modifications, compilations, and installation of the weka.jar file. The
build.xml file, provided in the initial WEKA download, was updated for the purposes of
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this research in order to compile and install the weka.jar file where needed. Appendix G
lists the modified build.xml file.

Executing WEKA
The WEKA application ran in an Ubuntu environment within a virtual machine.
The command line below started the WEKA GUI and included the required class paths.

java -cp /media/sf_nova/workspace/weka/dist/weka.jar:\
/media/sf_nova/data/KDD/wekaclassalgos/wekaclassalgos.jar \
-Xmx8192m weka.gui.GUIChooser

In the shell script, the memory allocation increased from the default of 512 MB to
8192 MB to accommodate large data files. The back slash “\” at the end of the line
indicated a continuation of the command line. The WEKA source code version 3.4.19
was used to be consistent with Lima et al. (2012) work.
The J48 classification tree execution used the ten-fold validation option for the
analysis. Saved results determined the features selected to construct the classification
tree. Appendix L and Appendix M list the shell scripts that read the files containing the
J48 classification tree results. These shell scripts extracted the features used to construct
the classification tree from the KDD CUP 99 results and the SRI results respectively.
Appendix N displays the output for the DOS category of the KDD CUP 99 data using
Shannon entropy.
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KDD CUP 99 Data Acquisition and Preparation
This data set contained approximately five million records of attacks and normal
traffic. The file, downloaded from the KDD CUP 99 website (KDD Cup 1999 Data,
1999), was in a comma separated value (csv) format that enabled easy manipulation using
Linux commands. Native WEKA data is in the Attribute-Relation File Format using the
extension arff. The data set contained 42 columns that describe each entry in the file.
Appendix J lists the features and their type corresponding to the data designation as
represented in the arff file.
Research conducted by Lima et al. (2012) used a subset of the KDD CUP 99 data
for their analysis. In order to replicate the work by Lima et al., similar attack and normal
traffic counts were replicated as close as possible, to accurately reproduce their results.
The specific lines used from the KDD CUP 99 were unknown. Table 2 displays a tally of
the KDD CUP 99 data available by attack type, and labeled “Available”. The column
labeled “Count” identified the number of entries of available data used during the
Lima et al. analysis and used in this research. A discrepancy identified in the multihop,
phf, spy, and loadmodule attack counts used by Lima et al. indicated more data than
supplied within the KDD CUP 99 dataset. For those instances where the “% of Total”
was greater than 100%, the maximum attack counts of entries were used even when the
count was less than what Lima et al. (2012) used in their research paper as noted in the
“Comment” column.
Using the attack counts listed in Table 3 by Lima et al. (2012) and in this research,
the files generated used a series of Linux commands pipelined together. This table
showed the total line counts for each of the files using the required WEKA format, arff.
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The command line below provides an example for the selection of the “back” attack from
the DoS category, which originated from a file named kdd.data.csv. This Linux
command string was repeated for each attack and appended to the proper attack file.

$ cat kdd.data.csv | grep back | shuf –n 1026 >>DoS.csv

Appendix H explains the commands used above. Appendix I lists the complete
Linux shell script used to generate the different data files that reproduced Lima et al.
(2012) results. The shell script wrote data to files used in WEKA. Additional information
entered into the arff files defined the variable names and data types contained in the file.
Since no timing information was associated with the KDD CUP 99 data, having the same
attacks grouped together modeled the periodicity for the Approximate and Sample
entropy. Appendix K provides a partial listing of the file contents for DoS.arff.
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Category
Attack
DoS
back.
land.
neptune.
pod.
smurf.
teardrop
Normal

Available

Count

% of Total

2,203
21
1,072,017
264
2,807,886
979
972,781

1,026
11
10,401
69
7,669
15
2,573

46.57%
52.38%
0.97%
26.14%
0.27%
1.53%
0.26%

Probe
Ipsweep
Nmap
Pportsweep.
Ssatan.
Normal.

12,481
2,316
10,413
15,892
972,781

586
151
155
16
1,704

4.70%
6.52%
1.49%
0.10%
0.18%

R2L
ftp_write
guess_passwd
imap
multihop.
phf.
spy.
warezclient.
warezmaster.
Normal

8
53
12
7
4
2
1,020
20
972,781

5
53
11
11
5
4
60
20
1934

62.50%
100.00%
91.67%
157.14%
125.00%
200.00%
5.88%
100.00%
0.20%

U2R
loadmodule.
buffer_overflow
perl.
rootkit.
Normal.

9
30
3
10
972,781

10
21
3
7
1,676

111.1%
70.00%
100.0%
70.00%
0.17%

Table 2- Attack Counts (Lima et al., 2012)

Category/
File name
DoS.arff
Probe.arff
R2L.arff
U2R.arff

Lines in
arff file
21,813
2,661
2,145
1,765

Table 3 - Line counts in KDD CUP 99 .arff data files
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Comment

Used 7
Used 4
Used 2

Used 9

KDD CUP 99 Analysis Results
This section describes the analytic results of this research by replicating the
approach use by Lima et al. (2012), as closely as possible. The following descriptions and
tables demonstrated the results were in close agreement with Lima et al. classifications.
This agreement does not extend to the number of features selected. The feature selected
and their counts vary significantly between Lima et al. work and this research.
The WEKA application used files generated for the DoS, Probe, R2L and U2R
categories as input. Appendix K lists a portion of the arff file for the DoS attack
category. Appendix N displays a sample of the J48 classification output for the DoS
attack category. Appendix O shows results of the shell script execution that extracted the
features from Appendix N.
Table 4 presents the results of this research using the KDD CUP 99 data with the
WEKA analysis for the different entropy calculations. Note that for the Rényi entropy,
the alpha value was 0.5, and for the Tsallis entropy, the alpha value was 1.2, as
recommended by Lima et al. (2012). When specifying Approximate and Sample entropy,
the window size, m, was “2” and the r value was “0.2” for both entropy calculations as
specified by Yentes et al. (2013). The definitions below describe each column listed in
the tables.


Attack & Entropy = Attack type and entropy used in the calculation



Source = Origin of calculation results:
Research indicates the work conducted in this research.
Lima described information from Lima et al. (2012).
Sharma described information from Sharma and Mukherjee (2012).
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CC = Correctly classified attacks.



ICC = Incorrectly classified attacks.



Features Selected = the features published from Lima et al. (2012),
Sharma and Mukherjee (2012), or the WEKA J48 classification analysis.



Attack
Entropy
DoS
Rényi

Qty = Number of features identified.

Source

CC

ICC

Features Selected

Qty

Lima
Research

99.9632%
99.4578%

0.0368%
0.5422%

2, 5, 7, 8, 23, 32, 35, 36, 39
4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32, 34, 37, 40

9
14

Lima
Research
Sharma

99.9495%
99.9541%
99.9000%

0.0505%
0.0459%
0.1000%

2, 5, 7, 8, 23, 34, 36, 39
2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 25, 29
5,6,24

Lima
Research

99.9586%
99.9357%

0.0414%
0.0643%

2, 5, 7, 8, 23, 26, 34, 39
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 36, 37

8
16

Research

99.8989%

0.1011%

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 23, 24, 37

10

Research

99.9081%

0.0919%

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 23, 24, 36, 37

11

Lima
Research

99.4266%
96.4778%

0.5734%
3.5222%

1, 2, 5, 6, 25, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35,
37

11

Lima
Research
Sharma

99.5031%
99.0046%
98.8000%

0.4969%
0.9954%
1.2000%

1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 23, 30, 33, 37, 38, 40
3, 5, 6, 12, 23, 25, 27, 32, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41
1,5,6,30,33

11
13
5

Lima
Research

99.3119%
99.1577%

0.6881%
0.8423%

1, 2, 4, 6, 23, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 40
2, 3, 5, 25, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41

11
12

Research

98.4303%

1.5697%

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37

10

Research

98.4303%

1.5697%

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37

10

Shannon
8
7
3

Tsallis

ApEn
SampEn

Probe
Rényi
17

Shannon

Tsallis

ApEn
SampEn

Note: Table 4 continued on next page
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Attack
Entropy
R2L
Rényi

Source

CC

ICC

Features Selected

Qty

Lima
Research

98.9534%
95.6107%

1.4066%
4.3893%

2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 19, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39
1, 4, 10, 13, 19, 22, 25, 34, 35, 36, 38

12
11

Lima
Research
Sharma

98.9058%
98.4733%
97.0000%

1.0942%
1.5267%
3.0000%

1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19, 22, 32, 33, 35
1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 33, 36, 38, 39
1, 3, 5, 6, 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 36

13
13
10

Lima
Research

98.8582%
98.1393%

1.1418%
1.8607%

1,3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 17, 19, 22, 37, 38
1, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 22, 26, 36, 39, 41

11
13

Research

97.9485%

2.0515%

1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 17, 18, 23, 35, 36, 40

12

Research

97.9485%

2.0515%

1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 17, 18, 23, 35, 36, 40

12

Lima
Research

99.4758%
98.4848%

0.5242%
1.5152%

13, 18, 32, 33, 36
1, 4, 10, 13, 19, 22, 25, 34, 35, 36, 38

5
11

Lima
Research
Sharma

99.5341%
99.0093%
80.8000%

0.4659%
0.9907%
19.2000%

13, 16, 17, 18, 32, 33
3, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 29, 32, 34, 36
1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36,
37

6
11

Lima
Research

99.4176%
98.5431%

0.5824%
1.4569%

13, 16, 18, 32, 33
1, 4, 5, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37

5
13

Research

98.6014%

1.3986%

2, 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18

8

Research

98.6014%

1.3986%

2, 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18

8

Shannon

Tsallis

ApEn
SampEn

U2R
Rényi

Shannon

16

Tsallis

ApEn
SampEn

Table 4- Attack Classification Results

The features selected, and the quantity of features selected, varied significantly
among the different entropy types and analysis sources. Table 4 details the results of
these variations. The bolded feature numbers under the “Features Selected” column
were common to more than 50% of the analysis results grouped by “Attack” type. The
table also shows the relationship of the entropy type by attack type used in the calculation
of correctly classified attacks and the number of features varied.
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Table 5 presents a different view of the results from Table 4. Table 5 is sorted by
the number of features found and entropy type, all grouped by attack type. It is observed
that entries with the minimum number of features selected were not necessarily the best
correctly classified results for the attack type. The results also showed that the lowest
number of features selected varied between attack type and entropy type. The Sharma and
Mukherjee (2012) results were not included since their approach did not use the J48
classification tree method.

The features selected by the approaches used by Lima et al. (2012) and this
research produced varying results. However, there are commonalities among selected
features. Table 6 lists the number of features selected by Lima et al. and this research
along with the number of features selected which were in agreement with the results.
These counts were taken from the preceding tables to compare the different entropy
calculations used. This table demonstrates that even though significant variations in the
results became evident, a subset of feature commonalities existed.
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Attack
# Features
DoS

Source

Entropy

CC

7
8
8
9
10
11
14
15

Research
Lima
Lima
Lima
Research
Research
Research
Research

Shannon
Tsallis
Shannon
Rényi
ApEn
SampEn
Rényi
Tsallis

99.9541%
99.9586%
99.9495%
99.9632%
99.8989%
99.9081%
99.4578%
99.9357%

10
10
11
11
11
12
13
17

Research
Research
Lima
Lima
Lima
Research
Research
Research

ApEn
SampEn
Shannon
Rényi
Tsallis
Tsallis
Shannon
Rényi

98.4303
98.4303
99.5031
99.4266
99.3119
99.1577
99.0046
96.4778

10
11
12
12
12
13
13
13

Lima
Research
Lima
Research
Research
Lima
Research
Research

Tsallis
Rényi
Rényi
ApEn
SampEn
Shannon
Shannon
Tsallis

98.8582%
95.6107%
98.8582%
97.9485%
97.9485%
98.9058%
98.4733%
98.1393%

5
5
6
8
8
11
11
13

Lima
Lima
Lima
Research
Research
Research
Research
Research

Rényi
Tsallis
Shannon
ApEn
SampEn
Shannon
Rényi
Tsallis

99.4758%
99.4176%
99.5341%
98.6014%
98.6014%
99.0093%
98.4848%
98.5431%

Probe

R2L

U2R

Table 5 Listing of the Feature Selection Count sorted by Feature count
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Category/
Entropy Research
DoS
Rényi
14
Shannon
7
Tsallis
16

Lima

Agreement

9
8
8

4
4
6

Probe
Rényi
Shannon
Tsallis

17
13
12

11
11
11

8
5
3

R2L
Rényi
Shannon
Tsallis

11
13
13

12
13
10

4
8
7

U2R
Rényi
Shannon
Tsallis

11
11
13

5
6
5

2
5
2

Table 6 Summary of KDD CUP 99 attack selected features

In summary, the KDD CUP 99 analysis showed variations existed between the
results presented by Sharma and Mukherjee (2012), Lima et al. (2012), and this research.
The following were issues that influenced variations occurring in the results:


Methodology used in the calculations for the Rényi and Tsallis entropies
in the Lima et al. (2012), were very different from the approach used by
Sharma and Mukherjee (2012).



Subset of selected data for the analyses was different, since Lima et al.
(2012) only listed attack counts.

62

SRI Malware Data
This section used a real-world data source to validated and compare the approach
that analyzed the KDD CUP 99 data. This additional data source demonstrated the
applicability of different entropy calculations for feature selection from a real-world
collection of data, not previously used for feature selection. Phillip Porras, Director of the
Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International, provided a source of collected
malware intrusion data for this research. It consisted of files in pcap and other formats
that contained malware alerts identified by the BotHunter (n.d.) project.
BotHunter was a project developed under the Cyber-TA research program by the
Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International (BotHunter, n.d.). The system
classified communications from both incoming and outgoing traffic at a network
boundary. Algorithms detected potential malware intrusions by analyzing the sequence of
events that occurred during the exchange using a customized version of Snort (n.d.), as
noted in the BotHunter description. The events were classified and correlated to the
activity of the malware life cycle model.

SRI Malware Data Acquisition and Analysis Method
Phillip Porras, at SRI, provided access to the Index of releases for a malware
(n.d.) website used for this research. The website organized entries by days starting on
May 1, 2008. Upon selection of a date, the corresponding page was displayed which was
the “SRI's Multiperspective Malware Infection Analysis Page” for that date.
Appendix P displays a sample of the web page.
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Each row in “SRI's Multiperspective Malware Infection Analysis Page”
contained an alert entry triggered by a match from a Snort rule. Each alert contained
multiple links to individual text files, available for download, and the complete network
communications session in compressed pcap format. For this research, ten days of alerts
yielded 4,328 usable events. The following steps described the process used to acquire
and synthesize the SRI data for this research.

1. Primary web page. The web page for each date was saved into a file named
“Multiperspective Malware Analysis Page.htm”. A page from each of the
following dates was retrieved: 20080501, 20080502, 20080503, 20080504,
20080505, 20080506, 20080507, 20080508, 20080509, and 20080510. A
separate directory hosted each date in which the associated malware files
existed.

2. Identification of files to retrieve. Within the “Multiperspective Malware
Analysis Page.htm” files, there were many html “href” tags referencing
URL’s to files for download. A Linux command string to read the
“Multiperspective Malware Analysis Page.htm” files and select the URL’s
which contained character strings within the file name required for the
analysis. The file types contained the character strings of “pcap.gz” and
“virus-labels” within the URL. These character strings were entered into a file
name “ll”. Output of this command string created a script file named “file.sh”
for subsequent execution. A Linux “wget” command prepended each
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command line for the URL file retrieval. The following command string was
used:

cat Multiperspective\ Malware\ Analysis\ Page.htm |fgrep -f ll|sed -e
"s/href/\r\nhref/g"|grep http|cut -f2 -d\"|sed -e "s/^/wget
/g"

>file.sh

The commands in this string sent the contents of the files to the fgrep
command that selected lines contained in the character strings stored in file ll.
The sed command put a carriage return and new line characters in front of the
href tag. The grep selected lines that contained http character string. The cut
selected the second field from the line using a double quote (“) as the
delimiter. Lastly, the sed command put a wget character string at the
beginning of the line.

3. Download of files. Appendix Q displays a portion of the resultant “file.sh” for
the date of 20080501. This file ran on a command line with the named files
downloaded to the current directory. Appendix R displays a sample listing of
the downloaded files. The file extension designators are:
a. .pcap.gz – the compressed pcap file from the session capture. Step 5
described the process that expanded these files.
b. .alerts – contained the alerts generated by BotHunter.
c. .rules – contained the Snort rules that generated an alert.
d. .alerts_botHunter.txt – The report generated by BotHunter.
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e. .virus-labels – Reported the analysis of the suspicious test results from
VirusTotal (n.d.). It listed the viruses found in the pcap file from
different Anti-Virus vendors. The file has a hex based name and may
be associated with multiple pcap files. In some cases,
multiple .virus-labels files are associated with one pcap file.

Note: Appendix U lists the above named files of alerts, .rules,
alerts_botHunter.txt, and virus-labels.

4. Organizing files. As shown in Appendix R, the files names did not relate well
to each other. In order to improve file management, a program listed in
Appendix S, prepends a sequential numbering scheme to related files.
Appendix T shows a partial listing of the files for 20080501 and their
corresponding sequential numbering. The association showed the files with
the date and numbering “.associations” extensions file in each date directory.

5. Using tcpdump. To process the binary pcap.gz files, the files were
uncompressed using the Linux “gunzip” command. The “tcpdump”
command produced a readable text of packet activity. The “tcpdump”
command line used was used as follows:

cat pcap-file | tcpdump –r - > pcap-file.tcpdump
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6. Contents of tcpdump output. The tcpdump files listed the packet activity
that generated the malware attack records. WEKA used the features extracted
from these records for the feature selection process using the J48 classification
tree algorithm. Each of the expanded pcap.gz files generated between less
than 100 lines to over 80,000 lines of activity after the files were processed by
“tcpdump”.

7. Malware naming convention. In the files with the virus-labels extension, a
number of antivirus vendors were listed along with their assignment of their
name for the malware evaluated. There was no standardized malware naming
convention that existed among the different antivirus vendors. Only one
vendor, AntiVir, produced malware entries in all of the files. Not all vendors
had entries for all the malware files. The AntiVir vendor was selected as the
antivirus program for naming the malware in this research. Using one vendor
enabled a consistent and standard naming convention for this research;
therefore, the malware named by AntiVir provided the naming convention for
each occurrence.

8. Raw data assembly. The shell script named bf.sh collected all relevant raw
data from the files and assembled the information into one file that generated
the .arff file to use in WEKA. Appendix V lists the bf.sh script that ran in
each date directory and the output generated was saved as date.bf such as
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“20080501.bf”. All ten of the date.bf files were concatenated into one file,
named SRI.bf, which was used in the analysis.

9. Feature selection. The next task compiled all the features available for the
assessment used in the analysis. The features selected originated from the
tcpdump output, the rules files, and the alerts files. Reviewing the available
features and identifying those that had an impact on this analysis resulted in a
list of twenty-two features including the malware detected. Appendix W lists
and describes the twenty-two features chosen from the available data.

10. Extracting features. Appendix Y lists the Java application that extracted the
selected features from the data files. This program read the “SRI.bf” file as
described in Step 8 and generated the results in a comma separated value (csv)
format that was used in the data portion of the arff for WEKA. Additional
information was manually added to the csv-formatted data to make it
compliant with the WEKA arff formatting requirements. The resulting file
header information was similar to that in Appendix K but designed for the SRI
data. See Appendix X for a partial listing of the SRI data in arff format. The
partial listing displayed the formatted header information for the arff
information as required by WEKA at the start of the data portion. The total
number of records for the data portion of the WEKA file was 4,328.
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11. Analysis in WEKA. Analysis was conducted using WEKA with the arff file
generated from the SRI Malware data store for May 1, 2008 through
May 10, 2008. The file contained twelve malware attack types defined in
Appendix U. The WEKA application ran each of the five entropy calculations
using the J48 classification tree to determine which features influenced the
results, and calculated statistics on the results.

SRI Malware Analysis Data Preparation
This section discusses the analysis of the real-world data that applied five entropy
types to the feature selection process. In order to get different perspectives of the
analysis, multiple sets of runs were conducted for each entropy calculation, varied the
attributes, and focused on different labels and. The Shannon entropy was already
included in the WEKA application and the Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample
entropy calculations were added to WEKA in a manner consistent with that used by Lima
et al. (2012). The unique application of this research modeled the data to represent timebased sequences for the Approximate entropy (ApEn) and Sample entropy (SampEn) in
the classification model similar to that of Yentes et al. (2013).
Defining the different combinations for the entropy calculations resulted in 221
unique parameter configurations that provided detailed results. Each run had the entropy
type and associated parameters varied as described in Table 7. The tunable parameter for
the Rényi and Tsallis entropy calculations, the α term, denoted the sensitivity to the
probability distribution shapes. For the Approximate and Sample entropy calculations the
tunable parameters were the window size, m, and the amount of the standard deviation
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used, r. The results compared the number of features selected by the different entropy
types. The data used was from the SRI BotHunter application and included the complete
set of 4,328 records labeled with appropriate malware descriptors.

Entropy

Parametric values

Shannon

None

Rényi

α = 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99

11

Tsallis

α = 1.01, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.99

11

m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9

99

Approximate

Sample

Number of runs
1

r = 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99
m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9

99

r = 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99

Table 7 - Parametric values used in SRI analysis

Three sets of analyses conducted provided alternative views of the results. Each
analysis utilized a different approach to the data labeling. The first analysis used the
complete data set with the ten-malware types as listed in Appendix W. The goal was to
identify the entropy type that produced the lowest number of features required when
using all ten malware attacks as the labels.
The second analysis examined the ten-malware attacks individually by the
generating ten different data sets, each analyzing one specific attack. This goal was to
determine the least number of features required to identify individual malware attacks
labeled within the whole set of data. Ten separate runs were made, one for each malware
attack as the label.
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This third analysis looked at the data by infection type labeled as the field Enum
in Appendix W. This analysis grouped the different malware attacks based upon
communication flows between the internal host and a set of external hosts into infection
types identified by the BotHunter application Cheung and Valdes (2009). Each activity
entry was labeled with the infection type for the analysis.

SRI Malware Results

Results of the three analyses are presented. Each one shows that the percent of
correctly classified values were mostly very high and close to each other numerically,
however, the number of features required to select the correct malware showed much
wider variation. The details are discussed in the remainder of this section.

Analysis one – Data labeled by Malware attack
In this first analysis, the data was labeled with the appropriate malware attack as
identified in Appendix W. Each entropy calculation varied the parameters with the
number of runs as shown in Table 7. The complete results from the WEKA runs for this
analysis are presented in Appendix Z. The lowest number of features required for each
entropy type are listed in Table 8.
Results showed that Tsallis, Sample, and Rényi entropy required six features for
correct classification of the ten-malware attacks. Tsallis entropy had the highest correctly
classified value of 99.9312%, followed by Sample entropy at 99.2428%. Rényi entropy
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also required six features, but the correctly classified percentage was 90.3167%, which
was 8.9621% to 10.3888% lower than the Tsallis and Sample entropy correctly classified
values. Shannon entropy had a correctly classified value of 99.8853% but required 8
features.
For the Tsallis, Sample, and Rényi entropy calculations, the minimum number of
features occur at only one point for each of the parameter combinations. This is quite
different for Approximate entropy since the minimum number of features occur for a
wide range parameter combinations. As previously noted, all the results for this analysis
are listed in Appendix Z. These results in Table 8 show that Tsallis and Sample entropy
require the fewest number of features with the highest correct classification percentage.

Entropy

#FS

CC

Parameters

Tsallis

6

99.9312%

alpha=1.9

Sample

6

99.2428%

m=1; r=0.2

Rényi

6

90.3167%

alpha=0.5

Approximate

7

99.1051%

m=2;r=0.01, 0.1, 0.2
m=3,4; r=0.01,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7
m=5,6,7,8,9; r=0.01,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,0.99

Shannon

8

99.8853%

Table 8 – Lowest feature count by entropy type using the full set of SRI Malware data

Analysis two – Data labeled individually by Malware attack
Analysis two examined the number of features required to identify each specific
malware attack by each entropy type using the entire data. In these runs, only one
malware attack examined was labeled with the attack name, and the remaining entries
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were labeled as “other”. The number of WEKA runs for this analysis was 2,210 since
there were 221 combinations of the entropy calculations used times the 10 malware
attacks. WEKA was not able to produce the selection of features that identify the attack
for several of the entropy combinations. In those cases, an “NA” was entered for the
number of features. Different methods are available to provide data for missing points as
in this case that are entered as “NA”. Schafer and Graham (2002) identified different
processes for interpreting missing data points. A discussion of these missing points is in
Chapter 5. Table 9 shows the minimum number of features required for identifying the
individual attacks by entropy type.

Malware

Type

BE1
NA

BE2
2

BE3
4

BH1
4

BH2
3

BH4
6

ET1
3

NB
4

SH
3

TFTP
1

NA

3

NA

3

3

NA

NA

1

2

NA

2

1

1

3

3

4

3

1

3

1

Tsallis

NA

3

NA

3

3

2

3

1

2

1

Sample

NA

10

1

5

2

3

NA

1

NA

1

2

1

1

3

2

2

3

1

2

1

Approximate
Renyi
Shannon

Min #FS

Table 9 – Minimum number of features required to identify the individual malware.

Results shown in Table 9 indicate that when considering only one malware attack
at a time, the Shannon entropy has the highest success rate at requiring the minimum
number of features for 7 malware types. The remaining order is Tsallis for 6 types,
Sample for 4 types, Rényi for 3 types, and Approximate entropy for 2 types.
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Analysis three – Data labeled individually by Infection type
The BotHunter application by SRI detected bot related malware into five common
types of infections based upon the communications between the internal and external
hosts (Cheung & Valdes, 2009). Two infections of the five identified by Cheung and
Valdes are part of the SRI data store retrieved for this research and contain the ten
different malware attacks as listed in Appendix W and described in Table 10. In this
analysis, the label used was the infection designation: E2 or E3.

Infection

Description

Malware designations

E2

External-to-internal inbound exploit

BE1, NB, SH

E3

Internal-to-external binary acquisition

BE2, BE3, BH1, BH2, BH4, ET1, TFTP

Table 10 - Infection type description

The results presented in Table 11 show the minimum number of features required
to identify the infection type for the data provided. All of the correct classification
percentages are quite close to each other, so the primary difference is in the number of
features required to identify the infection types in a single run by each entropy. The
results showed that Sample and Rényi entropy each require 1 feature.
#FS

CC

Approximate

3

99.8853%

Renyi

1

99.6329%

Shannon

4

100.0000%

Tsallis

3

99.9312%

Sample

1

99.6329%

Infection

Table 11- Number of features selected for identifying E2 and E3 infection types
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Summary
This chapter provided analytic details of the research using the KDD CUP 99 data
and the SRI Malware data. Work consisted of algorithm development using Java for the
Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate and Sample entropy algorithms and their integration into the
open source WEKA application. Additional programs developed in Java and Linux shell
scripts conducted data manipulation and management.
The first part of the research duplicated the work by Lima et al. (2012). This
included creating files that represented the attacks from the KDD CUP 99 data in a
manner that closely replicated the work of Lima et al. The classification mechanism was
the WEKA J48 tree classification with the ten-fold validation option. The representative
files were the run in separate WEKA executions using the Shannon, Rényi, and Tsallis
entropy in the J48 decision tree calculations. From these runs, a comparison of the correct
classification percentages and features selected were made. Results showed that the
correct classification percentages were close to that of Lima et al.; however, the number
of features selected varied. The next step included the use of Approximate and Sample
entropy calculations in separate WEKA executions. In general, results showed that the
correct classification percentages were close to that of Lima et al., however the number of
features selected varied from the results of Lima et al. These summarized results are in
Table 5 and Table 6.
The second part of the research applied a similar process as used for analysis of
the KDD CUP 99 data to a set of real-world data that has not been used for this pupose.
The source was from the SRI Cyber Threat Analysis lab using BotHunter application that
captures malware attacks. Assembly of the data required the retrieveal and processing of
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multiple files to identify and extract a set of features for the analysis. The WEKA
application used the J48 classification model and determined the number of features
required and correct classification percentage for the different sets of data. There were
three different labeled groups of data used. Each set contained 4,328 activity entries. The
first group used the different malware attacks as the labels to determine the number of
featires needed to identify the attacks all together. The second set of data used all the data
points one at a time. There were ten separate groups of runs made. The data containing
the specific attack was labeled with that attack identifier, while the entries in the file were
labeled as “other”. The third set used the infection type as the label from which the data
acquired contained two infection types. In addition to the three sets of data, the five
entropy types had their parameters varied to cover a wide set of occurrences for a total of
221 runs per data set as detailed in Table 7.
The results showed the following:


The first set of data labeled with all of the malware attacks showed that
Shannon, Sample, and Rényi each required six features to identify the
malware attacks. The Shannon and Sample entropies each had correct
classifications above 99%. The Rényi entropy was at 90%. Approximate and
Tsallis each had correct classifications over 99% but they required seven and
eight features respectively. Table 8 contains these results.



Data sets for the second analysis looked at each of the the malware attacks
individually for a total of 2,210 runs. Results showed that all the entropies
except Shannon had at least one instance at which it was not able to identify
the specific malware. The minimum number of features required for the
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Shannon had 7, Tsallis with 6, Sample with 4, Rényi with 3, and Approximate
entropy with 2.


The third analysis that labeled the data by infection type showed that Sample
and Rényi entropies required only one feature, Tsallis entropy required 3
features, and Shannon entropy required 4 features. All of the entropy types
had a correct classification rate of well over 99% with Shannon entropy at
100%.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
The work conducted in this research shows that using different entropy
calculations and data labeling techniques in the feature selection process impacts the
results when using intrusion detection data. This research discussed the use of entropy in
feature selection and results achieved using the KDD CUP 99 data and SRI Malware
data. Also identified were potential applications of this research to the intrusion detection
processes and systems. The end of this chapter contains a summary of the entire research
paper and provides a concise description of the research accomplished and potential
applications in the use of this work.
Entropy calculations measure the randomness of data. Comparing two sets of
entropy calculations provide a measure of information gained between the two
measurements. Claude Shannon applied entropy to information processing in a paper in
1948. His formula was straightforward with no tunable parameters and adapted well for
use with intrusion detection data. Lima et al. (2012) examined the impact of entropy on
feature selection using Shannon’s formula, they added Rényi and Tsallis entropy
formulas, and analyzed the same set of data that produced different views of the results.
This research extended the techniques used by Lima et al. (2012) and added
Approximate and Sample entropy to the feature selection process using intrusion
detection data. Approximate and Sample entropy were typically used for biomechanical
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data analysis in the past (Yentes et al. 2013). This is the first known use of Approximate
and Sample entropy applied to intrusion detection data.
Rényi and Tsallis entropy contain a sensitivity factor, called alpha, within the
calculation. This factor provided a mechanism that adjusted the impact of the probability
distribution. Approximate and Sample entropy each have two variable parameters. Since
these entropy types were time based, the variable m defined a sliding window that
determined the number of points to consider at a time. The second variable is a
multiplication factor, r, between zero and one, calculated a portion of the standard
deviation for the number of points within the window.
Using a specified range of values for these parameters of the Rényi, Tsallis,
Approximate, and Sample entropy enabled a profile of views of the results for the
number of features, features selected, and correct classifications percentages. Different
combinations of these variables produced significantly different results as shown is
Appendix Z. To determine the best combination for the analysis, an inclusive range of
variable values must obtain an overall view of the feature count, features selected, and the
correctly classification result. This was accomplished by using the programs developed
by the WEKA J48 tool during this research. The results produced a classification tree that
showed how specific variable values and features contributed to the identification of the
labeled data.
Lima et al. (2012) used Shannon, Rényi, and Tsallis entropy to select features
from a subset of the KDD CUP 99 data set. Their results showed that the Rényi and
Tsallis entropy calculation performed well with the C4.5 classification tree for feature
selection with high correct percentage classification values. This research extended
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Lima’s work to include Approximate and Sample entropy. Results from Approximate and
Sample entropy were in line with Lima et al. results for correct classification, however
the feature count and features selected differed from the results Lima et al. reported. In
order to provide validation to the inclusion of Approximate and Sample entropy to the
C4.5 classification algorithm, an additional new intrusion detection data set was
implemented. Data obtained from SRI Cyber Threat Analysis organization was
assembled during this research into label data sets. This was the first time the SRI data
was labeled and used to conduct feature selection research.
Research conducted by Lima et al. (2012) contained recommendations for Rényi
and Tsallis entropy settings of the alpha term. Yentes et al. (2013) recommended settings
for the variable parameter settings of window size and statistics terms in Approximate
and Sample entropy. The recommendations from both these groups enabled their research
to attain results that were conducive to their findings.
The work for this thesis extended these findings through the application of Rényi,
Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample entropy into the C4.5 classification tree analysis using
a well-known data set, the KDD CUP 99 data; and using a new set of real-world data not
previously analyzed in this manner, the SRI Malware data. This unique approach
produced results discussed in the following sections.
A data-mining package from the University of Waikato in New Zealand, called
WEKA, was the data mining analysis tool used in this research. Supervised learning by
the C4.5 decision tree method, developed by Quinlan (1986), was included in WEKA
within the J48 classification module. Results from the J48 module produced a decision
tree that identified features observed, their values in the tree, and correctly and
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incorrectly classified results and percentages. A representation of this decision tree is
located in Appendix N.
The C4.5 classification tree analysis was part of WEKA and implemented in Java
in the J48 module. The J48 module included the Shannon entropy and this research
developed the algorithms for Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample entropy, and
integrated them into the WEKA J48 calculation. Each of the Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate,
and Sample entropy calculations contained parameters that were varied to optimize
results. Based upon the entropy calculation used, and the parametric values chosen for
those entropy calculations that contain variables, the resulting J48 classification tree
identified the features required to classify the activity.
This research demonstrated that more than one view of the data provided
additional options in the area of feature selection. The main methodology used to obtain
different views included:


Labeling. The classification tree lists the features and values needed to
identify an attack or series of attacks based upon how the data was labeled.



Entropy and entropy variables values. Created for the analysis, was a
range of values for the alpha variable in the Rényi and Tsallis entropy
calculation; and the m and r variables for Approximate, and Sample
entropy calculations that generated a profile of the different values in the
results.



Comparing different views. Comparing the results from different entropy
calculations or different views can identify commonalities of features that
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impact the results. The results can also be used to identify unique features
that define a specific attack that are not common to other attacks or views.

Using the output of the classification tree provided information for rule generation
of an intrusion detection system. These rules can examine the traffic for capturing attacks
traversing across the network. This assumed the static model was representative of the
actual traffic.

In most dynamic networks, the traffic patterns change over time. To accommodate
this change, periodically, another set of data would be collected and labeled
appropriately. The new set of data was analyzed in a static manner as conducted in this
research. Changes were made in the detection rules that were the most applicable to the
traffic and resources available.
By having more than one view of the data available, some options become more
applicable to different situations such as:


Choosing entropy results that minimized the number of features and
maximized correctly identified percentages.



Tradeoffs among the number of features required, specific features
identified, maximize correct performance, and the ability to extract
features from the data stream.



Select the labeling method that provided the greatest advantage for the
situation. This may be a result that overlapped certain features for the
developed rules that share common features.
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These different scenarios described show some of the power and applicability of
using the analysis techniques put forth in this research. One application of these results
may be for rule development in that the information provides a potential starting point
that can improve, reduce, or stop malicious activity from infecting the computing
networks and computer systems. Traffic composition generally changes over time and a
periodic re-evaluation of the parameters should be performed to maintain the freshness of
the detection capabilities.

Another aspect of the data used in feature selection involved labeling of the data.
Data labeling enabled multiple views of the results based the entropy, values used in the
entropy calculation, and the labels of the attack categories. Labeled data enabled the use
of supervised learning and the method of data labeling defined supplemented the view. In
the KDD CUP 99 data set, the data was labeled by attack type. In other data sets, the
labels may be a specific attack or attack groupings. The SRI results section discussed the
different types of data labeling actions conducted during this research

KDD CUP 99 Data Conclusions

In the KDD CUP 99 data, each activity entry was labeled by a specific category.
The J48 calculation and selected entropy produced results that named features and their
associated values used in the classification tree. Table 2 lists the different categories and
specific attacks within the KDD CUP 99 data. This labeling enabled the quantity and
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identification of features that classified the specific attack and normal traffic. This
analysis was conducted using the four attack categories with each of the five entropy
types. Also, the J48 classification tree included the both the correctly and incorrectly
classified results and percentages. This provided information as to the effectiveness of a
specific entropy with the associated parametric settings.
Constructing sets of KDD CUP 99 data with the same distribution of attacks used
by Lima et al. (2012) enabled the comparison of the results with this research. The
analysis employed the WEKA J48 classification tree that identified features and the
correct classification results for the four attack categories. Conclusions derived from the
results displayed in Table 5 for the KDD CUP 99 data, were as follows:


The correct classifications of attacks were very similar in the DoS (within
0.5%) and U2R (within 1.0%) categories but the number of features
selected varied by a count of 8 for both DoS and U2R.



The Probe and R2L attack categories varied more in the correct
classification of the attacks. Nearly 3.0% for Probe and 3.3% for R2L. The
overall feature counts varied by 7 for Probe and 3 for R2L.



The Approximate and Sample entropy values for correctly classified
attacks were within 1% of the best values and were the same for the Probe,
R2L, and U2R attack categories. The features selected were also the same
for these categories.



The Approximate and Sample entropy values for the DoS attack category
were also within 1% of the best values, however the Sample entropy was
slightly better in the results.
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The features selected were different between the Approximate and Sample
entropy values for the DoS attack category. This was due large to the
number of duplicate entries in this attack category as compared to the
other attack categories.



The absence of Sharma and Mukherjee (2012) results was due to their use
of a single entropy, that of Shannon, and they used the Naïve Bayes
classifier as their method of feature selection. The results that they
achieved produced lower correct classified values than in this research and
that of Lima et al. (2012).

Observed differences in the results between Lima et al. (2012) and this research
were partly due to the selection of the specific records from the KDD CUP 99 data set.
Other differences observed included the implementation of the Rényi and Tsallis entropy
calculations within WEKA. Multiple random selections of records from KDD CUP 99
resulted in varied correctly classified percentages. Since the exact KDD CUP 99 records
used by Lima et al. were unknown, the approximation of the attack make up used the
counts documented by Lima et al. Chapter 4 addressed inconsistencies with the attack
counts in this research.

SRI Malware Data Conclusions

The WEKA J48 tree classification method calculated the results for this research
using real-world SRI Malware data with the Shannon, Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate, and
Sample entropies and this was the first time this data was used for entropy research.
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Depending on the variable parametric values, each entropy type produced some results
with a low number of features but most had high correct classification percentages as
shown in Table 8.
Tsallis and Sample entropy produced the highest correctly classified results of
99.9312% and 99.2428% respectively, and with the least number of features of 6. Rényi
entropy also required only 6 features but resulted in the lowest correctly classified results
of 92.3818%. Appendix Z contains the complete results of the SRI data analysis showing
the entropy calculations used, parameter settings, correctly classified results, and the
number of features selected.
As seen in the results of this research with the SRI data, the agreement with the
correct classification was within the same general range as that of the KDD CUP 99 data.
In analyzing SRI data, no previous research existed for this type of study. Most of the
results were high in values for the correct classification and low for the number of
features selected, which varied minimally as shown in Table 8.
When considering the individual malware attacks, described in the analysis of the
SRI data, the number of features required dropped significantly as detailed in Table 9.
Examining an individual attack, and generalizing all the remaining data as “other”,
allowed the analysis to focus on the one specific type of attack and selected these features
that only identified those activities.
When labeling the data by infection type, as denoted by enum in Appendix W,
results were more pronounced as shown in Table 11. The correct classification
percentages were all over 99% for each entropy type, but the number of features required
to detect the infection was only 1 for Sample and Rényi entropies, 3 for Approximate and
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Tsallis entropies, and 4 for Shannon. The infection types along with their associate
malware attacks are in Table 10.
When evaluating results of the three analyses together, the averages showed how
the different entropies and labeling strategies significantly impacted the number of
features required. The row numbers in Table 12 below referenced a different table
containing the data. In row 1, the number of features for each entropy type originated
from Table 8 that corresponds to Full Set of SRI data. In row 2, the number of features
for each entropy type is from Table 9 that corresponded to Individual Malware. The
number of features for each entropy type in row 3 is from Table 11 that corresponds to
Infection Type.
The WEKA J48 classification tree analysis was unable to produce results with
certain attack/entropy combinations. Some of the data points in Table 9 contain an “NA”
for values. In order to quantify these points, “NA”, a method described by Schafer and
Graham (2002) as the Available-case analysis, was used. This process considered a
pairwise inclusion of data to estimate the missing values. The pair assumed for this
analysis, is the maximum value determined by other calculations, which was 10. Values
other than 10 for the substitution of “NA” produced similar representative results.
Labeling

Table
Ref

Shannon

Rényi

Tsallis

Approximate

Sample

Full Set of SRI data

8.0

6.0

6.0

7.0

6.0

Individual Malware

2.2

6.2

4.2

4.2

5.9

9

Infection Type

4.0

1.0

3.0

3.0

1.0

11

Average

4.7

4.4

4.3

4.7

4.1

Table 12 - Average number of features required from the three SRI analyses
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Results, from Table 12, show how the number of features vary based upon the
data labeling used. The feature count and average feature count varies for the different
analyses by using the complete set of data and adjusting the labeling to focus on
particular views.

Overall Conclusion
Labeling of data affects the results produced. The results from the classification
tree provided the number of features, the features selected, and the correct classification
percentages. The KDD CUP 99 data used only one labeling method in an effort to show
how the Approximate and Sample entropy calculations impacted the classification tree
results.
By having different labeling scenarios available, the selection of features that best
identified a specific attack was possible in an intrusion detection system. This also
supported the proposal that subsequent analyses be conducted periodically with a new
collection of labeled data to keep intrusion detection current with changes occurring in
network traffic patterns. Knowledge gained from previous results using combination of
entropies and their variable assignments may shorten the analyses of the newly collected
data.

Implications

This research supported previous work that showed the feature selection actually
reduced the number of fields required to analyze intrusion detection data. By analyzing
different models through the labeling of data to detect specific attacks or groupings of
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attacks provided additional views of the results and assisted in the selection and
application that best fit the purpose of the analysis. These techniques should apply to
other types of data to be analyzed. Where others have used biomechanical data for
classification and feature selection, this research used intrusion detection data.
Selection of tunable parameters for the entropy type, in conjunction with C4.5
classification tree analysis, produced differences in results especially in the features
selected and number of features selected. Duplicate entries within the data set influenced
the Sample entropy calculations. Since the Sample entropy suppressed duplicate records
in the calculations, it generally produced better results than Approximate entropy
especially with the malware data that contained a large number of duplicate records.

Recommendations
The use of different labels for the data provided more than one view of the data.
This enabled the user and implementer additional information from which to choose the
best results for their needs. These results can assist in better performance of an intrusion
detection system for specific attacks or groups of attacks by selecting the best
combination of features that identify the attack.
Varying the values of the tunable parameters in the entropy calculations affected
the results of feature selection. To obtain the best results required multiple runs using
sequential variation of the parameters that developed a set empirical data to identify the
optimal number of features required. These runs should be conducted periodically to
represent the current network traffic.

89

This research focused on the WEKA J48 classification method as used by Lima et
al. (2012). Results of this thesis supported the additional study of the benefits of entropy
using Shannon, Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample entropy for intrusion detection
systems data. Different models of the data looked at specific attacks or groupings of
attacks through the labels associated with the activity. Variation of the tunable parameters
demonstrated how the features selected could differ based upon the data labeling strategy
chosen.
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Summary
The goal of this research was to minimize the number of features required in a set
of intrusion detection data that rapidly identifies malicious activity while maintaining the
integrity of the data set. By reducing the redundant features, irrelevant features, and
noise, it was possible to decrease the number of features required that rapidly analyze the
data for identifying anomalous activities. This focus was on the application of entropy in
feature selection process of labeled data sets. Feature selection is the process of
identifying features from a set of data that are relevant to the analyses. Reasons for
feature selection are to reduce the size of the data set and more efficiently use the
computing resources. Using the C4.5 decision tree developed by Quinlan (1986), the
results can be readily adapted for developing rules for intrusion detection systems. This
work also showed the positive impact of how different labeling methods provide
additional results for implementation of intrusion detection mechanisms.
This work began by replicating the work of Lima et al. (2012) who used C4.5
classification tree method in the WEKA data mining analysis tool to select features from
intrusion detection data. They used a subset of the well-known KDD CUP 99 data file for
selecting the features required to identify the four-attack types labeled in the data using
Shannon, Rényi, and Tsallis entropy. WEKA includes the Shannon entropy and Lima et
al. added the algorithms for Rényi and Tsallis.
The research for this thesis added the Rényi and Tsallis to WEKA, and replicated
the results of Lima et al. (2012) to develop a base line of reference that validated the
entropy calculations developed for the records and integrated into the data-mining tool.
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Results showed good agreement with Lima et al. for correct classification percentages,
however, the number of features and specific features varied.
This research extended the use of entropy in feature selection to include
Approximate and Sample entropy typically used in time-series based data. Yentes et al.
(2013) used Approximate and Sample entropy for feature selection with biomechanical
data. Analysis using these two entropies demonstrated new results with the KDD CUP 99
data.
This research programmed four entropy calculations that were added to WEKA
source code. Each formula contained variables that could be optimized to obtain the
result. Rényi and Tsallis contained an alpha term that adjusted the sensitivity of the
entropy calculation’s impact on the results. Approximate and Sample entropy contained
two adjustable parameters. Since they were time based, one parameter, named m, defined
how many points were included in a calculation. The second variable, r, defined the
portion of the standard deviation of the data within the window size, m, to use in the
entropy calculation. Results of using Approximate and Sample were similar to correct
classification percentage that Lima et al. (2012) achieved. Again, the number of features,
and specific features were different.
In order to validate the process developed for this research, a second set of data
from SRI Cyber-TA BotHunter (n.d.) project was used. This data was retrieved from a
series of files that collected different features of the malware attack. Assembling the SRI
data into a usable format for the WEKA analysis, required the development of additional
applications using Java and Linux shell scripts that enabled the extraction, conversion,
normalization, and labeling of the data.
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Three types of analysis were conducted with the SRI data that used three different
labeling methods. The first method labeled each row of activity by the specific malware
identified for that row. The second method labeled considered only one malware attack
for the rows of that malware and with the remaining rows labeled with “other” resulting
in ten files for analysis. The third method labeled each row with one of the two infection
types identified in the SRI data files. These different labeling methods enabled the results
to show how the combination of labels, different entropy calculations, and variable values
influenced the number of features, features selected, and the correct classification results.
The following lists the values for the variables chosen for the Rényi, Tsallis,
Approximate, and Sample entropy calculations:
Rényi
alpha = 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99.
Tsallis
alpha = 1.01, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.99.
Approximate and Sample
m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
r = 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99.

The C4.5 classification tree, developed by Quinlan (1986), was implemented in
the WEKA analysis package as the J48 module programmed in Java. The code developed
for this research for the Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample entropy calculations
was integrated into the J48 module. Output from the J48 module provided a classification

93

tree that identified the structure with features names, their values, and dependencies as
shown below.
Partial sample of a classification tree
SWBn = 0
|
seqRange <= 102: other (349.0)
|
seqRange > 102
|
|
toPort <= 8147
|
|
|
priority <= 1: WIN (2127.0)
|
|
|
priority > 1
|
|
|
|
toPort <= 470: other (70.0)
|
|
|
|
toPort > 470: WIN (305.0)
|
|
toPort > 8147
|
|
|
toPort <= 9996: other (35.0)
|
|
|
toPort > 9996: WIN (16.0)
SWBn = 1
|
enum = E2
|
|
seqRange <= 1260: WIN (4.0)
|
|
seqRange > 1260: other (34.0)
|
enum = E3: other (1418.0)

o
o
o

In the table below, multiple labeling methods demonstrated how the number of
features varied based upon how the data was labeled. The row labeled “Individual
Malware” was an average of the number of features required to identify the ten unique
malware attacks. The bottom row labeled “Average” was an equally weighted average of
the three labeling methods in the table.

Labeling

Shannon

Rényi

Tsallis

Approximate

Sample

Full Set of SRI data

8.0

6.0

6.0

7.0

6.0

Individual Malware

2.2

6.2

4.2

4.2

5.9

Infection Type

4.0

1.0

3.0

3.0

1.0

Average

4.7

4.4

4.3

4.7

4.1
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Since the overall composition of packets that flow across a network may evolve
over time, analyzing the features and their values used for the rules periodically focused
to identifying new attacks to the network and the computer systems attached. Conducting
subsequent analyses would require collecting traffic into a set of files used for analysis.
This collection may consist of a complete set of traffic at collection points, only packet
headers, or the traffic may be a filtered to eliminate known good and/or known bad
traffic.

This research showed how several different techniques in the use of entropy for
feature selection provided benefits by reducing the volume of data for identifying attacks
against computers and networks. Other accomplishments included:


The five entropy calculations made showed how the results differ for
number of features selected, specific features selected, and correctly
classified results.



The classification tree output provided the information needed to identify
the number of features, the specific features, and the correctly classified
results for the labeled set of data.



Different labeling methodologies had an impact by constructing a table
that shows the results referencing the number of features required across
multiple scenarios.



When using Rényi, Tsallis, Approximate, and Sample entropy, the values
assigned to the parameters impacted the results. By substituting a range of
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values for those parameters, a profile of the results created to determine
the least number of features required to identify a specific attack.


Using the classification tree output, the parameters for use in an intrusion
detection are presented and directly applicable to rule development.

Other implications from this research were identified that the analysis must be
conducted periodically to maintain operation of the intrusion detection system at optimal
performance level as network traffic changes over time. This research showed positive
impact and advanced the feasibility of using multiple entropy calculations to reduce the
number of features required to identify specific methods for intrusion detection data. The
full complements of analyses available demonstrated the different options available to
identify malware. It also showed how labeling the data could optimize the number of
features selected as shown in the different examples. An implementer can apply these
results to the intrusion detection system based upon their needs and environment of the
networks and computer systems.
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Appendices
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Appendix A: Listing of Modified EntropyBasedSplitCrit Class
This is the Java listing of the modified EntropyBasedSplitCrit Class.
/*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*/
/*
*
*
*
*/
/*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*/

This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.

EntropyBasedSplitCrit.java
Copyright (C) 1999 Eibe Frank

This class has the following modifications made in order
to accommodate the use of different entropy calculations
Method varInitialize() = initializes entropy variable
by instantiating a call to the method that reads the
configuration file. Also prints out the parameters used.
Method logFunc() = modified to use the different entropy calculations
calculations.
Method oldEnt() = modified to use the different entropy calculations
calculations.
Author: Frank Acker – December 2014

package weka.classifiers.trees.j48;
/**
* "Abstract" class for computing splitting criteria
* based on the entropy of a class distribution.
*
* @author Eibe Frank (eibe@cs.waikato.ac.nz)
* @version $Revision: 1.5 $
*/
public abstract class EntropyBasedSplitCrit extends SplitCriterion{
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
/** The log of 2. */
protected static double log2 = Math.log(2);
public double alpha; // for Reni and Tsallis entropy
public int ET; // entropy type number
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public int m; // window size for ApEn and SampEn
public double r; // & of standard deviation for ApEn and SampEn.
public boolean D; // Debugger
private static ApproximateEntropy ae = new ApproximateEntropy();
public static SampleEntropy se
= new SampleEntropy();
private static boolean readFile = false; // read file once per execution
public static entUtils eu = new entUtils();
public static fileRead fr = new fileRead();

public final void varInitialize() {
eu.getFileInfo();
ET
= fr.getEType();
alpha = fr.getAlpha();
m
= fr.getM();
r
= fr.getR();
D
= fr.getD();
String C = ",";
if (D) System.out.println("varInitialize - readFile");
if (D) System.out.println("ET, alpha, m, r, D " + ET + C + alpha + C
+ m + C + r + C + D);
}
/**
* Help method for computing entropy.
*/
public final double logFunc(double num) {
if (!readFile) {
readFile = true;
varInitialize();
if (D) System.out.println("logFunc - readFile");
}
//
if
if
if
if
if

Constant hard coded for efficiency reasons
(num < 1e-6) return 0;
(ET == 0) return num*Math.log(num)/log2;
(ET == 1) return Math.pow(num, alpha);
(ET == 2) return Math.pow(num, alpha);
(ET == 3) {
return num*Math.log(num)/log2;

}
if (ET == 4) {
return num*Math.log(num)/log2;
}
return -99.0; // entered to satisify eclipse
}
/**
* Computes entropy of distribution before splitting.
*/
public final double oldEnt(Distribution bags) {
double returnValue = 0;
int j;
if (D) System.out.println("oldEnt - bags.numClasses()="+bags.numClasses());
if (ET == 0 || ET == 1 || ET == 2) {
for (j=0;j<bags.numClasses();j++) {
returnValue = returnValue + logFunc(bags.perClass(j));
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if (D) System.out.println("oldEnt - j="+j+"
bags.perClass(j)="+bags.perClass(j));
}
}
if (ET == 3 || ET == 4) {
double [] apsampClasses = new double[bags.numClasses()];
for (j = 0; j < bags.numClasses(); j++) {
apsampClasses[j] = bags.perClass(j);
if (D) System.out.println("oldEnt AE - j="+j+"
bags.perClass(j)="+bags.perClass(j)+" apsampClasses[j]="+apsampClasses[j]);
}
if (ET == 3) returnValue = returnValue + ae.ApEn(apsampClasses,m,r);
if (ET == 4) returnValue = returnValue +
se.SampEn(apsampClasses,m,r);
}
if (D) System.out.println("oldEnt - bags.total()="+bags.total());
if (ET == 0 || ET == 3 || ET == 4) return logFunc(bags.total()) returnValue;
if (ET == 1) return (((Math.log (logFunc(bags.total()) )/log2)/(1.0 alpha)) - ((Math.log(returnValue)/log2))/(1.0 - alpha));
if (ET == 2) return ((logFunc(bags.total()))/(alpha - 1.0)) - (returnValue
/(alpha - 1.0));
return 0.0;
}
/**
* Computes entropy of distribution after splitting.
*/
public final double newEnt(Distribution bags) {
double returnValue = 0;
int i,j;
if (D) System.out.println("newEnt - bags.numBags="+bags.numBags());
if (D) System.out.println("newEnt - bags.numClasses="+bags.numClasses());
for (i=0;i<bags.numBags();i++){
if (ET ==0 || ET == 1 || ET == 2) {
for (j=0;j<bags.numClasses();j++) {
returnValue = returnValue+logFunc(bags.perClassPerBag(i,j));
if (D) System.out.println("newEnt - i,j="+i+","+j+"
bags.perClassPerBag(i,j)="+bags.perClassPerBag(i,j) + "
returnValue="+returnValue);
}
}
if (ET == 3 || ET == 4) {
double [] apsampClasses = new double[bags.numClasses()];
for (j = 0; j < bags.numClasses(); j++) {
apsampClasses[j] = bags.perClass(j);
if (D) System.out.println("oldEnt AE/SE - j="+j+"
bags.perClass(j)="+bags.perClass(j)+" apsampClasses[j]="+apsampClasses[j]);
}
if (ET == 3) returnValue = returnValue + ae.ApEn(apsampClasses,m,r);
if (ET == 4) returnValue = returnValue +
se.SampEn(apsampClasses,m,r);
}
returnValue = returnValue-logFunc(bags.perBag(i));
if (D) System.out.println("newEnt - i="+i+"
bags.perBag(i)="+bags.perBag(i)+" returnValue="+returnValue);
}
return -returnValue;
}
/**
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* Computes entropy after splitting without considering the
* class values.
*/
public final double splitEnt(Distribution bags) {
double returnValue = 0;
int i;
if (D) System.out.println("splitEnt");
for (i=0;i<bags.numBags();i++)
returnValue = returnValue+logFunc(bags.perBag(i));
return logFunc(bags.total())-returnValue;
}
}
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Appendix B: Listing of ApproximateEntropy Class
package weka.classifiers.trees.j48;
/**
* Class for computing Approximate Entropy
* based on the entropy of a class distribution.
*
* @version $Revision: 1.0 $
*/
/* Approximate Entropy
* basic code retrieved Oct 18, 2014 from
* http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/27030/ \
*
Approximate-and-Sample-Entropies-Complexity-Metric
*
* It has since been modified for use in this application.
*
*
Author: Frank Acker – December 2014
*/
public

class ApproximateEntropy extends EntropyBasedSplitCrit{

/**
*
*/
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
/* Approximate Entropy
* basic code retrieved Oct 18, 2014 from
* http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/27030/Approximate-and-SampleEntropies-Complexity-Metric
*
* It has since been modified for use in this application
*/
public double ApEn(double data[], int m, double r) {
/*
* data[] is an double array of the data collected for ApEn calculation
* m is the window size = default is 2
* r is the multiplier of the standard deviation to use = default to 0.2
*/
entUtils eu = new entUtils();
fileRead fr = new fileRead();
boolean D = fr.getD();
int Cm = 0, Cm1 = 0, i, j, k;
int N = data.length;
// check that m is not less than the data length
if (m > N)
m = N;
double err = 0.0, sum = 0.0;
//double r = 0.2;
// Calculate std dev
double std = eu.stdev(data);
err = std * r;
if (D) System.out.println("ApEn - N="+N+" r="+r+" std="+std+"
err="+err);
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for ( i = 0; i < N - (m + 1) + 1; i++) {
Cm = Cm1 = 0;
for ( j = 0; j < N - (m + 1) + 1; j++) {
boolean eq = true;
for (k = 0; k < m; k++) {
if (D) System.out.println("ApEn - i,j,k="+i+","+j+","+k+"
data[i+k]="+data[i+k]+" data[j+k]="+data[j+k]+" err="+err);
if (Math.abs(data[i+k] - data[j+k]) > err) {
if (D) System.out.println("ApEn - Math.abs(data[i+k] data[j+k]) > err is true");
eq = false;
break;
}
}
if (eq) Cm++;
k = m;
if (eq && Math.abs(data[i+k] - data[j+k]) <= err)
Cm1++;
}
if (Cm >
double
double
if (D)

0 && Cm1 > 0){
dCm = (double)Cm;
dCm1 = (double)Cm1;
System.out.println("ApEn -dCm="+dCm+" dCm1="+dCm1);

sum += Math.log(dCm / dCm1)/log2;
}
}
if (D) System.out.println("ApEn - N="+N+" m="+m+" sum="+sum);
double apenreturnvalue;
if ((N - m) == 0) {
apenreturnvalue = 0;
} else {
apenreturnvalue = sum / (double)(N - m);
}
if (D) System.out.println("ApEn - apenreturnvalue="+apenreturnvalue);
return apenreturnvalue;
}
}
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Appendix C: Listing of SampleEntropy Class
package weka.classifiers.trees.j48;
/**
* Class for computing Sample Entropy
* based on the entropy of a class distribution.
*
* basic code retrieved Oct 18, 2014 from
* http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/27030/

*
*
Approximate-and-Sample-Entropies-Complexity-Metric
*
* It has since been modified for use in this application
*
*
Author: Frank Acker – December 2014
*
* @version $Revision: 1.0 $
*/
public class SampleEntropy extends EntropyBasedSplitCrit{
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
public double SampEn(double data[], int m, double r) {
/*
*

data[] is an double array of the data collected for ApEn

calculation
*
*

m is the window size = default is 2
r is the multiplier of the standard deviation to use

default to 0.2
*/
int N = data.length;
// check that m is not less than the data length
if (m > N)
m = N;
entUtils eu = new entUtils();
fileRead fr = new fileRead();
boolean D = fr.getD();
int Cm
double
double
if (D)
err="+err);
for (i

= 0, Cm1 = 0, i, j, k;
std = eu.stdev(data);
err = std * r;
System.out.println("SampEn - N="+N+" r="+r+" std="+std+"

= 0; i < N - (m + 1) + 1; i++) {
for (j = i + 1; j < N - (m + 1) + 1; j++) {
boolean eq = true;
//m - length series
for (k = 0; k < m; k++) {
if (D) System.out.println("SampEn i,j,k="+i+","+j+","+k+" data[i+k]="+data[i+k]+" data[j+k]="+data[j+k]+"
err="+err);
if (Math.abs(data[i+k] - data[j+k]) > err) {
if (D) System.out.println("SampEn Math.abs(data[i+k] - data[j+k]) > err is true");
eq = false;
break;
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}
}
if (eq) Cm++;
//m+1 - length series
k = m;
if (eq && Math.abs(data[i+k] - data[j+k]) <= err)
Cm1++;
}
}
if (Cm > 0 && Cm1 > 0) {
double dCm = (double)Cm;
double dCm1 = (double)Cm1;
return (Math.log(dCm / dCm1))/log2;
} else {
return 0.0;
}
}
}
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Appendix D: Listing of fileRead Class
package weka.classifiers.trees.j48;
import java.io.*;
/*
*
*
*
*
*
*/

This class was written in order to
support the reading of the configuration
file and parse its parameters.
Author: Frank Acker – December 2014

public class fileRead extends EntropyBasedSplitCrit{
/* The Entropy Type (etype) is designated in the
* Entropy Information file defined as variable
* in this class as: "fileName".
*
* The entropy indicator number is as follows:
* etype = 0 - Shannon
* etype = 1 - Rényi
* etype = 2 - Tsallis
* etype = 3 - Approximate
* etype = 4 - Sample
*/
public static int etype;
public static boolean D = false; // debugger switch
/* The alpha term is used in the Rényi and Tsallis entropy calculations.
* If no alpha term is defined in the value is set to a 0.
* The default for Rényi entropy is 0.5.
* The default for Tsallis entropy is 1.2.
*/
public static double alpha;
double defaultAlpha = 0;
double defaultRényiAlpha = 0.5;
double defaultTsallisAlpha = 1.2;
/* "r" is a measure of the percentage of the standard deviation
* to consider for ApEn and SampEn.
* Default is 0.2 as defined by Yentes et al. (2013) but must
* be entered in the ENtropy Information File
*/
public static double r = 0.2;
double defaultR = -1.0;
public final String fileName = "/media/sf_nova/data/EntropyInfoFile.txt";
/* "m" is a windows size to use for the series length
* Used for ApEn and SampEn.
* Default is 2 as defined by Yentes et al. (2013) but must
* be entered in the ENtropy Information File
*/
public static int m = 2;
int defaultM = -1;
public long filemod = 0;
public boolean updatedFile(){
File file = new File(fileName);
long ifilemod = file.lastModified();
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if (ifilemod == filemod)
return false;
else {
System.out.println("updtaedFile - ifilemod= "+ ifilemod + "
filemod="+ filemod);
filemod = ifilemod;
return true;
}
}
public boolean fileRead() {
// This will reference one line at a time
String line = null;
try {
// FileReader reads text files in the default encoding.
FileReader fileReader =
new FileReader(fileName);
// Always wrap FileReader in BufferedReader.
BufferedReader bufferedReader =
new BufferedReader(fileReader);
while((line = bufferedReader.readLine()) != null) {
// get rid of any spaces in line
String line1 = line.replace(" ","");
String[] parts = line1.split("=");
if (parts[0].equals("etype")) {
etype = Integer.parseInt(parts[1]);
if (fr.D) System.out.println("=+=etype="+etype);
}
if (parts[0].equals("alpha")) {
alpha = Double.parseDouble(parts[1]);
if (fr.D) System.out.println("===ET="+etype+ " alpha ="+
alpha);
}
if (parts[0].equals("m")) {
m = Integer.parseInt(parts[1]);
}
if (parts[0].equals("r")) {
r = Double.parseDouble(parts[1]);
}
if (parts[0].equals("D")) {
System.out.println("fileRead - Hit D - parts[1]="+parts[1]);
if (parts[1].equals("true")) D = true;
if (parts[1].equals("false")) D = false;
//if (parts[1].equalsIgnoreCase("true")) D = true;
//if (parts[1].equalsIgnoreCase("false")) D = false;
System.out.println("D="+D);
}
}
// Always close files.
bufferedReader.close();
}
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catch(FileNotFoundException ex) {
System.err.println("Unable to open file '" + fileName + "'");
return false;
}
catch(IOException ex) {
System.err.println("Error reading file '" + fileName + "'");
return false;
}
// check for valid etype
if (etype <0 || etype >4) {
System.out.println("Bad or no Entropy Type (etype) defined.
Entered value:" + etype);
return false;
}
// check Rényi alpha
if (etype == 1 && alpha == defaultAlpha) {
alpha = defaultRényiAlpha;
System.out.println("Alpha for Tsallis Entropy set to " + alpha);
}
// check Tsallis alpha
if (etype == 2 && alpha == defaultAlpha) {
alpha = defaultTsallisAlpha;
System.out.println("Alpha for Tsallis Entropy set to " + alpha);
}
// check Approximate and Sample entropy values
if (etype == 2 || etype == 3) {
if (r == defaultR) {
System.out.println("No \"r\" value for Approximate Entropy
entered");
System.exit(1);
}
if (m == defaultM) {
System.out.println("No \"m\" value for Approximate Entropy
entered");
System.exit(1);
}
}
return true;
}
public int getEType () {
if (fr.D) System.out.println("getEType="+etype);
return etype;
}
public double getAlpha() {
return alpha;
}
public String getETName() {
String etname[] = new String[] {"Shannon", "Rényi", "Tsallis",
"Approximate", "Sample"};
return etname[etype];
}
public int getM() {
return m;
}
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public double getR() {
return r;
}
public boolean getD() {
if (D) System.out.println("getD D="+D);
return D;
}
}
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Appendix E: Listing of entUtils Class
The following is a list of the entUtils class which is used in support of the entropy
calculations.
package weka.classifiers.trees.j48;
import java.text.DateFormat;
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
import java.util.Date;
/* entUtils
* This class contains utilities for the entropy calculations,
* standard deviation, and prints the configuration
* files parameters settings.
*
* Author: Frank Acker December 2014.
*/
public

class entUtils extends EntropyBasedSplitCrit {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
public double stdev(double data[]) {
int i;
double mean = 0.0;
int dlen = data.length;
double sum1 = 0.0;
for (i = 1; i < dlen; i++)
mean += data[i]/dlen;
for (i = 1; i < dlen; i++)
sum1 += Math.pow((data[i] - mean),2)/dlen;
double result = Math.sqrt(sum1);
return result;
}
public void getFileInfo() {
DateFormat dateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("MM/dd/yyyy

HH:mm:ss");
Date d = new Date();
System.out.println("WEKA Analysis for Entropy Research");
System.out.print("\nDate and time for this run is ");
System.out.println(dateFormat.format(d));
fileRead fr = new fileRead();
//Read the configuration file if it hasn't been done already
if (!fr.fileRead()) System.exit (1);
// Get the entropy values for use and print out.
ET = fr.getEType();
alpha = fr.getAlpha();
m = fr.getM();
r = fr.getR();
D = fr.getD();
System.out.println("Using " + fr.getETName() + " Entropy.");
if (ET == 1 || ET == 2)
System.out.println("The alpha term is set to " + alpha);
if (ET == 3 || ET == 4) {
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System.out.println("Window size (m)
= " + m);
System.out.println("% of standard deviation (r) = " + r);
}
System.out.println("Debugger is "+ D);
}
}
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Appendix F: Listing of EntropyFileInfo.txt
Below is a listing of the configuration file for an analysis using the Tsallis entropy
calculation. The “#” symbol at the beginning of the line indicates a comment and the line
is ignored. This file is changed for each type of entropy calculation or when parameter
settings are made.
# The Entropy Type (etype) is designated in the
# Entropy Information file defined as variable
# in this class as: "fileName".
#
# The entropy indicator number is as follows:
#
* etype = 0 - Shannon
#
* etype = 1 - Rényi
#
* etype = 2 - Tsallis
#
* etype = 3 - Approximate
#
* etype = 4 - Sample
#
# The alpha term is used for Rényi and Tsallis
# entropy calculations. The work by Lima et al. (2012)
# determined the following values were best in
# research:
#
Rényi alpha
= 0.5
#
Tsallis alpha = 1.2
#
etype = 2
alpha = 1.2
#alpha = 0.5
m = 2
r = 0.2
#D = false
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Appendix G: Listing of Modified build.xml File for Eclipse
Below is the modified file used by Eclipse to compile the Java code and install the
current weka.jar file for use.
<project name="weka" default="compile" basedir=".">
<!-===========================================================================
Ant build file for weka. Tested with ant 1.6.5 and Junit 3.8.2. Requires
JavaMail and the java activation framework for mailing unit test results.
Type ant -projecthelp for targets and descriptions.
Assumes weka and tests (if unit testing) are in the same directory.
Build file can reside and be executed from either inside weka or the
directory containing weka.
Modified to only build the components needed for the weka.jar file to
Support the research.
Author: Frank Acker October 2014.
$Revision: 7185 $
===========================================================================
-->
<!-- set global properties for this build -->
<property name="src" value="/media/sf_nova/weka/weka-src/wekasrc/src/main/java"/>
<property name="src-test" value="/media/sf_nova/weka/weka-src/wekasrc/src/test/java"/>
<property name="lib" value="/media/sf_nova/weka/weka-src/weka-src/lib" />
<property name="regression_tests_root" value="src/test/resources/wekarefs"/>
<property name="build" value="/media/sf_nova/workspace/weka/build"/>
<property name="dist" value="/media/sf_nova/workspace/weka/dist"/>
<property name="doc" value="doc"/>
<property name="reports" value="reports"/>
<property name="javac_max_memory" value="4096m"/>
<property name="run_tests_fail" value="true"/>
<property name="headless" value="false"/>
<property name="macdistrib" value="osx-distrib"/>
<property name="debug" value="on" />
<target name="init_all">
<!-- Create the time stamp -->
<tstamp/>
</target>
<!-- general classpath definition, incl. CLASSPATH env. variable,
// but jars in lib directory have precedence over the CLASSPATH variable -->
<path id="project.class.path">
<fileset dir="${lib}">
<include name="*.jar"/>
<include name="*.zip"/>
</fileset>
<pathelement location="${build}/classes"/>
<pathelement location="${build}/testcases"/>
<pathelement path="${java.class.path}" />
</path>
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<!-============================================================================
Compilation and documentation making stuff
============================================================================
-->
<target name="init_compile" depends="init_all">
<!-- Create the build directory structure used by compile -->
<mkdir dir="${build}/classes"/>
</target>
<!-- Compile the java code from ${src}weka into ${build}/classes -->
<target name="compile" depends="init_compile"
description="Compile weka and deposit class files in build/classes">
<javac srcdir="${src}"
fork="yes" memoryMaximumSize="${javac_max_memory}"
destdir="${build}/classes"
optimize="${optimization}"
debug="${debug}"
deprecation="${deprecation}"
source="1.4" target="1.4">
<classpath refid="project.class.path" />
</javac>
<copy todir="${build}/classes" >
<fileset dir="${src}">
<include name="weka/**/*.gif"/>
<include name="weka/**/*.jpeg"/>
<include name="weka/**/*.jpg"/>
<include name="weka/**/*.props"/>
<include name="weka/**/*.txt"/>
<include name="weka/**/DatabaseUtils.props.*"/>
<include name="weka/gui/beans/README*"/>
</fileset>
</copy>
<rmic base="${build}/classes"
classname="weka.experiment.RemoteEngine"/>
</target>
<!-===========================================================================
Release making stuff
===========================================================================
-->
<target name = "init_dist" depends="init_all">
<!-- Create the distribution directory -->
<mkdir dir="${dist}"/>
</target>
<!-- Put everything in ${path_modifier}${build}/classes into the weka.jar
file -->
<target name="exejar" depends="compile, init_dist"
description="Create an executable jar file in ./dist">
<jar jarfile="${dist}/weka.jar"
basedir="${build}/classes">
<manifest>
<attribute name="Main-Class" value="weka.gui.GUIChooser"/>
</manifest>
</jar>
</target>
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<!-- Put all .java, and .props files into ${path_modifier}${dist}/wekasrc.jar-->
<target name="srcjar" depends="init_dist, init_all"
description="Create a jar file containing weka source in ./dist">
<!-- jar up the source -->
<jar jarfile="${dist}/weka-src.jar"
basedir=".">
<include name="*.xml"/>
<include name="src/**/*.gif"/>
<include name="src/**/*.java"/>
<include name="src/**/*.jpeg"/>
<include name="src/**/*.jpg"/>
<include name="src/**/*.props"/>
<include name="src/**/*.txt"/>
<include name="src/**/*.xml"/>
<include name="src/**/*.cost"/>
<include name="src/**/*.arff"/>
<include name="lib/**/*.jar"/>
<include name="src/**/DatabaseUtils.props.*"/>
<include name="src/**/weka/gui/beans/README*"/>
</jar>
</target>
<!-- make a jar file containing just the stuff needed for running a remote
experiment server -->
<target name="remotejar" depends="compile, init_dist"
description="Create a jar file containing classes for remote experiments
in ./dist">
<jar jarfile="${dist}/remoteEngine.jar"
basedir="${build}/classes"
includes="weka/experiment/*_*.class,weka/experiment/RemoteEngine*.class,weka/ex
periment/Compute.class,weka/experiment/Task.class,weka/experiment/TaskStatusInf
o.class,weka/core/Queue*.class"/>
<copy todir="${dist}" >
<fileset dir="${src}/weka/experiment">
<include name="remote.policy"/>
<include name="remote.policy.example"/>
</fileset>
</copy>
<jar jarfile="${dist}/remoteExperimentServer.jar"
basedir="${dist}"
includes="remoteEngine.jar,remote.policy,remote.policy.example"/>
<delete file="${dist}/remoteEngine.jar"/>
<delete file="${dist}/remote.policy"/>
<delete file="${dist}/remote.policy.example"/>
</target>
<!-- Writes $release version number to weka/core/version.txt -->
<target name="set_version">
<echo message="${release}" file="${src}/weka/core/version.txt"/>
<echo message="${release}" file="${build}/classes/weka/core/version.txt"/>
</target>
<!-- Make a release -->
<target name="release" depends="set_version, exejar, remotejar, srcjar"
description="Make a release in ${release}. Run with -Drelease=&lt;number of
release (eg. 3-4-1)&gt;.">
<!-- copy the docs to dist/docs -->
<copy todir="weka-${release}/weka-${release}/doc" >
<fileset dir="${doc}"/>
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</copy>
<copy todir="weka-${release}/weka-${release}">
<fileset dir="${dist}"/>
</copy>
<copy todir="weka-${release}/weka-${release}/data">
<fileset dir="../wekadocs/data"/>
</copy>
<copy todir="weka-${release}/weka-${release}">
<fileset dir="../wekadocs">
<include name="README*"/>
<include name="*.pdf"/>
<include name="COPYING"/>
<include name="documentation.*"/>
<include name="weka.gif"/>
<include name="weka.ico"/>
</fileset>
</copy>
<zip destfile="weka-${release}.zip"
basedir="weka-${release}"/>
</target>
</project>
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Appendix H: Explanation of Linux commands in selecting attack lines
In generating the data files from the KDD CUP 99 data to mimic the data used by
Lima et al. (2012), a series of Linux commands are used and pipelined together to
produce the needed results as in the following entry.
$ cat kdd.data.csv | grep back | shuf –n 1026 >>DoS.csv

In the example above, a description of the Linux commands is as follows:
Command

Description

cat

List the contents of the given to standard out.

grep

This command looks for the given character string, in this case “back”,
in each line. If it is found, the line is written to standard out.

shuf

This command reads from standard input and outputs the results in
random order. The “-n 1026” options indicates to output 1,026 lines. It
is similar to the “sort –R” command but runs much faster.

>>DoS.csv

This is a redirection of standard output to concatenate the results to the
file DoS.csv. If DoS.csv does not exist, it will be created.
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Appendix I: Listing of Linux shell script to generate KDD CUP 99 files
The listing for the Linus shell script to generate the files for use in reproducing the
Lima et al. (2012) results is as follows:
echo `date` Dos.arff
>Dos.arff
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep

,back.$|shuf -n 1026 >>DoS.arff
,land.$|shuf -n 11 >>DoS.arff
,neptune.$|shuf -n 10401 >>DoS.arff
,pod.$|shuf -n 69 >>DoS.arff
,smurf.$|shuf -n 7669 >>DoS.arff
,teardrop.$|shuf -n 15 >>DoS.arff
,normal.$|shuf -n 2573 >>DoS.arff

echo `date` Probe.arff
>Probe.arff
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep

,ipsweep.$|shuf -n 586 >>Probe.arff
,nmap.$|shuf -n 151 >>Probe.arff
,portsweep.$|shuf -n 155 >>Probe.arff
,satan.$|shuf -n 16 >>Probe.arff
,normal.$|shuf -n 1704 >>Probe.arff

echo `date` R2L.arff
>R2L.arff
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep

,ftp_write.$|shuf -n 5 >>R2L.arff
,guess_passwd.$|shuf -n 53 >>R2L.arff
,imap.$|shuf -n 11 >>R2L.arff
,multihop.$|shuf -n 7 >>R2L.arff
,phf.$|shuf -n 4 >>R2L.arff
,spy.$|shuf -n 2 >>R2L.arff
,warezclient.$|shuf -n 60 >>R2L.arff
,warezmaster.$|shuf -n 20 >>R2L.arff
,normal.$|shuf -n 1934 >>R2L.arff

echo `date` U2R.arff
>U2R.arff
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep
cat kddcup.data.csv |grep

,loadmodule.$|shuf -n 9 >>U2R.arff
,buffer_overflow.$|shuf -n 21 >>U2R.arff
,perl.$|shuf -n 3 >>U2R.arff
,rootkit.$|shuf -n 7 >>U2R.arff
,normal.$|shuf -n 1676 >>U2R.arff

echo `date` Dos.arff
cat Dos.arff|cut -f42 -d,|sort|uniq -c
echo `date` Probe.arff
cat Probe.arff|cut -f42 -d,|sort|uniq -c
echo `date` R2L.arff
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Appendix J: Listing of the KDD CUP 99 features
The table below is the KDD CUP 99 data set features and its definition in the arff
file from the KDD CUP 99 web site (KDD Cup 1999 Data, 1999).
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Feature Name
duration
protocol_type
service
flag
src_bytes
dst_bytes
land
wrong_fragment
urgent
hot
num_failed_logins
logged_in
num_compromised
root_shell
su_attempted
num_root
num_file_creations
num_shells
num_access_files
num_outbound_cmds
is_host_login
is_guest_login
count
srv_count
serror_rate
srv_serror_rate
rerror_rate
srv_rerror_rate
same_srv_rate
diff_srv_rate
srv_diff_host_rate
dst_host_count
dst_host_srv_count
dst_host_same_srv_rate
dst_host_diff_srv_rate
dst_host_same_src_port_rate
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate
dst_host_serror_rate
dst_host_srv_serror_rate
dst_host_rerror_rate
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate
class

Feature Type or values
continuous.
symbolic.
symbolic.
symbolic.
continuous.
continuous.
symbolic.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
symbolic.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
symbolic.
symbolic.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
continuous.
back,buffer_overflow,ftp_write,guess_pass
wd,imap,ipsweep,land,loadmodule,multihop,
neptune,nmap,normal,perl,phf,pod,portswee
p,rootkit,satan,smurf,spy,teardrop,warezc
lient,warezmaster.
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Appendix K: Partial listing of DoS.arff file
The following is a partial listing of the DoS.arff file. It shows the formatting
requirements as defined at the WEKA website (WEKA 3, n.d.). The other arff files used
in the analysis each follow this format. At the end of this listing, the data continues to the
complete length of the data.
@relation "DoS data to reproduce Lima (2012) results"
@attribute duration numeric
@attribute protocol_type {tcp,icmp,udp}
@attribute service {aol,http_8001,http,smtp,finger,domain,domain_u,auth,telnet,
ftp,eco_i,ntp_u,ecr_i,other,private,pop_3,ftp_data,rje,time,mtp,link,remote_job
,gopher,ssh,name,whois,login,imap4,daytime,ctf,nntp,shell,IRC,nnsp,harvest,http
_443,http_2784,exec,printer,efs,courier,uucp,klogin,kshell,echo,discard,systat,
supdup,iso_tsap,hostnames,csnet_ns,pop_2,sunrpc,uucp_path,netbios_ns,netbios_ss
n,netbios_dgm,sql_net,vmnet,bgp,Z39_50,ldap,netstat,urh_i,X11,urp_i,pm_dump,tft
p_u,tim_i,red_i}
@attribute flag {SF,S1,REJ,S2,S0,S3,RSTO,RSTR,RSTOS0,OTH,SH}
@attribute src_bytes numeric
@attribute dst_bytes numeric
@attribute land {0,1}
@attribute wrong_fragment numeric
@attribute urgent numeric
@attribute hot numeric
@attribute num_failed_logins numeric
@attribute logged_in {0,1}
@attribute num_compromised numeric
@attribute root_shell numeric
@attribute su_attempted numeric
@attribute num_root numeric
@attribute num_file_creations numeric
@attribute num_shells numeric
@attribute num_access_files numeric
@attribute num_outbound_cmds numeric
@attribute is_host_login {0,1}
@attribute is_guest_login {0,1}
@attribute count numeric
@attribute srv_count numeric
@attribute serror_rate numeric
@attribute srv_serror_rate numeric
@attribute rerror_rate numeric
@attribute srv_rerror_rate numeric
@attribute same_srv_rate numeric
@attribute diff_srv_rate numeric
@attribute srv_diff_host_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_count numeric
@attribute dst_host_srv_count numeric
@attribute dst_host_same_srv_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_diff_srv_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_same_src_port_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_serror_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_srv_serror_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_rerror_rate numeric
@attribute dst_host_srv_rerror_rate numeric
@attribute class {normal.,back.,land.,neptune.,pod.,smurf.,teardrop.}
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@data
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2,2,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,32,32,1.00,0.00,0.03,0.00,0.03,0.03,0.03,0.03,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,3,3,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,228,228,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.06,0.06,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,3,3,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,178,178,1.00,0.00,0.01,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.01,0.01,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2,2,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.03,0.03,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,4,4,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.05,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,4,4,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.05,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,3,3,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.04,0.04,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,4,4,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.05,back.
7,tcp,http,RSTR,20440,1460,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,3,3,0.00,0.00,0.33,0
.33,1.00,0.00,0.00,26,26,1.00,0.00,0.04,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.35,0.35,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2,3,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.3
3,1.00,0.00,0.67,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.03,0.03,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,5,5,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.05,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2,2,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.01,0.01,0.04,0.04,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2,2,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,172,172,1.00,0.00,0.01,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.01,0.01,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2,2,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,164,164,1.00,0.00,0.01,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.01,0.01,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,5,7,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.2
9,1.00,0.00,0.43,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.05,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,5,6,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.1
7,1.00,0.00,0.33,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.04,0.04,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,5,5,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.01,0.01,0.04,0.04,back.
0,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,5,5,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,255,255,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.03,0.03,back.
5,tcp,http,SF,54540,8314,0,0,0,2,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,3,3,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.0
0,1.00,0.00,0.00,31,31,1.00,0.00,0.03,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.35,0.35,back.
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Appendix L: Listings of KDD CUP 99 feature extraction shell script and files
The following is a listing of the shell script to extract the features used in the J48
classification tree results file for the KDD CUP 99 data.
TEMP1=attemp.txt
TEMP2=attlist.txt
TEMP3=attnums.txt
TEMP4=TEMP3$$
TEMP5=TEMP4$$
A=/media/sf_nova/data/KDD/attributes_names
f=$1
cat $f|sed -e "s/^/ /g" >$TEMP4
firstpipe=`grep -n "^ |" $TEMP4|head -1|cut -f1 -d:`
echo firstpipe = $firstpipe
starthere=`expr $firstpipe - 1`
echo starthere = $starthere
lastpipe=`grep -n "^ |" $TEMP4|tail -1|cut -f1 -d:`
echo lastpipe = $lastpipe
tail -n+$starthere $TEMP4|head -1>$TEMP1
grep -n "^ |" $TEMP4>>$TEMP1
>$TEMP2
>$TEMP3
atnum=0
for i in `cat $A`
do
atnum=`expr $atnum + 1`
c=`grep " $i" $TEMP1|wc -l`
echo $atnum $i $c
if
[ $c -gt 0 ]
then
echo $atnum $i>>$TEMP2
echo -n "$atnum " >>$TEMP3
fi
done
echo >>$TEMP3
cat $TEMP3|sed -e "s/ /, /g"|sed -e "s/, $//" >$TEMP4
cat $TEMP4>$TEMP3
rm $TEMP4
nl $TEMP2
cat $TEMP3
rm -rf $TEMP1 $TEMP2 $TEMP3

(Continued on next page)
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(Appendix L continued)
The following is a list of the feature names used by the shell script to parse the
J48 results file from the KDD CUP 99 data.
duration
protocol_type
service
flag
src_bytes
dst_bytes
land
wrong_fragment
urgent
hot
num_failed_logins
logged_in
num_compromised
root_shell
su_attempted
num_root
num_file_creations
num_shells
num_access_files
num_outbound_cmds
is_host_login
is_guest_login
count
srv_count
serror_rate
srv_serror_rate
rerror_rate
srv_rerror_rate
same_srv_rate
diff_srv_rate
srv_diff_host_rate
dst_host_count
dst_host_srv_count
dst_host_same_srv_rate
dst_host_diff_srv_rate
dst_host_same_src_port_rate
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate
dst_host_serror_rate
dst_host_srv_serror_rate
dst_host_rerror_rate
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate
attack
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Appendix M: Listings of SRI feature extraction shell script and files
The following is a listing of the shell script to extract the features used in the J48
classification tree results file for the SRI data.
TEMP1=attemp.txt
TEMP2=attlist.txt
TEMP3=attnums.txt
TEMP4=TEMP3$$
TEMP5=TEMP4$$
A=/media/sf_nova/data/SRI/bin/SRIattributes_names
f=$1
cat $f|sed -e "s/^/ /g" >$TEMP4
firstpipe=`grep -n "^ |" $TEMP4|head -1|cut -f1 -d:`
echo firstpipe = $firstpipe
starthere=`expr $firstpipe - 1`
echo starthere = $starthere
lastpipe=`grep -n "^ |" $TEMP4|tail -1|cut -f1 -d:`
echo lastpipe = $lastpipe
tail -n+$starthere $TEMP4|head -1>$TEMP1
grep -n "^ |" $TEMP4>>$TEMP1
>$TEMP2
>$TEMP3
atnum=0
for i in `cat $A`
do
atnum=`expr $atnum + 1`
c=`grep " $i" $TEMP1|wc -l`
echo $atnum $i $c
if
[ $c -gt 0 ]
then
echo $atnum $i>>$TEMP2
echo -n "$atnum " >>$TEMP3
fi
done
echo >>$TEMP3
cat $TEMP3|sed -e "s/ /, /g"|sed -e "s/, $//" >$TEMP4
cat $TEMP4>$TEMP3
rm $TEMP4
nl $TEMP2
cat $TEMP3
rm -rf $TEMP1 $TEMP2 $TEMP3

(Continued on next page)
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(Appendix M continued)
The following is a list of the feature names used by the shell script to parse the
J48 results file from the SRI data.
date
index
timemms
frPort
toPort
flags
seqRange
ack
win
pktLength
SWB
SWBn
smb
rrq
warn
nop
val
ecr
enum
priority
service
Mesg
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Appendix N: Listing of the J48 Classification Results
The following is the output from WEKA with the KDD CUP 99 data using the
J48 classification algorithm with Shannon entropy. There is one of these files for each
run of the data and entropy combinations.
=== Run information ===
Scheme:
Relation:
Instances:
Attributes:

Test mode:

weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -C 0.25 -M 2
DoS data to reproduce Lima (2012) results
21764
42
duration
protocol_type
service
flag
src_bytes
dst_bytes
land
wrong_fragment
urgent
hot
num_failed_logins
logged_in
num_compromised
root_shell
su_attempted
num_root
num_file_creations
num_shells
num_access_files
num_outbound_cmds
is_host_login
is_guest_login
count
srv_count
serror_rate
srv_serror_rate
rerror_rate
srv_rerror_rate
same_srv_rate
diff_srv_rate
srv_diff_host_rate
dst_host_count
dst_host_srv_count
dst_host_same_srv_rate
dst_host_diff_srv_rate
dst_host_same_src_port_rate
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate
dst_host_serror_rate
dst_host_srv_serror_rate
dst_host_rerror_rate
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate
class
10-fold cross-validation

=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
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J48 pruned tree
-----------------same_srv_rate <= 0.48
|
src_bytes <= 14: neptune. (10354.0)
|
src_bytes > 14: normal. (28.0/1.0)
same_srv_rate > 0.48
|
src_bytes <= 20309
|
|
serror_rate <= 0.59
|
|
|
wrong_fragment <= 0
|
|
|
|
protocol_type = tcp: normal. (2015.0/1.0)
|
|
|
|
protocol_type = icmp
|
|
|
|
|
src_bytes <= 373: normal. (23.0)
|
|
|
|
|
src_bytes > 373: smurf. (7670.0/1.0)
|
|
|
|
protocol_type = udp: normal. (502.0)
|
|
|
wrong_fragment > 0
|
|
|
|
protocol_type = tcp: pod. (0.0)
|
|
|
|
protocol_type = icmp: pod. (68.0)
|
|
|
|
protocol_type = udp: teardrop. (14.0)
|
|
serror_rate > 0.59
|
|
|
land = 0: neptune. (47.0)
|
|
|
land = 1: land. (11.0)
|
src_bytes > 20309
|
|
service = aol: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = http_8001: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = http: back. (1025.0)
|
|
service = smtp: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = finger: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = domain: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = domain_u: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = auth: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = telnet: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = ftp: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = eco_i: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = ntp_u: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = ecr_i: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = other: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = private: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = pop_3: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = ftp_data: normal. (7.0)
|
|
service = rje: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = time: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = mtp: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = link: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = remote_job: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = gopher: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = ssh: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = name: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = whois: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = login: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = imap4: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = daytime: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = ctf: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = nntp: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = shell: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = IRC: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = nnsp: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = harvest: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = http_443: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = http_2784: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = exec: back. (0.0)
|
|
service = printer: back. (0.0)
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|
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|
|
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|
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|
|
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service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service
service

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Number of Leaves

efs: back. (0.0)
courier: back. (0.0)
uucp: back. (0.0)
klogin: back. (0.0)
kshell: back. (0.0)
echo: back. (0.0)
discard: back. (0.0)
systat: back. (0.0)
supdup: back. (0.0)
iso_tsap: back. (0.0)
hostnames: back. (0.0)
csnet_ns: back. (0.0)
pop_2: back. (0.0)
sunrpc: back. (0.0)
uucp_path: back. (0.0)
netbios_ns: back. (0.0)
netbios_ssn: back. (0.0)
netbios_dgm: back. (0.0)
sql_net: back. (0.0)
vmnet: back. (0.0)
bgp: back. (0.0)
Z39_50: back. (0.0)
ldap: back. (0.0)
netstat: back. (0.0)
urh_i: back. (0.0)
X11: back. (0.0)
urp_i: back. (0.0)
pm_dump: back. (0.0)
tftp_u: back. (0.0)
tim_i: back. (0.0)
red_i: back. (0.0)

Size of the tree :

:

81
91

Time taken to build model: 0.63 seconds
=== Stratified cross-validation ===
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances
Incorrectly Classified Instances
Kappa statistic
Mean absolute error
Root mean squared error
Relative absolute error
Root relative squared error
Total Number of Instances

21754
10
0.9993
0.0002
0.0115
0.1098 %
3.8271 %
21764

99.9541 %
0.0459 %

=== Detailed Accuracy By Class ===
TP Rate
0.999
0.999
1
1
0.986
0.999
0.933

FP Rate
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Precision
0.997
1
1
1
1
1
1

Recall
0.999
0.999
1
1
0.986
0.999
0.933

F-Measure
0.998
1
1
1
0.993
1
0.966

=== Confusion Matrix ===
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Class
normal.
back.
land.
neptune.
pod.
smurf.
teardrop.

a
2571
1
0
0
1
5
1

b
0
1025
0
0
0
0
0

c
d
0
1
0
0
11
0
0 10401
0
0
0
0
0
0

e
0
0
0
0
68
0
0

f
1
0
0
0
0
7664
0

g
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|

<-- classified as
a = normal.
b = back.
c = land.
d = neptune.
e = pod.
f = smurf.
g = teardrop.

Appendix O: Listing of the feature extraction shell results
Below is the output of the shell script showing the features used in the J48
Classification tree for the KDD CUP 99 DoS attack category using Shannon entropy. The
last line of the output is the feature numbers used.
1 duration 0
2 protocol_type 6
3 service 70
4 flag 0
5 src_bytes 6
6 dst_bytes 0
7 land 2
8 wrong_fragment 2
9 urgent 0
10 hot 0
11 num_failed_logins 0
12 logged_in 0
13 num_compromised 0
14 root_shell 0
15 su_attempted 0
16 num_root 0
17 num_file_creations 0
18 num_shells 0
19 num_access_files 0
20 num_outbound_cmds 0
21 is_host_login 0
22 is_guest_login 0
23 count 0
24 srv_count 0
25 serror_rate 2
26 srv_serror_rate 0
27 rerror_rate 0
28 srv_rerror_rate 0
29 same_srv_rate 1
30 diff_srv_rate 0
31 srv_diff_host_rate 0
32 dst_host_count 0
33 dst_host_srv_count 0
34 dst_host_same_srv_rate 0
35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate 0
36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate 0
37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 0
38 dst_host_serror_rate 0
39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate 0
40 dst_host_rerror_rate 0
41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate 0
42 attack 0
1 2 protocol_type
2 3 service
3 5 src_bytes
4 7 land
5 8 wrong_fragment
6 25 serror_rate
7 29 same_srv_rate
2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 25, 29
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Appendix P: Partial view of Malware Infection Analysis Page
This image below shows the page from the SRI's Multiperspective Malware Infection Analysis Page. It consists of multiple
columns and links to other files for down load.
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Appendix Q: Partial listing of file.sh
# head -40 file.sh
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-0501-analysis/ARCHIVE/90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.rules
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts_botHu
nter.txt
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/84cf85439891727b7c6d6e32f2caca7e/84cf8543989172
7b7c6d6e32f2caca7e.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/91e84b30547650f710f220117e031029/91e84b30547650
f710f220117e031029.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/ab989d919b6d0eb454a24f5ace298dc0/ab989d919b6d0e
b454a24f5ace298dc0.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/d930d42d1283f036888801c27f486285/d930d42d1283f0
36888801c27f486285.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.rules
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts_botHu
nter.txt
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1/5f78ff609da4fc
5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.rules
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunt
er.txt
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1/5f78ff609da4fc
5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.rules
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts_botH
unter.txt
wget
http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/ac331591236cd22abd082d1b9ab488
e2/ac331591236cd22abd082d1b9ab488e2.virus-labels
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wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.pcap.gz.alerts
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.rules
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.pcap.gz.alerts_botHun
ter.txt
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1/5f78ff609da4fc
5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.pcap.gz.alerts
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.rules
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.pcap.gz.alerts_botHun
ter.txt
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/76b4ab852ec50e9b1a959dd8139a41f5/76b4ab852ec50e
9b1a959dd8139a41f5.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz.alerts
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.rules
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz.alerts_botHun
ter.txt
wget http://www.cyberta.org/releases/malware/SOURCES/ccf7ce9bb50a0861e755df41dce9528d/ccf7ce9bb50a08
61e755df41dce9528d.virus-labels
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/220.213.33.230_130.107.167.170_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz
wget http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware/2008-05-01analysis/ARCHIVE/220.213.33.230_130.107.167.170_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts
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Appendix R: Partial list of downloaded files
The following is a partial list of downloaded files from the Linux “ls” command.
213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.pcap.gz
213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.pcap.gz.alerts
213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
213.197.10.57_130.107.208.13_10.2.32.207.rules
213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz
213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts
213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
213.22.217.163_130.107.192.209_10.2.32.216.rules
217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz
217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts
217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.rules
220.213.33.230_130.107.167.170_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz
220.213.33.230_130.107.167.170_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts
220.213.33.230_130.107.167.170_10.2.32.212.rules
5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels
5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels.1
5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels.2
60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.pcap.gz
60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.pcap.gz.alerts
60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
60.52.103.123_130.107.245.17_10.2.32.205.rules
76b4ab852ec50e9b1a959dd8139a41f5.virus-labels
84cf85439891727b7c6d6e32f2caca7e.virus-labels
85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz
85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz.alerts
85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
85.15.254.56_130.107.209.212_10.2.32.201.rules
88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz
88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts
88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.rules
90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz
90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts
90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.rules
91e84b30547650f710f220117e031029.virus-labels
ab989d919b6d0eb454a24f5ace298dc0.virus-labels
ac331591236cd22abd082d1b9ab488e2.virus-labels
ccf7ce9bb50a0861e755df41dce9528d.virus-labels
d930d42d1283f036888801c27f486285.virus-labels

Many more files are downloaded per the commands in the “files.sh” file.
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Appendix S: Listing of associations.sh script
The following is a listing of the script that generates the associations to improve
the naming conventions for the downloaded files.
# cat associate.sh
# associate.sh
# this script looks through files.sh and
# creates an association for each pcap.gz
# file. The contents contain:
#
pcap.gz filename
#
Date=20080501
Seq=0
for f in `cat file.sh|cut -f8 -d\/`
do
p=`echo $f|grep "pcap.gz$"|wc -l`
if
[ $p -eq 1 ]
then
Seq=`expr $Seq + 1`
fi
OutFile=$Date-$Seq
F=$OutFile-$f
A=$OutFile-associations.file
echo $f ==> $F
if
[ $p -eq 1 ]
then
#Seq=`expr $Seq + 1`
echo Pcap and Other associated files >$A
fi
echo $F >>$A
cat $f >$F
done
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Appendix T: Partial List of files prepended with association names
Below is a partial list of the files for the date of 20080501 with the date and
association numbers prepended to the file names.
20080501-1-84cf85439891727b7c6d6e32f2caca7e.virus-labels
20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap
20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts
20080501-190.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts.E3
20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.tcpdump
20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.rules
20080501-1-91e84b30547650f710f220117e031029.virus-labels
20080501-1-ab989d919b6d0eb454a24f5ace298dc0.virus-labels
20080501-1-associations.file
20080501-1-.AV
20080501-1-d930d42d1283f036888801c27f486285.virus-labels
20080501-2-85.96.201.158_130.107.212.30_10.2.32.201.pcap
20080501-2-85.96.201.158_130.107.212.30_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz.alerts
20080501-285.96.201.158_130.107.212.30_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
20080501-2-85.96.201.158_130.107.212.30_10.2.32.201.pcap.gz.alerts.E3
20080501-2-85.96.201.158_130.107.212.30_10.2.32.201.pcap.tcpdump
20080501-2-85.96.201.158_130.107.212.30_10.2.32.201.rules
20080501-2-associations.file
20080501-2-.AV
20080501-2-cd05c2e205bc9a84ad14e188d17eadd4.virus-labels
20080501-3-217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap
20080501-3-217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts
20080501-3217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
20080501-3-217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.gz.alerts.E3
20080501-3-217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.pcap.tcpdump
20080501-3-217.96.39.133_130.107.251.229_10.2.32.216.rules
20080501-3-5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels
20080501-3-associations.file
20080501-3-.AV
20080501-4-5f78ff609da4fc5e699ccf4cbac77bc1.virus-labels
20080501-4-88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap
20080501-4-88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts
20080501-4-88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
20080501-4-88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.gz.alerts.E3
20080501-4-88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.pcap.tcpdump
20080501-4-88.9.48.154_130.107.215.192_10.2.32.212.rules
20080501-4-associations.file
20080501-4-.AV
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Appendix U: Listing of an alerts, rules, BotHunter reports, and virus-labels files
The following is an alerts file.
$ cat 20080501-158-201.250.57.61_130.107.136.236_10.2.32.214.pcap.gz.alerts
05/01-20:02:15.451167 [**] [1:3000006:99] E3[rb] BotHunter MALWARE executable
upload [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP}
201.250.57.61:4915 -> 130.107.136.236:445
05/01-20:02:15.478900 [**] [1:299998:1] E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP [**]
[Classification: Executable code was detected] [Priority: 1] {TCP}
201.250.57.61:4915 -> 130.107.136.236:445
05/01-20:02:15.478900 [**] [1:21390:5] E2[rb] REGISTERED FREE SHELLCODE x86
inc ebx NOOP [**] [Classification: Executable code was detected] [Priority: 1]
{TCP} 201.250.57.61:4915 -> 130.107.136.236:445
05/01-20:02:15.504635 [**] [1:299998:1] E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP [**]
[Classification: Executable code was detected] [Priority: 1] {TCP}
201.250.57.61:4915 -> 130.107.136.236:445
05/01-20:02:15.504635 [**] [1:21390:5] E2[rb] REGISTERED FREE SHELLCODE x86
inc ebx NOOP [**] [Classification: Executable code was detected] [Priority: 1]
{TCP} 201.250.57.61:4915 -> 130.107.136.236:445
05/01-20:02:17.855834 [**] [1:2000427:9] E3[rb] ET POLICY PE EXE Install
Windows file download [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP}
201.250.57.61:1156 -> 130.107.136.236:1033
05/01-20:03:08.315644 [**] [1:2404005:1142] E4[rb] ET DROP Known Bot C&C
Server Traffic (group 6) [**] [Classification: A Network Trojan was detected]
[Priority: 1] {TCP} 130.107.136.236:1034 -> 211.96.97.44:7000
05/01-20:04:42.444922 [**] [1:2000352:6] E6[rb] ET ATTACK RESPONSE IRC - dns
request on non-std port [**] [Classification: Potential Corporate Privacy
Violation] [Priority: 1] {TCP} 130.107.136.236:1034 -> 211.96.97.44:7000

The following is a rules file
$ cat 20080501-158-201.250.57.61_130.107.136.236_10.2.32.214.rules
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"E3[rb] BotHunter MALWARE
executable upload"; flow:established,to_server; content:"ftp"; content: "echo";
content: ".exe"; nocase; classtype: misc-activity; sid:3000006; rev:99; )

The following is a botHunter.txt file which reports the BotHunter findings.
cat 20080501-158201.250.57.61_130.107.136.236_10.2.32.214.pcap.gz.alerts_botHunter.txt
Score:
1.8 (>= 0.8)
Infected Target: 130.107.136.236
Infector List:
201.250.57.61
Egg Source List: 201.250.57.61
C & C List:
211.96.97.44 (3)
Peer Coord. List: <unobserved>
Resource List:
<unobserved>
Observed Start:
05/01/2008 20:02:15.000 PDT
Report End:
05/01/2008 20:02:15.504 PDT
Gen. Time:
05/01/2008 20:04:44.289 PDT
INBOUND SCAN
<unobserved>
EXPLOIT
201.250.57.61 (6) (20:02:15.000 PDT-20:02:15.504 PDT)
event=1:1390 (2) {tcp} E2[rb] REGISTERED FREE SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP
2: 445<-4915 (20:02:15.478 PDT-20:02:15.504 PDT)
-------------------------
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event=1:2001944 {tcp} E2[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE EXPLOIT MS04-007 Kill-Bill
ASN1 exploit attempt
445<-4915 (20:02:15.478 PDT)
------------------------event=1:3003 {tcp} E2[rb] NETBIOS SMB-DS Session Setup NTMLSSP unicode
asn1 overflow attempt
445<-4915 (20:02:15.000 PDT)
------------------------event=1:99998 (2) {tcp} E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP
2: 445<-4915 (20:02:15.478 PDT-20:02:15.504 PDT)
EXPLOIT (slade)
<unobserved>
EGG DOWNLOAD
201.250.57.61 (2) (20:02:15.451 PDT)
event=1:2001684 {tcp} E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Malware Windows executable
sent from remote host, Win32
1033<-1156 (20:02:17.855 PDT)
------------------------event=1:3000006 {tcp} E3[rb] BotHunter MALWARE executable upload
445<-4915 (20:02:15.451 PDT)
C and C TRAFFIC
211.96.97.44 (3) (20:04:41.993 PDT)
event=1:2000345 {tcp} E4[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE ATTACK RESPONSE IRC - Nick
change on non-std port
1034->7000 (20:04:41.993 PDT)
------------------------event=1:2002024 {tcp} E4[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE TROJAN IRC NICK command
1034->7000 (20:04:41.993 PDT)
------------------------event=1:2002025 {tcp} E4[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE TROJAN IRC JOIN command
1034->7000 (20:04:42.223 PDT)
PEER COORDINATION
<unobserved>
OUTBOUND SCAN
46.113.10.222 (20:04:44.289 PDT)
event=1:2001569 {tcp} E5[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Behavioral Unusual Port 445
traffic, Potential Scan or Infection
1046->445 (20:04:44.289 PDT)
201.250.57.61 (20:04:44.289 PDT)
event=555:5555005 {tcp} E5[sc] scade detected scanning of 6 IPs (fail
ratio=0:0/6):
0->0 (20:04:44.289 PDT)
ATTACK PREP
<unobserved>
DECLARE BOT
<unobserved>
tcpslice 1209697335.000 1209697335.505 inputFile.tcpd | tcpdump -r - -w
outputFile.tcpd 'host 130.107.136.236'
============================== SEPARATOR ================================
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The following is virus-labels file..
$ cat 20080501-158-7e28dac8de2cdb7f5f03766ff6500063.virus-labels
Antivirus Detection Summary: file 7e28dac8de2cdb7f5f03766ff6500063
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:

AhnLab-V3
AntiVir
Authentium
Avast
AVG
BitDefender
CAT-QuickHeal
ClamAV
DrWeb
eSafe
eTrust-Vet
Ewido
F-Prot
F-Secure
FileAdvisor
Fortinet
Ikarus
Kaspersky
McAfee
Microsoft
NOD32v2
Norman
Panda
Prevx1
Rising
Sophos
Sunbelt
Symantec
TheHacker
VBA32
VirusBuster
Webwasher-Gateway

found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found
found

[Win32/Kolab.worm.200441]
[TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen]
nothing
nothing
nothing
[Packer.PrivateExeProtector.A]
[I-Worm.Kolab.re]
nothing
[Win32.IRC.Bot]
[Suspicious File]
[Win32/ForBot.VC]
nothing
nothing
[Net-Worm.Win32.Kolab.qw]
nothing
[W32/Kolab.QW!worm.im]
[Packer.PrivateExeProtector.A]
[Net-Worm.Win32.Kolab.qw]
nothing
nothing
[Win32/Kolab.QW]
[W32/Smalltroj.DYQU]
nothing
[WORM.VARIANT!WORM]
nothing
[Mal/Generic-A]
nothing
[W32.Spybot.Worm]
nothing
[Net-Worm.Win32.Kolab.qw]
nothing
[Trojan.Crypt.XPACK.Gen]

CREDITS: Antivirus malware test results are from submissions to
www.virustotal.com.
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Appendix V: Listing of bf.sh script and a portion of results

The following is a listing of the bf.sh script used to extract pertinent data from the
existing files in each date directory.
# cat bf.sh
for j in `ls *alerts|grep "-"|cut -f2 -d-|sort -n`
do
E=`ls 20??????-$j-*alerts`
T=`ls 20??????-$j-*tcpdump`
R=`ls 20??????-$j-*rules`
echo "+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++"
echo "+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++"
echo E=$E
echo T=$T
echo R=$R
for i in `grep E3 $E|cut -f2-3 -d:|cut -f1 -d\ `
do
echo Search Term
echo $i
echo =====tcpdump entry
echo -n TP=
grep $i $T|grep -v 10.2.
echo =====Alert entry
echo -n AE=
grep $i $E
echo =====Actual Alert
echo -n AA=
grep $i $E | cut -f4 -d\]|cut -f1 -d\[
echo =============
echo
done
done

Below is a portion of the results of running the bf.sh script for the date of
20080501. The length of the files for each date is 3,229 lines to 8,649 lines long.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
E=20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.gz.alerts
T=20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.pcap.tcpdump
R=20080501-1-90.189.210.154_130.107.176.98_10.2.32.213.rules
File Reference
FR=20080501-1
Search Term
ST=17:51.525715
=====tcpdump entry
TP=02:17:51.525715 IP 90.189.210.154.4619 > 130.107.176.98.445: Flags [.], seq
1165743534:1165744974, ack 3737182244, win 64711, length 1440SMB-over-TCP
packet:(raw data
or continuation?)
=====Alert entry
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AE=05/01-00:17:51.525715 [**] [1:3000006:99] E3[rb] BotHunter MALWARE
executable upload [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] {TCP}
90.189.210.154:4619 ->
130.107.176.98:445
=====Actual Alert
AA= BotHunter MALWARE executable upload
=============
File Reference
FR=20080501-1
Search Term
ST=17:54.399343
=====tcpdump entry
TP=02:17:54.399343 IP 90.189.210.154.1596 > 130.107.176.98.1033: Flags [P.],
seq 1196786334:1196786846, ack 3738074074, win 64800, length 512
=====Alert entry
AE=05/01-00:17:54.399343 [**] [1:2001683:3] E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Malware
Windows executable sent from remote host [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP}
90.189.210.154:1596 -> 130.107
.176.98:1033
=====Actual Alert
AA= BLEEDING-EDGE Malware Windows executable sent from remote host
=============
File Reference
FR=20080501-1
Search Term
ST=17:54.399343
=====tcpdump entry
TP=02:17:54.399343 IP 90.189.210.154.1596 > 130.107.176.98.1033: Flags [P.],
seq 1196786334:1196786846, ack 3738074074, win 64800, length 512
=====Alert entry
AE=05/01-00:17:54.399343 [**] [1:2001683:3] E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Malware
Windows executable sent from remote host [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP}
90.189.210.154:1596 -> 130.107
.176.98:1033
=====Actual Alert
AA= BLEEDING-EDGE Malware Windows executable sent from remote host
=============
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Appendix W: Listing of Features selected from SRI data
Fields used for the feature selection analysis in WEKA.

Field
Num

Name

1

Description

Values

Date

Date of data in yyyymmdd

20080501 … 20080510

2

Index

Reference of data file

Numeric

3

Timemms

Time of day of incident in microseconds

Numeric

4

frPort

From port number

Numeric

5

toPort

To port number

Numeric

6

Flags

TCP flags in packet

NA, ACK, flags, PUSH&ACK

7

seqRange

Range of pack numbers

Numeric

8

ack

Byte count in exchange

Numeric

9

win

Bytes count of window size

Numeric

10

pktLength

Byte count of data sent

Numeric

11

SWR

Additional info with length

NA, RRQ, SMB, WARNING

12

SWRn

Indicator if RRQ, SMB, or Warning present

0, 1

13

Smb

Server Message Block message

NA, SMB-over-TCP

14

Rrq

Read Request message

NA, svchost.exe

15

Warn

Warning of packet continuation

NA, Packet continued

16

Nop

Count of NOP in options

Numeric

17

Val

Sender timestamp info

Numeric

18

Ecr

Echo reply timestamp info

Numeric

19

Enum

Alert E indicator

E2, E3

20

Priority

Priority of alert

Numeric

21

Service

Type of protocol used

TCP, UDP

22

aMesg

Alert message indicator

BE1, BE2, BE3, BH1, BH2, BH4,
ET1, NB, SH, TFTP
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The first three fields are used as references for trace back to the initial data file.
Fields 13, 14, and 15 have a value taken from the tcpdump line for the incident. An NA
or other value are acceptable for this field as identified in the above table.
Below is an expanded description of the fields:
1. The date is that designated by the SRI web site which contains the data.
2. Index is a number generated to keep better management of the different files for each
day. All the files with the same index are from the same incident. The main files for
each incident are the tcpdump file, the alert file, virus-labels, rules, and the
associations file.
3. Timemms is the time of day in microseconds. The time taken from the tcpdump files
for the incident which matches the search term.
4. The frPort field is port number contained in the source IP field in the tcpdump file.
5. The toPort field is port number contained in the destination IP field in the tcpdump
file.
6. Flags are the TCP flags in many of the tcpdump entries. In the data used for the
analysis, the following flags were used: 1) ACK 2) PUSH&ACK.
7. The seqRange feature uses the difference of the values in the seq parameter from the
tcpdump output.
8. The ack is the number of bytes in the exchange.
9. The win is the widow size in bytes.
10. The pktLength is the number of bytes in the packet.
11. SWR is a feature which indicates which, if any, additional information is appended to
the packet length parameter. The possibilities are “RRQ”, “SMB”, or “WARNING”.
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12. The SWRn feature indicates if a “RRQ”, “SMB”, or “WARNING” was present.
13. The Smb is the type of Server Message Block test presented. For the data used, it is
only “SMB-over-TCP”.
14. The Rrq is the Read Request message. For the data used, it is only “svchost.exe”.
15. The Warn id the “Warning of packet continuation”. For the data used, it is only
“Packet continued”.
16. The Nop is in the options field in the tcpdump output. This parameter contains a
count of the number of “nop” entries there are between the brackets in the options
field.
17. The Val value is a time stamp in the options field. The parameter “TS val” between
the brackets is a timestamp from the sender.
18. The Ecr value is a time stamp in the options field. The parameter “ecr” between the
brackets is an echo reply timestamp from the sender.
19. The Enum feature comes from the rules files which is a BotHunter message. This
E number is associated with the infection type. For the data used, the values are “E2”,
or “E3”.
20. The Priority feature is a numeric value in the alerts file .
21. The Service feature is the type of protocol in the tcpdump file. For the data used, the
values are “TCP”, or “UDP”.
22. The aMesg feature is a shortened version of the Alert message indicator from the
alerts file. For the data used, the values are “BE1”, “BE2”, “BE3”, “BH1”, “BH2”,
“BH4”, “ET1”, “NB”, “SH”, or “TFTP”. The table following this list shows the
expanded description of each value.
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aMesg

Enum

Description

Count

BE1

E2

BLEEDING-EDGE EXPLOIT MS04-007 Kill-Bill ASN1 exploit
attempt

BE2

E3

BLEEDING-EDGE Malware Windows executable sent from remote
host, Win32

BE3

E3

BLEEDING-EDGE VIRUS Sasser Transfer _up.exe

BH1

E3

BotHunter HTTP-based .exe Upload on backdoor port

BH2

E3

BotHunter MALWARE executable upload

BH4

E3

BotHunter Scrip-based Windows egg download .exe
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ET1

E3

ET POLICY PE EXE Install Windows file download

150

NB

E2

NETBIOS SMB-DS Session Setup NTMLSSP unicode asn1 overflow
attempt

22

SH

E2

SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP

12

TFTP

E3

TFTP GET .exe from external source
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4
2128
35
353
1356
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Appendix X: Partial Listing of SRI.arff file
@relation "SRI data"
@attribute date {20080501,20080502,20080503,20080504,20080505,20080506,20080507
,20080508,20080509,20080510}
@attribute index NUMERIC
@attribute timemms NUMERIC
@attribute frPort NUMERIC
@attribute toPort NUMERIC
@attribute flags {NA,ACK,flags,PUSH&ACK}
@attribute seqRange NUMERIC
@attribute ack NUMERIC
@attribute win NUMERIC
@attribute pktLength NUMERIC
@attribute SWB {NA,RRQ,SMB,WARNING}
@attribute SWBn {0,1}
@attribute smb {NA,SMB-over-TCP}
@attribute rrq {svchost.exe,NA}
@attribute warn {NA,Packet_continued}
@attribute nop NUMERIC
@attribute val NUMERIC
@attribute ecr NUMERIC
@attribute enum {E2,E3}
@attribute priority NUMERIC
@attribute service {TCP,UDP}
@attribute Mesg {BE1,BE2,BE3,BH1,BH2,BH4,ET1,NB,SH,TFTP}
@data
%date,index,timemms,frPort,toPort,flags,seqRange,ack,win,pktLength,SWR,SWRn,smb
,rrq,warn,nop,val,ecr,enum,priority,service,aMesg
20080501,1,8271525715,4619,445,ACK,1440,3737182244,64711,1440,SMB,1,SMB-overTCP,NA,NA,0,0,0,E3,3,TCP,BH2
20080501,1,8274399343,1596,1033,PUSH&ACK,512,3738074074,64800,512,NA,0,NA,NA,NA
,0,0,0,E3,0,TCP,BE2
20080501,1,8274399343,1596,1033,PUSH&ACK,512,3738074074,64800,512,NA,0,NA,NA,NA
,0,0,0,E3,0,TCP,BE2
20080501,1,8297720956,1038,80,PUSH&ACK,45,3632878526,17520,45,NA,0,NA,NA,NA,0,0
,0,E3,3,TCP,BH1
20080501,1,8297722080,1039,80,PUSH&ACK,47,851293562,17520,47,NA,0,NA,NA,NA,0,0,
0,E3,3,TCP,BH1
20080501,1,8297723954,1040,80,PUSH&ACK,44,311488835,17520,44,NA,0,NA,NA,NA,0,0,
0,E3,3,TCP,BH1
20080501,2,8762681249,48983,445,ACK,1452,1619850869,64217,1452,SMB,1,SMB-overTCP,NA,NA,0,0,0,E3,3,TCP,BH2
20080501,2,8765115020,49214,1028,ACK,1452,1620640693,64240,1452,NA,0,NA,NA,NA,0
,0,0,E3,3,TCP,ET1
20080501,3,8991897517,1630,445,ACK,1460,26535918,64151,1460,SMB,1,SMB-overTCP,NA,NA,0,0,0,E3,3,TCP,BH2
20080501,3,8994461706,1705,1033,ACK,1460,27935892,64240,1460,NA,0,NA,NA,NA,0,0,
0,E3,3,TCP,ET1
20080501,4,9206779357,4004,445,ACK,1440,488988015,65446,1440,SMB,1,SMB-overTCP,NA,NA,0,0,0,E3,3,TCP,BH2
20080501,4,9209229243,4010,1033,ACK,1440,489801999,65535,1440,NA,0,NA,NA,NA,0,0
,0,E3,3,TCP,ET1
20080501,5,9610941864,3786,445,ACK,1448,64185918,64052,1448,SMB,1,SMB-overTCP,NA,NA,2,831416,2662,E3,3,TCP,BH2
20080501,5,9612600730,3820,1033,ACK,1448,64785892,64064,1448,NA,0,NA,NA,NA,2,83
1433,0,E3,3,TCP,ET1
20080501,6,9689209897,3750,445,ACK,1460,3862234534,17431,1460,SMB,1,SMB-overTCP,NA,NA,0,0,0,E3,3,TCP,BH2
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Appendix Y Listing of Java files to read and parse SRI data
This appendix contains the listings of five Java classes use to parse the SRI data and
fomat it for usin in WEKA. The order of the listings are:






util1.java
util2.java
util3.java
util4.java
dv.java

===================
util1.java
import java.io.*;
/*
* This class is supports the retrieval of the raw SRI
* malware data from multiple files. The output writes
* the data into an intermediate file that is read by
* other applications.
*
* Author: Frank Acker, December 2014
*/
public class util1 {
util2 u2 = new util2();
util3 u3 = new util3();
public void po () {
System.out.println("FR="+dv.FRinfo);
System.out.println("ST="+dv.STinfo);
System.out.println("TP="+dv.TPinfo);
System.out.println("AE="+dv.AEinfo);
System.out.println("AA="+dv.AAinfo);
}
public void nullInfo() {
dv.FRinfo
= dv.NULL;
dv.STinfo
= dv.NULL;
dv.TPinfo
= dv.NULL;
dv.AEinfo
= dv.NULL;
dv.AAinfo
= dv.NULL;
dv.frIP
= "0";
dv.frPort
= "0";
dv.toIP
= "0";
dv.toPort
= "0";
dv.Flags
= "0";
dv.seqRange
= 0;
dv.ackThere
= 0;
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dv.ackValue
dv.winThere
dv.winValue
dv.pktLength
dv.smbType
dv.rrqType
dv.smbFound
dv.warnType
dv.warnFound
dv.flagsNum
dv.seqNum
dv.winNum
dv.lengthNum
dv.ackNum
dv.optType
dv.optNum
dv.rrqNum
dv.nopCount
dv.valNum
dv.ecrNum
dv.valValue
dv.ecrValue
dv.attackType

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

// From AE line
dv.aeEnum
=
dv.aeAMsg
=
dv.aeAMsgDesig =
dv.aePriority =
dv.aeService
=

0;
0;
0;
0;
dv.NA;
dv.NA;
false;
dv.NA;
false;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
dv.NA;
0;
0;
0;
-99;
-99;
0;
0;
dv.NULL;
dv.NULL;
dv.NULL;
dv.NULL;
0;
//
dv.NULL;

// E3
// Alert message
// Alert message designator
Alert Priority
// Alert network service used

}
//static String[] stuff = new String[256];
public long timecalcmms(String stuff) {
if (stuff.length() == 0) return 0;
String [] ts = stuff.split(":");
long hr = 0, min = 0;
try {
hr = Long.parseLong(ts[0]) * 3600 * 1000000;
}catch(NumberFormatException ex){
System.out.println("OOPS in timecalamms-hr
string="+stuff+"=");
System.out.println("OOPS in timecalamms-hr
ts[0]="+ts[0]+"=");
}
try {
min = Long.parseLong(ts[1]) * 60 * 1000000;
//}catch(NumberFormatException ex){
}catch(ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException ex){
System.out.println("OOPS in timecalamms-min
string="+stuff+"=");
System.out.println("OOPS in timecalamms-min
ts[1]="+ts[1]+"=");
}
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Double sec = 0.0;
try {
sec = Double.parseDouble(ts[2]) *1000000.0;
//}catch(NumberFormatException ex){
}catch(ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException ex){
System.out.println("OOPS");
System.out.println("OOPS in timecalamms-sec
string="+stuff+"=");
System.out.println("OOPS in timecalamms-sec
ts[2]="+ts[2]+"=");
}
Long mmsec = hr + min + sec.longValue();
return mmsec;
}
public void getFlags(String [] TPvar) {
String s;
String flagInfo = TPvar[dv.flagsNum+1];
if (dv.flagsNum > 0) {
String [] FlagSym = {".", "F","F.","FP","P","P.","R",
"R.","S","S."};
String [] FlagDesc = {"ACK", "Finish","Finish&ACK",
"FIN&Pish","PUSH","PUSH&ACK","RST","RST&ACK",
"SYN","SYN&ACK"};
flagInfo = flagInfo.replace("[","");
flagInfo = flagInfo.replace("]","");
flagInfo = flagInfo.replace(",","");
int i;
for (i=0; i<FlagSym.length; i++) {
if (flagInfo.equals(FlagSym[i])) {
dv.Flags = FlagDesc[i];
break;
}
}
}
// Seq
if (dv.seqNum > 0 )
dv.seqRange = getSeqRange(TPvar[dv.seqNum+1]);
// ack
if (dv.ackNum > 0) {
dv.ackThere = 1;
s = TPvar[dv.ackNum+1].replace(",","");
dv.ackValue = Long.parseLong(s);
}
// win
if (dv.winNum > 0) {
dv.winThere = 1;
s = TPvar[dv.winNum+1].replace(",","");
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dv.winValue = Integer.parseInt(s);
}
// options
if (dv.optNum >0)
u3.optManage(TPvar);
// length
if (dv.lengthNum > 0) {
s = TPvar[dv.lengthNum+1].replace(",","");
s = s.replace(":","");
// check if alphas are butted up to length
boolean ok = true;
if (s.contains(dv.aSMB) && ok) {
u3.lenSplit(s, TPvar, dv.aSMB);
ok = false;
}
if (s.contains(dv.aRRQ) && ok) {
u3.lenSplit(s, TPvar, dv.aRRQ);
ok = false;
}
if (s.contains(dv.aWARN) && ok) {
u3.lenSplit(s, TPvar, dv.aWARN);
ok = false;
}
if (ok)
dv.pktLength = Integer.parseInt(s);
}
}
public Long getSeqRange(String data) {
data = data.replace(",","");
String [] numz = data.split(":");
if (numz.length >1) {
long num1 = Long.parseLong(numz[0]);
long num2 = Long.parseLong(numz[1]);
return (long) (num2-num1);
}
return (long)0;
}
public Boolean allInfo() {
if (dv.FRinfo.equals(dv.NULL)
dv.STinfo.equals(dv.NULL)
dv.TPinfo.equals(dv.NULL)
dv.AEinfo.equals(dv.NULL)
dv.AAinfo.equals(dv.NULL)
return false;
}
return true;
}
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||
||
||
||
) {

// method to sort input string to proper variables
public void inSort (String input) {
String c2 = "";
if (input.length() > 2) {
c2 = input.substring(0,2);
}
if (c2.equals(dv.FR)) { // File Reference
dv.FRinfo = input;
}
if (c2.equals(dv.ST)) { // Search Term
dv.STinfo = input;
}
if (c2.equals(dv.TP)) { // TCP Dump
dv.TPinfo = input;
}
if (c2.equals(dv.AE)) { // Alert Entry
dv.AEinfo = input;
}
if (c2.equals(dv.AA)) { // Actual Alert
dv.AAinfo = input;
}
}
}

==================
util2.java
import java.io.*;
/*
* This class is supports the retrieval of the raw SRI
* malware data from multiple files. The output writes
* the data into an intermediate file that is read by
* other applications.
*
* Author: Frank Acker, December 2014
*/
public class util2 {
util3 u3 = new util3();
util4 u4 = new util4();
boolean header = true;
public void pdvFlags() {
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System.out.println("dv.flagsNum="+dv.flagsNum);
System.out.println("dv.seqNum="+dv.seqNum);
System.out.println("dv.winNum="+dv.winNum);
System.out.println("dv.lengthNum="+dv.lengthNum);
System.out.println("dv.ackNum="+dv.ackNum);
System.out.println("dv.optNum="+dv.optNum);
System.out.println("dv.valNum="+dv.valNum);
System.out.println("dv.ecrNum="+dv.ecrNum);
System.out.println("dv.rrqNum="+dv.rrqNum);
}
public void setTPNums(String[] TPvar) {
String t[] = dv.TPinfo.split("=");
//String[] TPvar = t[1].split(" ");
int j;
for (j=0; j<TPvar.length; j++) {
System.out.println(j + " " + TPvar[j]);
if (TPvar[j].equals(dv.aFlags)) dv.flagsNum
if (TPvar[j].equals(dv.aSeq))
dv.seqNum
if (TPvar[j].equals(dv.aWin))
dv.winNum
if (TPvar[j].equals(dv.aLength)) dv.lengthNum
if (TPvar[j].equals(dv.aAck))
dv.ackNum
if (TPvar[j].contains(dv.aOpt))
dv.optNum
if (TPvar[j].contains(dv.aVal)) {
dv.valNum
= j;
dv.valValue = u3.justNums(TPvar[dv.valNum
}
if (TPvar[j].contains(dv.aEcr)) {
dv.ecrNum
= j;
dv.ecrValue = u3.justNums(TPvar[dv.ecrNum
}
if (TPvar[j].contains(dv.aRRQ)) {
dv.rrqNum = j;
dv.rrqType = TPvar[j+1].replace("\"","");
}
}
}

=
=
=
=
=

j;
j;
j;
j;
j;
= j;

+ 1]);

+ 1]);

public void getIPnPort(String [] TPvar) {
String ipInfo[] = TPvar[2].split("\\.");
// get the port numbers
String s=ipInfo[0];
s=s.concat(".");s=s.concat(ipInfo[1]);s=s.concat(".");
s=s.concat(ipInfo[2]);s=s.concat(".");s=s.concat(ipInfo[3]);
dv.frIP=s;
dv.frPort = ipInfo[4];
ipInfo = TPvar[4].split("\\.");
s=ipInfo[0];
s=s.concat(".");s=s.concat(ipInfo[2]);s=s.concat(".");
s=s.concat(ipInfo[1]);s=s.concat(".");s=s.concat(ipInfo[3]);
dv.toIP=s;
dv.toPort = ipInfo[4].replace(":","");
}
public void prtOutVars() {
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// From TCP Dump line
System.out.println("+++OUTPUT VALUES+++");
System.out.println("frIP="+dv.frIP);
System.out.println("frPort="+dv.frPort);
System.out.println("toIP="+dv.toIP);
System.out.println("toPort="+dv.toPort);
System.out.println("Flags="+dv.Flags);
System.out.println("seqRange="+dv.seqRange);
System.out.println("ackThere="+dv.ackThere);
System.out.println("ackValue="+dv.ackValue);
System.out.println("winThere="+dv.winThere);
System.out.println("winValue="+dv.winValue);
System.out.println("pktLength="+dv.pktLength);
System.out.println("smbType="+dv.smbType);
System.out.println("rrqType="+dv.rrqType);
System.out.println("warnType="+dv.warnType);
System.out.println("optType="+dv.optType);
System.out.println("nopCount="+dv.nopCount);
System.out.println("valValue="+dv.valValue);
System.out.println("ecrValue="+dv.ecrValue);
System.out.println("aeEnum="+dv.aeEnum);
System.out.println("aeAMsg="+dv.aeAMsg);
System.out.println("aeAMsgDesig="+dv.aeAMsgDesig);
System.out.println("aePriority="+dv.aePriority);
System.out.println("aeService"+dv.aeService);
if (dv.header) u4.csvHeader();
u4.csvOut();
}
}

===================
util3.java
import java.io.*;
/*
* This class is supports the retrieval of the raw SRI
* malware data from multiple files. The output writes
* the data into an intermediate file that is read by
* other applications.
*
* Author: Frank Acker, December 2014
*/
public class util3 {
public void lenSplit(String s, String [] TPvar, String type) {
String stLength = dv.NULL;
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String msg
= dv.NULL;
int i;
for (i=1; i<=s.length(); i++) {
String c = s.substring(i-1,i);
if (dv.nums.contains(c)) {
stLength += c;
} else {
break;
}
}
int ii;
for (ii= i; ii<= s.length(); ii++) {
String c = s.substring(ii-1,ii);
msg += c;
}
s = stLength;
dv.pktLength = Integer.parseInt(s);
for (i=dv.lengthNum+2; i<TPvar.length; i++) {
msg += " ";
msg += TPvar[i];
}
System.out.println("type="+type+"
msg="+msg);
if (type.contains(dv.aSMB)) dv.smbType = "SMB-over-TCP";
if (type.contains(dv.aWARN)) dv.warnType = "Packet_continued";
if (type.contains(dv.aRRQ)) dv.rrqType = msg;
}
public void optManage(String [] TPvar) {
dv.optType = dv.NULL;
int i;
for (i=dv.optNum+1; i<dv.lengthNum; i++) {
dv.optType += TPvar[i];
dv.optType += " ";
}
dv.optType = dv.optType.replace("[","");
dv.optType = dv.optType.replace("]","");
String [] optTemp = dv.optType.split(",");
//System.out.println("Looking for NOP");
for (i=0; i<optTemp.length; i++) {
if (optTemp[i].contains(dv.aNop)) dv.nopCount++;
}
}
public int justNums (String s) {
int i, n;
String snum = dv.NULL;
for (i=1; i<=s.length(); i++) {
String c = s.substring(i-1,i);
if (dv.nums.contains(c)) {
snum += c;
} else {
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break;
}
}
return(Integer.parseInt(snum));
}
}

===================
util4.java
import java.io.*;
/*
* This class is supports the retrieval of the raw SRI
* malware data from multiple files and reads
* the data from the intermediate file and formats it for
* use in WEKA.
*
* Author: Frank Acker, December 2014
*/
public class util4 {
public void csvHeader() {
System.out.print("csvHead=");
System.out.print("frPort");
System.out.print(","+"toPort");
System.out.print(","+"flags");
System.out.print(","+"seqRange");
System.out.print(","+"ack");
System.out.print(","+"win");
System.out.print(","+"pktLength");
System.out.print(","+"smb");
System.out.print(","+"rrq");
System.out.print(","+"warn");
System.out.print(","+"nop");
System.out.print(","+"val");
System.out.print(","+"ecr");
System.out.print(","+"enum");
System.out.print(","+"aMesg");
System.out.print(","+"priority");
System.out.print(","+"service");
System.out.println();
dv.header = false;
}
public void csvOut() {
System.out.print("csvOut=");
System.out.print(dv.frPort);
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System.out.print(","+dv.toPort);
System.out.print(","+dv.Flags);
System.out.print(","+dv.seqRange);
System.out.print(","+dv.ackValue);
System.out.print(","+dv.winValue);
System.out.print(","+dv.pktLength);
System.out.print(","+dv.smbType);
System.out.print(","+dv.rrqType);
System.out.print(","+dv.warnType);
System.out.print(","+dv.nopCount);
System.out.print(","+dv.valValue);
System.out.print(","+dv.ecrValue);
System.out.print(","+dv.aeEnum);
System.out.print(","+dv.aeAMsgDesig);
System.out.print(","+dv.aePriority);
System.out.print(","+dv.aeService);
System.out.println();
}
public void aeParse(String aeLine) {
int i, e;
// find the " E" char string
e = aeLine.indexOf(" E");
// get the E and number after it
dv.aeEnum = "E";
dv.aeEnum += aeLine.charAt(e+2);
dv.aeAMsg = dv.NULL;
// move ahead 8 spaces. the next should be the
// beginning of the Alert message
e +=8;
char c;
while ((c = aeLine.charAt(e++)) != '[') {
dv.aeAMsg += c;
}
// get the attack designator
int msgLen2 = dv.aeAMsg.length()/2;
String msg2 = dv.aeAMsg.substring(msgLen2/2,msgLen2);
for (i=0; i<dv.attacks.length; i++) {
//if (dv.aeAMsg.contains(dv.attacks[i])) {
if (dv.attacks[i].contains(msg2)) {
dv.aeAMsgDesig = dv.attackDesig[i];
break;
}
}
// get the Priority
e = aeLine.indexOf("Priority");
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c = aeLine.charAt(e + 10);
dv.aePriority = Character.getNumericValue(c);
// get the service type
e = aeLine.indexOf("{") + 1;
while ((c = aeLine.charAt(e++)) != '}') {
dv.aeService += c;
}
}
}

===================
dv.java
import java.io.*;
/* This class contains the variables used by the different
* methods in this set of java programs
*
* Author: Frank Acker, December 2014
*/
public class dv {
static String NULL = "";
static String NA = "NA";
static String EQ = "="; // Equals sign
// Triggers from
static String FR
static String ST
static String TP
static String AE
static String AA

bf files
= "FR"; //
= "ST"; //
= "TP"; //
= "AE"; //
= "AA"; //

File Reference
Search Term
Tcpdump entry
Alert entry
Actual Alert

// Contents of complete lines
static String FRinfo = NULL; //
static String STinfo = NULL; //
static String TPinfo = NULL; //
static String AEinfo = NULL; //
static String AAinfo = NULL; //

File Reference info
Search Term info
Tcpdump entry info
Alert entry info
Actual Alert info

// Search terms in lines
static String aFlags = "Flags";
static String aSeq
= "seq";
static String aWin
= "win";
static String aLength = "length";
static String aAck
= "ack";
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static
static
static
static
static
static
static

String
String
String
String
String
String
String

aSMB
aWARN
aRRQ
aOpt
aNop
aEcr
aVal

// Position markers
static int flagsNum
static int seqNum
static int winNum
static int lengthNum
static int ackNum
static int optNum
static int rrqNum
static int valNum
static int ecrNum

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

"SMB";
"WARNING";
"RRQ";
"options";
"nop";
"ecr";
"val";

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
-99;
-99;

// Variables used in the
// From TCP Dump line
static String frIP
=
static String frPort
=
static String toIP
=
static String toPort
=
static String Flags
=
static long seqRange
=
static int ackThere
=
static long ackValue
=
static int winThere
=
static int winValue
=
static int pktLength
=
static String smbType =
static String rrqType =
static String warnType =
static String optType =
static int nopCount
=
static int valValue
=
static int ecrValue
=
static String attackType

output file
"0";
"0";
"0";
"0";
"0";
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
NA;
NA;
NA;
NA;
0;
0;
0;
= NULL;

// From AE line
static String aeEnum
static String aeAMsg
static String aeAMsgDesig
static int
aePriority
static String aeService

=
=
=
=
=

NULL;
NULL;
NULL;
0;
NULL;

// Other variables for use
static boolean smbFound = false;
static boolean warnFound = false;
static String nums = "0123456789";
static boolean header = true;

//
//
//
//
//
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E3
Alert
Alert
Alert
Alert

message
message designator
Priority
network service used

static String [] attacks = {
"BLEEDING-EDGE EXPLOIT MS04-007 Kill-Bill ASN1 exploit attempt
",
"BLEEDING-EDGE Malware Windows executable sent from remote
host, Win32",
"BLEEDING-EDGE VIRUS Sasser Transfer _up.exe ",
"BotHunter HTTP-based .exe Upload on backdoor port",
"BotHunter MALWARE executable upload",
"BotHunter Malware Windows executable (PE) sent from remote
host",
"BotHunter Scrip-based Windows egg download .exe",
"ET POLICY PE EXE Install Windows file download",
"ET WORM Sasser Transfer _up.exe ",
"NETBIOS SMB-DS Session Setup NTMLSSP unicode asn1 overflow
attempt ",
"SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP",
"TFTP GET .exe from external source"};
static String [] attackDesig = {"BE1","BE2","BE3","BH1","BH2",
"BH3","BH4","ET1","ET2","NB","SH","TFTP"};
}
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Appendix Z – Results of Analysis using SRI Malware data
ENTROPY
Approximate

PARAMS

CC

#FS

m=1;r=0.01
m=1;r=0.1
m=1;r=0.2
m=1;r=0.3
m=1;r=0.4
m=1;r=0.5
m=1;r=0.6
m=1;r=0.7
m=1;r=0.8
m=1;r=0.9
m=1;r=0.99

99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

m=2;r=0.01
m=2;r=0.1
m=2;r=0.2
m=2;r=0.3
m=2;r=0.4
m=2;r=0.5
m=2;r=0.6
m=2;r=0.7
m=2;r=0.8
m=2;r=0.9
m=2;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

m=3;r=0.01
m=3;r=0.1
m=3;r=0.2
m=3;r=0.3
m=3;r=0.4
m=3;r=0.5
m=3;r=0.6
m=3;r=0.7
m=3;r=0.8
m=3;r=0.9
m=3;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

m=4;r=0.01
m=4;r=0.1
m=4;r=0.2
m=4;r=0.3
m=4;r=0.4
m=4;r=0.5
m=4;r=0.6
m=4;r=0.7
m=4;r=0.8
m=4;r=0.9
m=4;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.0821
99.0821
99.0821

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
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ENTROPY
Approximate

PARAMS

CC

#FS

m=5;r=0.01
m=5;r=0.1
m=5;r=0.2
m=5;r=0.3
m=5;r=0.4
m=5;r=0.5
m=5;r=0.6
m=5;r=0.7
m=5;r=0.8
m=5;r=0.9
m=5;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

m=6;r=0.01
m=6;r=0.1
m=6;r=0.2
m=6;r=0.3
m=6;r=0.4
m=6;r=0.5
m=6;r=0.6
m=6;r=0.7
m=6;r=0.8
m=6;r=0.9
m=6;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

m=7;r=0.01
m=7;r=0.1
m=7;r=0.2
m=7;r=0.3
m=7;r=0.4
m=7;r=0.5
m=7;r=0.6
m=7;r=0.7
m=7;r=0.8
m=7;r=0.9
m=7;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

m=8;r=0.01
m=8;r=0.1
m=8;r=0.2
m=8;r=0.3
m=8;r=0.4
m=8;r=0.5
m=8;r=0.6
m=8;r=0.7
m=8;r=0.8
m=8;r=0.9
m=8;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

m=9;r=0.01
m=9;r=0.1
m=9;r=0.2
m=9;r=0.3
m=9;r=0.4
m=9;r=0.5
m=9;r=0.6
m=9;r=0.7
m=9;r=0.8
m=9;r=0.9
m=9;r=0.99

99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051
99.1051

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

161

ENTROPY
Sample

PARAMS

CC

#FS

m=1;r=0.01
m=1;r=0.1
m=1;r=0.2
m=1;r=0.3
m=1;r=0.4
m=1;r=0.5
m=1;r=0.6
m=1;r=0.7
m=1;r=0.8
m=1;r=0.9
m=1;r=0.99

95.732
95.8926
99.2428
98.6232
97.2006
97.7283
96.5351
96.8105
96.6269
96.4892
96.581

7
8
6
10
9
9
9
10
10
9
9

m=2;r=0.01
m=2;r=0.1
m=2;r=0.2
m=2;r=0.3
m=2;r=0.4
m=2;r=0.5
m=2;r=0.6
m=2;r=0.7
m=2;r=0.8
m=2;r=0.9
m=2;r=0.99

93.9881
93.9192
95.2501
96.2827
95.8697
95.8697
95.8008
95.8467
95.6631
95.9615
95.2731

11
11
10
9
8
9
10
13
9
9
10

m=3;r=0.01
m=3;r=0.1
m=3;r=0.2
m=3;r=0.3
m=3;r=0.4
m=3;r=0.5
m=3;r=0.6
m=3;r=0.7
m=3;r=0.8
m=3;r=0.9
m=3;r=0.99

93.7357
93.7357
93.7357
93.4144
93.8045
93.6668
93.3685
93.4374
93.4144
94.0799
93.0932

10
10
10
10
10
11
11
11
10
10
10

m=4;r=0.01
m=4;r=0.1
m=4;r=0.2
m=4;r=0.3
m=4;r=0.4
m=4;r=0.5
m=4;r=0.6
m=4;r=0.7
m=4;r=0.8
m=4;r=0.9
m=4;r=0.99

93.0014
93.0014
93.0014
93.0014
93.0014
93.0014
93.0014
93.7816
93.7816
93.7816
94.1028

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
11
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ENTROPY
Sample

PARAMS

CC

#FS

m=5;r=0.01
m=5;r=0.1
m=5;r=0.2
m=5;r=0.3
m=5;r=0.4
m=5;r=0.5
m=5;r=0.6
m=5;r=0.7
m=5;r=0.8
m=5;r=0.9
m=5;r=0.99

92.9555
92.9555
92.9555
92.9555
92.726
92.726
93.0702
93.0702
93.3915
93.6668
93.598

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

m=6;r=0.01
m=6;r=0.1
m=6;r=0.2
m=6;r=0.3
m=6;r=0.4
m=6;r=0.5
m=6;r=0.6
m=6;r=0.8
m=6;r=0.9
m=6;r=0.99

92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
93.0014
93.0014
93.0702

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

m=7;r=0.01
m=7;r=0.1
m=7;r=0.2
m=7;r=0.3
m=7;r=0.4
m=7;r=0.5
m=7;r=0.6
m=7;r=0.7
m=7;r=0.8
m=7;r=0.9
m=7;r=0.99

92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.0606
91.877
92.6801
92.5425
92.5425
92.5425

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

m=8;r=0.01
m=8;r=0.1
m=8;r=0.2
m=8;r=0.3
m=8;r=0.4
m=8;r=0.5
m=8;r=0.6
m=8;r=0.7
m=8;r=0.8
m=8;r=0.9
m=8;r=0.99

92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

m=9;r=0.01
m=9;r=0.1
m=9;r=0.2
m=9;r=0.3
m=9;r=0.4
m=9;r=0.5
m=9;r=0.6
m=9;r=0.7
m=9;r=0.8
m=9;r=0.9
m=9;r=0.99

92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983
92.1983

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
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ENTROPY
Shannon

PARAMS

CC
99.8853

#FS
8

ENTROPY
Tsallis

PARAMS

CC

#FS

alpha = 1.01
alpha = 1.1
alpha = 1.2
alpha = 1.3
alpha = 1.4
alpha = 1.5
alpha = 1.6
alpha = 1.7
alpha = 1.8
alpha = 1.9
alpha = 1.99

99.9082
99.9082
99.7476
99.7935
99.8853
99.9082
99.8853
99.9082
99.9312
99.9312
99.8623

7
8
10
10
10
7
10
8
8
6
7

PARAMS

CC

#FS

alpha = 0.01
alpha = 0.1
alpha = 0.2
alpha = 0.3
alpha = 0.4
alpha = 0.5
alpha = 0.6
alpha = 0.7
alpha = 0.8
alpha = 0.9
alpha = 0.99

90.8903
90.9133
92.3818
91.7164
91.3722
90.3167
89.7201
88.9399
88.894
87.4484
73.4511

7
7
7
7
9
6
6
9
6
7
7

ENTROPY
Rényi
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